Policy options to respond to rapid climate change by Swart, R.J. et al.
 
 
 
Policy options to respond to rapid 
climate change  
 
2 Alterra-Policy_implications_of_extreme_climate_change_scenarios[2].doc  
 
Commissioned by PBL 
Policy options to respond to rapid climate change  
 
 
 
R. Swart1  
N. Marinova1 
S. Bakker2  
X. van Tilburg2 
 
with input from  
 
T. van der Werff3 
D. van Vuuren3 
E. Stehfest3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______ 
1 Alterra 
2 ECN 
3  PBL
Alterra - Policy implications of extreme climate change scenarios  
 
Alterra, Wageningen, 2009 
4 Alterra-Policy_implications_of_extreme_climate_change_scenarios[2].doc  
ABSTRACT 
 
Swart, R., Marinova, N., Bakker S. and van Tilburg X., 2009. Policy options to respond to rapid climate 
change, Wageningen, Alterra, Alterra - Policy implications of extreme climate change scenarios.doc 
166 blz.; 8 figs.; 4 tables.; 57 refs.  
 
 
Ongoing research on climate change indicates that we cannot rule out the possibility of extreme 
climatic changes, beyond current IPCC scenarios.  The thinking about policy responses to address 
these risks is still in its infancy. This study explores the possibilities for responding to extreme 
climatic changes in an integrated, systematic fashion. It distinguishes four main categories of 
emergency response options: drastic emission reduction, carbon dioxide removal, solar radiation 
management and enhanced adaptation to unavoidable consequences. These options  may also 
become relevant  if natural or social systems would turn out to be more vulnerable than until 
recently assumed or if  current mitigation efforts would be unsuccessful. 
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(KNMI), Heleen De Coninck (ECN), Paul Crutzen (Max Planck Institute for 
Chemistry), Marius Enthoven (ex-VROM), Eric Ferguson (ex-TNO), Wouter 
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Summary 
Ongoing research on climate change indicates that we cannot rule out the possibility 
of extreme climatic changes, beyond current IPCC scenarios. The thinking about 
policy responses to address these risks is still in its infancy. This study explores the 
possibilities for responding to extreme climatic changes in an integrated, systematic 
fashion. It does not address the likelihood of such extreme changes. The vast 
majority of available or proposed technologies or practices to respond to an 
accelerating climate change can be classified in four categories: drastic emission 
reductions, carbon dioxide removal, solar radiation management, and emergency 
adaptation. These options  may also become relevant  if natural or social systems 
would turn out to be more vulnerable than until recently assumed or if  current 
mitigation efforts would be unsuccessful.. Drastic emission reduction options are 
well-known today, but involve controversial policies. As an additional measure, 
carbon dioxide can be removed from the atmosphere through natural and artificial 
methods. These methods vary in terms of effectiveness, energy and space demands, 
and environmental and societal risks. Solar radiation management options have a 
rapid effect once deployed, but research, development and international agreement 
about implementation may take some decades and involve potentially large risks. 
Emergency adaptation is the last resort and could include radical in addition to 
incremental options. Trade-offs exist between response options: if one option would 
not be successful, others with possibly other difficulties and risks may be required. 
Because of different time delays none of the emergency options can be fully effective 
within a few decades. Emergency climate policy could be developed in parallel to 
current climate policies and raises new governance questions and new ethical 
questions. To enhance their preparedness to extreme climate change, individual 
countries should consider broadening their portfolio of policy options. Much is yet 
unknown, and better understanding of the dynamics of tipping points and 
development of early warning systems and monitoring is needed, as well as research 
that further explores and expands the menu of emergency response options. 
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Samenvatting 
Uit wetenschappelijk onderzoek blijkt dat de mogelijkheid niet kan worden 
uitgesloten dat het klimaat sneller verandert dan voorheen gedacht. Het denken over 
beleidsopties om met deze mogelijkheid om te gaan staat nog in de kinderschoenen. 
Deze studie onderzoekt de verschillende mogelijkheden op een geïntegreerde 
systematische wijze. Het rapport gaat niet in op de waarschijnlijkheid van extreme 
klimaatverandering. De meeste opties kunnen in vier categorieën worden ingedeeld: 
drastische emissiereducties, verwijdering van koolstofdioxide uit de atmosfeer, 
beïnvloeding van de stralingsbalans van de atmosfeer, en noodaanpassing. 
Mogelijkheden om broeikasgasemissies drastisch te beperken zijn bekend, maar 
maatschappelijke weerstand en technologische uitdagingen zullen moeten worden 
overwonnen om effect te sorteren. Natuurlijke of kunstmatige methoden om 
koolstof uit de atmosfeer te halen verschillen in haalbaarheid en wat betreft de 
benodigde energie en ruimte. Opties om de stralingsbalans te beïnvloeden kunnen 
snel effect sorteren, maar ontwikkeling van en internationale overeenstemming over 
de veelal controversiële opties zouden enige decennia kunnen kosten. Het opvoeren 
van de adaptatieinspanningen, waarbij wellicht ook meer radicale opties moeten 
worden meegenomen, is een laatste toevlucht als de andere opties niet afdoende 
zouden blijken te zijn.  De noodmaatregelen kunnen ook relevant worden als 
ecologische en maatschappelijke systemen kwetsbaarder blijken dan tot voor kort 
verondersteld, of als het niet lukt de mondiale emissies voldoende en voldoende snel 
te beperken. Beleidsopties gericht op het omgaan met extreme klimaatverandering 
zou vooralsnog parallel aan de reguliere klimaatbeleidsontwikkeling kunnen worden 
onderzocht. Vaak roepen deze opties nieuwe ethische vragen op en vragen met 
betrekking tot de institutionele organisatie ervan. Individuele landen kunnen hun 
portfolio van mitigatie- en adaptatiemaatregelen geleidelijk uitbreiden om klaar te zijn 
voor een meer extreme klimaatverandering, mocht deze optreden.  Om de 
mogelijkheden van knikpunten in het klimaatsysteem beter te begrijpen en vroegtijdig 
te kunnen herkennen is meer gericht onderzoek en monitoring nodig. Ook is verder 
onderzoek nodig naar de mogelijkheden en risico’s van maatregelen die zouden 
kunnen worden ingezet bij een snelle klimaatverandering. 
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Background and context   
• Ongoing research on climate change indicates that we cannot rule out the possibility of extreme 
climatic changes, beyond current IPCC scenarios.  Such extreme changes, both faster and graver 
in consequence, would require drastic policy measures.  
• Four main categories of options are available to respond to extreme climate change and impacts: 
drastic emission reduction efforts, carbon dioxide removal (CDR), solar radiation management 
(SRM) and adaptation to the unavoidable consequences. These have hardly been explored in an 
integrated, systematic fashion yet. 
• It would make sense to start exploring such options in a second, parallel track of policy 
development, specifically geared at responding to extreme climate change. Doing so would avoid a 
situation in which uninformed decisions could prevail and policy responses could be inadequate or 
even harmful. 
• Emergency response options could also be appropriate if natural or social systems would turn out 
to be more vulnerable to climate change than until recently assumed, or if the currently debated 
mitigation policies would turn out to be ineffective. 
 
Background  
Up to recently, the main climate policy questions related to the reality of the climate 
problem, the impacts of climate change on humans and the natural environment, 
 the share of human activities in causing it, and possible initial responses. The IPCC has 
documented the increasingly convincing evidence of climatic change in a series of 
assessment reports. The IPCC has generally focused on what most scientists agreed 
about and on the remaining differences in views and scientific uncertainties. After the 
closing date for inclusion of new scientific information for the IPCC’s Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4) in 2006, several new publications hinted at the possibility that 
climate change and sea level rise may develop faster and to higher levels than was 
previously assessed in the AR4, while other publications suggested that the climate 
response might be weaker. For this report, we considered the consequences of the 
former possibility. If the climate would change less than projected by the IPCC, some 
may consider the mitigation efforts up to now to have been wasted, but others would 
stress these mitigation efforts benefit other areas, including energy safety, employment 
and environmental sustainability. Therefore, for this report, such a possibility has not 
been analysed. 
 
Why is it important to consider climate change beyond the ranges assessed by the IPCC? 
From global to local levels, currently both mitigation and adaptation policies which are 
being developed and implemented to address climate change, usually take the ranges of 
projected future changes in temperature, precipitation and sea level rise from the 
Working Group I report (IPCC, 2007a) as a starting point. The attention often focuses 
on the general picture of these ranges, or selected climate scenarios within them, not 
specifically on the outer ends of these ranges. 
 
There are many uncertainties with respect to temperature change, two key dimensions of 
which are reflected in the axes of Figure 1: the climate sensitivity1
                                                          
1
 Equilibrium climate sensitivity refers to the change in the global mean annual surface temperature 
following a doubling of the atmospheric equivalent carbon dioxide concentration.  
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 and factors determining radiative forcing2 (including natural and manmade emissions, 
and other forcing factors). If both the climate sensitivity and the factors determining 
radiative forcing turn out to be at the low end of the IPCC range or below it, there is no 
reason to change current policies when they also serve other purposes, otherwise policies 
might even be relaxed (‘best case scenario’, bottom left quadrant).  
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Climatic changes beyond the range covered by the IPCC (colored ellipse) demand different policies or revision 
of current policy 
  
If the climate sensitivity would end up being at the low end of the IPCC estimates or 
below (hence relatively low temperature changes), but the forcing at the high end or 
above (e.g.,  relatively high CO2 concentrations), there may be reasons to review and 
maybe adjust the menu of mitigation and adaptation options, for instance, strengthen 
policies aimed at reducing ocean acidification through decreasing carbon emissions (top 
left quadrant). In the opposite case, radiative forcing would be lower than projected, but 
climate sensitivity higher, and the mix of climate policies may be revised in favour of 
additional adaptation efforts (bottom right quadrant). For this report, the focus is on 
potential policy responses in the ‘worst case’ (top right quadrant), where both radiative 
forcing and climate sensitivity would turn out to be high. In this report, we considered 
scenarios at or beyond the boundaries of the IPCC AR4 projections as ‘extreme’ climate 
change. Where the rate of climate change associated with such extreme scenarios is 
important, we also used the term ‘accelerating’ or ‘rapid’ climate change. For this report, 
we  explicitly have not assessed the likelihood of such a situation. Because of the large 
uncertainties and the impossibility of assigning probabilities to extreme climate change 
scenarios, worst case policies cannot be meaningfully addressed by a quantified risk 
approach (e.g., Kattenberg and Verver, 2009). However, to give a rough idea, Schneider 
                                                          
2
 Radiative forcing is the change in the net, downward minus upward, irradiance (usually expressed in 
W/m2) at the tropopause due to a change in an external driver of climate change, such as, for example, a 
change in the concentration of carbon dioxide or the output of the sun. 
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(2009) noted that IPCC (2007a) estimated that it is likely (66-99% probability assessed by 
the authors) that global mean temperature in the highest (A1FI) scenario would be 
between 2.5 and 6.4 °C by 2100, or would have a chance of 5 to 17% that it would be 
above 6.4 °C. Schneider also noted that the number and intensity of abrupt events and 
the possibility of irreversible damages increases non-linearly with warming, and that a 5 
to 17% chance is well above the threshold, above which people usually take out 
insurance. In this context, it is also important to note that for a global mean temperature 
increase of 6.4 oC, temperature changes will actually be higher in many regions. The 
likelihood of the A1FI scenario cannot be assessed, but Schneider noted that since the 
A1FI scenario was published about ten years ago, global emissions have increased more 
or less in line with this scenario, which, of course, is no guarantee that they will continue 
to do so.  
 
In case the climate would change as in the top-right quadrant, the ‘worst case scenario’, 
the dynamics of the world’s response will be very different from the current orderly – 
albeit not yet very effective - negotiations of the UNFCCC. The danger that may have to 
be faced might not involve the climate, but a break-down of the international order 
(Ferguson, personal communication). As will be discussed later in this report, nations 
may move from negotiation and collaboration to the pursuance of narrow self-interest 
with all political and maybe even military means at their disposal. On the positive side, 
the financial and economic crisis that started in 2008 illustrates that in times of crisis very 
rapid political steps appear to be feasible that would have been inconceivable just a few 
months before. We hope that such a breakdown of the global system will never occur as 
a result of climate change, but the report addresses options that could be considered IF 
climate change would indeed accelerate. 
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Figure 2. Various events may be triggered by increasing global warming with different spatial and temporal 
scales (source Kattenberg and Verver, 2009)3 
                                                          
3
 WAIS = West Antarctic Ice Sheet; GIS = Greenland Ice Sheet; MOC = Meridional Overturning 
Circulation; ENSO = El Nino Southern Oscillation; ‘climate sensitivity wrong’ refers to the possibility, that 
the current estimates of this key factor (range between 2 to 4.5 oC) would turn out to be incorrect. 
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Kattenberg and Verver ( 2009) assessed which feedbacks and other factors in the 
climate-ocean-biosphere system could lead to such extreme, rapid climatic changes. They 
also assessed under which conditions such changes could take place, moving the world 
into the top right quadrant of Figure 1. They discussed various types of global and 
regional extreme climatic changes and tipping points that would lead to rapid and high 
sea level rise, temperature change, precipitation change, and possibly ecological diebacks. 
Different factors that would move the climate system into this quadrant have different 
spatial and temporal dimensions (see Figure 2). At present, knowledge is insufficient to 
determine in a quantitative fashion at which level of climate change particular tipping 
points may be passed, how they are interacting, and how serious or irreversible the 
results are. Aiming at stabilising climate change at the lowest possible levels would reduce 
the chance of thresholds being passed, and enhanced monitoring of indicators relevant 
for tipping points would increase our early warning capability.  
 
Risk approaches 
Does it make sense to account for the possibility of extreme and rapid climatic change in 
policy development, even if the uncertainties are very large? Because of the large 
potential impacts, the answer is yes. The risks of extreme, rapid climate change are real, 
even if they cannot be quantified, particularly because neither the probability nor the 
adaptive capacity of society can be meaningfully quantified. The resulting kind of 
uncertainty can be described as ‘recognised ignorance’: we know that climate change 
could accelerate, but we cannot predict how and when this might happen, nor how 
ecological and societal systems may respond. Figure 3 gives a subjective, qualitative 
assessment of likelihood and impacts, where the risk (a function of likelihood and 
potential impacts) increases from the bottom left to the top right of the graph.  
 
The figure gives some rough, subjective idea about which events may represent larger 
risks than others, but in considering the level of the risks and how to deal with them, it 
should be noted that there are large differences in perception of uncertainty and risk 
between different stakeholders, and even between different scientists. For example, the 
formulation of the findings of the IPCC Working Groups reflects the very different risk 
perspectives of the scientific communities involved (see Box 1). And even if there would 
be agreement within the scientific community about the evidence, there would still be 
disagreement between different actors on how to act, because of different risk 
perspectives (Dessai and Van der Sluijs, 2007). While risks cannot be quantified, the 
factors determining them can be addressed: the potential impacts can be reduced and the 
adaptive capacity can be enhanced. For example, when considering adaptation options 
with high investment needs, it may be wiser to increase resilience or adaptive capacity 
which may be cheaper, and hence avoid investments that eventually may be unnecessary. 
Another option is ‘anticipating design, for example, in the case of dykes, constructing a 
foundation that would also be adequate for larger dykes in the future, may those become 
necessary because of higher flood or sea levels (Dessai and Van der Sluijs, 2007). Such 
approaches are discussed more extensively further on in this report. 
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Text box 1: Different perspectives on risks, according to IPCC Working Groups 
 
IPCC WG I projects global sea level rise to be in the range of 0.18 to  0.59 metres, 
between 2090 and 2099, relative to 1999 levels (IPCC, 2007a). According to WG II, 
‘there is medium confidence that at least partial deglaciation of the Greenland ice sheet, 
and possibly the West Antarctic ice sheet, would occur over a period of time ranging 
from centuries to millennia for a global average temperature increase of 1 to 4 °C 
(relative to 1990–2000), causing a contribution to sea level rise of 4 to 6 metres or more’ 
(IPCC, 2007b). While these outcomes are consistent and based on the same data, the 
working groups convey very different messages (Webster, 2009). While WG I does 
discuss the option of larger and more rapid changes, for example, in the context of 
positive carbon cycle feedbacks or changes in ice flows; however, these changes were not 
included, because ‘understanding of these effects is too limited to assess their likelihood 
or to provide a best estimate or an upper bound for sea level rise’ (IPCC, 2007a). By 
contrast, taking a risk management perspective, for WG II the lack of understanding or 
agreement was no reason not to seriously highlight low-probability, high-impact effects 
of climate change, or impacts that may occur on longer timescales. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Probability and impact estimates for the ‘high temperature’ centennial timescale (i.e. 4 to 8 °C 
warming in 2200). The size and shape of the ovals are arbitrary and do NOT indicate uncertainties in 
impact and likelihood (Source: Kattenberg and Verver, 2009) 
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Objectives 
The main objective of this study was to identify appropriate policy options if new data or improved 
knowledge would provide growing evidence that the climate will probably change, according to the high end 
of the IPCC climate projections or beyond. We note that the associated policy options would 
also be appropriate in two other situations. Firstly, they may become relevant if natural or 
social systems would turn out to be more vulnerable than until recently assumed, and 
impacts of climate change would materialise faster or would be much more serious than 
projected, even if the climate would not change faster than projected by the IPCC. 
Several authors have hinted at this possibility (Smith et al., 2007; Hansen et al., 2008; 
Leemans et al., 2009), which suggests that the EU climate goal of 2 oC may, in fact, entail 
larger risks than was foreseen at the time this goal was set. Secondly, the drastic policy 
options discussed in this report could also be taken into account if the current national 
and international (EU, UNFCCC) negotiations would turn out to be unsuccessful. For 
example, the Royal Society (2009) recently evaluated geoengineering4 options – not in the 
context of extreme climate change, but in a context of the current mitigation policies 
possibly being unsuccessful (Brumfiel, 2009).  
 
The UNFCCC and EU discussions have become very specialised and detailed on the 
basis of the knowledge embodied in the IPCC assessment reports. Moreover, the 
characteristics of a response to extreme or rapid climate change, beyond the IPCC 
projections, are likely to be different from the dynamics of the current policy debate 
which is based on the expectation of a gradual climate change. We, explicitly, did not 
limit policy option to present options for climate mitigation and adaptation, as these are 
generally incremental improvements on existing technologies and practices, but also 
include options requiring more fundamental system changes, and also currently 
controversial measures, such as geoengineering. Therefore, to not complicate the current 
climate policy negotiations, the options in this report could also be further explored in 
parallel, in the context of a separate climate emergency response strategy. 
 
Methodology and scope 
The above objective was addressed through literature review, expert brainstorming 
sessions and interactions with experts and policymakers, during a number of national and 
international meetings in 2009. In addition, drafts were reviewed by a national advisory 
group and by a number of additional national and international reviewers.  The project 
benefited from interaction with the organisers of a meeting of a high-level political think 
tank on ‘Preparing for a worst case climate change scenario’. This think tank was invited 
by the Dutch Government, in the early summer of 2009, to review the potential 
implications of rapid climate change (background document: Zoeteman and Kersten, 
2009). The present report includes a critical inventory of the most important options for 
setting policy and research agendas.  A full, comprehensive analysis, such as one 
including modelling analyses, was beyond the scope and resources of this report. We 
focused on the options themselves, rather than on potential policy instruments for their 
implication. Much of the literature on extreme climatic changes and how to respond to 
them has a time horizon of a century or more, but if and when observations would 
                                                          
4
 There are various definitions of geoengineering. The IPCC defines it in a climate context as ‘technological 
efforts to stabilise the climate system by direct intervention in the energy balance of the Earth for reducing 
global warming’. In this report, we also included technological carbon sequestration options, such as air 
capture and ocean fertilisation. However, following the main literature, we did not include large-scale 
carbon sequestration in forests or managed ecosystems in the term, unlike the Royal Society (2009), which 
also includes afforestation. 
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confirm that climate change is really accelerating, policymakers would need to respond 
within years rather than decades. Therefore, it is useful to start thinking about the 
possibilities well in advance, and this report provides an overview of the options to 
support this thinking process.  
 
Responding to extreme or rapid climate change is usually framed in the context of 
geoengineering options (see, for instance, Boyd (2008),  Schneider (2008) and the Royal 
Society (2009)). These studies however did not compare these options with others, but 
merely stated that geoengineering should be considered as a last resort, when greenhouse 
gas emission reductions would not suffice. In a modelling experiment, Wigley (2006) 
addressed the relationship between solar radiation management through sulphur 
injections in the stratosphere and global mitigation requirements. However, he did not 
evaluate the options other than by considering their radiative effects, nor did he elaborate 
on the policy consequences. The Royal Society (2009) assessed the current state of 
knowledge about solar radiation management and carbon dioxide removal, and has 
recommended policymakers to consider the appropriate balance between the relative 
contributions of mitigation, adaptation, and both carbon dioxide removal and solar 
radiation management.  Our report supports the evaluation of such an appropriate 
balance by systematically evaluating a wide range of options. 
 
Different categories of climate emergency response options 
For the purpose of this report, we have structured possible emergency response options 
into the four categories below. In practice, possibly all of them, or combinations between 
some of them, would be needed, and some yet unproven options beyond these four have 
been suggested. 
 
a) Drastic emission reduction; 
b) Removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere; 
c) Influencing the radiative balance of the earth (‘solar radiation management’ or SRM); 
d) Enhanced adaptation. 
 
In Chapter 2, a summary of these options is provided. In Appendices A to C of this 
report, fact sheets provide more detailed descriptions. Figure 4 shows the relationship 
between these four sets of options and the factors causing rapid climate change described 
in Kattenberg and Verver (2009). The potential of deep greenhouse gas emission cuts (a) 
has been the subject of a huge body of literature. We have not reviewed this literature in 
any detail, but instead focused on options that can be associated with an emergency 
situation, when criteria such as economic feasibility are valued differently. In such a 
situation, options that would imply premature replacement of capital investments, or that 
would be politically unacceptable in the curre nt situation, may become realistic options. 
Options (b) and (c) are often referred to as geoengineering. With the exception of carbon 
sequestration in forestry or other land-use options, which we excluded from the 
definition of geoengineering, in this report. These have not yet been considered in any 
serious way in the formal deliberations about national and international climate policy. 
However, geoengineering options already have been extensively discussed in the 
scientific and technical literature, for a very long time, for example, in the context of 
weather modification. We have dealt with adaptation (d) in a way similar to drastic 
mitigation, and have not focused on adaptation options that are currently included in 
climate response programmes, but rather on those options that currently are considered 
to be premature or too expensive.  
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For all categories, different grades were considered: higher cost options in the current 
menu of options that can probably be introduced through regular economic, regulatory 
or voluntary policy instruments, options that require more serious political enforcement 
against societal resistance, and options that are not yet on the menu, such as 
geoengineering. Here should be taken into account that, because of the often speculative 
nature of many of the emergency response options, reliable and comparable information 
about costs is, as yet, mostly unavailable.  At the same time, there are likely to be 
conflicting views on the priority options: on the one hand, these should primarily be 
effective as quickly as possible, while on the other hand, options which imply a more 
fundamental transformation of our production and consumption patterns and associated 
energy system may carry less risks and have a longer-term effect.  
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Figure 4. Relationship between different factors with the potential of inducing rapid climate change and 
emergency response options; and their coverage in the present ‘Worst case policies’ report and an 
accompanying ‘Beyond the boundaries’ report (Kattenberg and Verver, 2009) 
 
Criteria for evaluation of options 
In order to evaluate the various options, we distinguished four criteria: effectiveness, 
feasibility, environmental risks, and political implications5. In the fact sheets of 
Appendices A to C, all options are described taking these four criteria into account. 
                                                          
5
 An assessment of geoengineering options, performed by the Royal Society (2009), coincided with the 
writing of our report. The Society used four quite similar, overlapping, but more limited technical criteria: 
effectiveness, timeliness, safety, and costs. We included ‘timeliness’ under ‘effectiveness’ assuming that 
options are not effective if untimely, and ‘costs’ under ‘technical, economic and social feasibility’. In 
addition, we paid attention to political and governance criteria, which the Royal Society also discussed in 
some detail, but did not include in its criteria. 
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• Effectiveness. There are various factors that determine the effectiveness of the 
options. For drastic emission reductions, removal of greenhouse gases from the 
atmosphere and solar radiation management, the effectiveness is determined by 
the degree to which human-induced climate change is counteracted. This 
effectiveness is determined by how fast the option can be implemented in 
practice, at which scale it can be deployed, how quickly the climate system 
responds to the measure, for how long it should be maintained, and what the net 
effect on the greenhouse gas balance is - some options require a large amount of 
energy which may be produced through fossil sources, requiring additional 
mitigation. For enhanced adaptation, the effectiveness is determined by the extent 
to which the impacts of the rapid climate change are avoided or addressed. 
 
• Feasibility. The feasibility of an option has technical, economic and social 
components. The technical feasibility is dependent on the level of development. 
For example, the option can be a creative idea, it can be based on established 
theory, possibly it has already been analysed with models, prototypes may have 
been developed or tests could have been performed. Often, some idea exists 
about the remaining technical challenges. The economic feasibility is determined by 
the costs of implementing the option (development, investment, maintenance), 
and the costs or benefits of side effects and spillovers. The social feasibility is 
assumed to be related to two factors: societal acceptance and behavioural barriers. 
In a situation of accelerating climate change societal acceptability of currently 
controversial options may increase, but some lack of acceptance is likely to 
continue to play a role. There may be large differences between different regions 
and social groups, as the example of nuclear energy illustrates, and it is likely that 
societal acceptance will change over time, as a possible climate emergency 
situation would unfold. While for many of the options in this report there has not 
yet been any public debate, for evaluating those options some subjective 
judgment is required. In general, options can be easier and thus faster 
implemented if less behavioural change is required. Feasibility is not a constant 
factor, it depends on the political priority of the issues at stake: in an emergency 
situation options can become ‘feasible’ while in a situation of gradual climate 
change they are not. 
 
• Environmental risks and co-benefits. This criterion relates to the risks or co-benefits 
for natural systems. These can include direct or indirect climate effects other than 
radiative forcing, such as known and unpredictable regional climate impacts; 
changes in greenhouse gas concentrations; and other positive or negative 
environmental or ecological side-effects, such as air pollution, ecosystem or 
agricultural impacts, and resource depletion. Under this criterion, we also 
consider the level to which an option may lead to irreversible effects and if a 
rebound effect could occur. For example, if particular options (such as those 
influencing the atmospheric radiative balance) would be discontinued, climate 
change would be unmasked and even accelerate further. 
 
• Political implications. Depending on the type of option, international agreement and 
control may be required during its development and implementation, or 
governance requirements and responsibilities may be limited to the local or 
national level. It may be an advantage if effective options do not require 
international coordination, unless there are risks involved extending to countries 
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beyond those taking action. Some options may be vulnerable to aggressive action, 
or conversely could be applied to inflict intentional harm. A generic concern is 
that many of the options, if regarded attractive by some actors, could possibly 
ease the urgency of mitigation. Ideally, under this criterion, requirements for 
effective policy instruments would also be included, but current knowledge about 
the effectiveness of specific policy instruments in a climate emergency situation is 
insufficient to distinguish between the options. 
 
We did not assess the various options with the intention to select the best one. In an 
aggravating emergency situation it is likely that a combination of different options would 
be appropriate. The preferred menu of options could change, over time, as on the one 
hand, further Research,Development and Demonstration (RD&D) may make options 
more effective or cheaper, while on the other hand, they may ultimately be ineffective, 
have unexpected undesirable side-effects, or eventually become unnecessary. In addition, 
the development of a portfolio of response options and preferences for different options 
will also depend on risk perspectives and perceptions, which could also change over time. 
We also recognised that the criteria are not independent. Effectiveness, for instance, or 
real or perceived environmental risks can affect feasibility. In the next chapter, the main 
characteristics of the four options have been summarised, while details are elaborated in 
the appendices of this report, structured according to the four criteria. Because the main 
objective of this report is to address policy implications of rapid climate change, Chapter 
3 highlights governance and ethical questions. These are particularly important for policy 
development, but are often overshadowed by a focus on the technical and economic 
characteristics of response options, which are described in more detail in Appendices A 
to C of this report. In the fourth and final chapter, the information is synthesised in 
support of a number of possible ways forward for Dutch and international policy. 
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Four categories of options to respond to extreme climate change 
• Drastic emission reduction options are well-known today, but may call for policy 
measures that are neither voluntary nor kind. They often imply fundamental system changes, 
profound innovations and lifestyle changes rather than incremental improvements in current 
consumption and production patterns, slowing their introduction and increasing the appeal of 
other emergency response options. Reduction of emissions of short-lived substances and 
behavioural changes may be the fastest option. Additional options would be required to reach a 
low-carbon economy, but these would require more time. These could include accelerated 
introduction of carbon capture and storage (CCS) and nuclear and renewable energy. 
• Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) can be realised in terrestrial and marine ecosystems (e.g., 
by changes in land use and forestry, enhanced oceanic carbon uptake, or aquatic sequestration 
via algae), or by artificial methods (e.g., ‘air capture’,  enhanced mineral weathering). 
Particularly, marine sequestration can have known and unknown ecosystem effects, and its 
permanency still needs to be unambiguously demonstrated. Artificial methods have as yet 
unattractive energy and economic characteristics. 
• Solar radiation management (SLR) can provide immediate emergency cooling, but 
entails often unknown consequences. The risks of stratospheric aerosol injections and space 
reflectors are larger and  raise even more ethical questions than those of cloud seeding and 
terrestrial albedo modifications.  Solar radiation management does not prevent ocean 
acidification. Its deployment, if ever, should be seen as a temporary measure, until greenhouse gas 
concentrations are stabilised through mitigation.  
• Emergency adaptation would be required If the types of options above would not work. 
Adaptation options beyond those considered today are possible but can have major social, 
economic and environmental implications, and there are limits to adaptation.  
 
Basically, there are four categories of emergency response options: reduce emissions, 
remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, directly influence the radiative balance of 
the atmosphere, or adapt to the (remaining) consequences. In this chapter, the most 
important options have been summarised under the four categories. Chapter 4 presents 
an evaluation of these options in more detail against the other options, taking into 
account the various criteria. In Appendices A to C of this report more detailed fact 
sheets are included for the first three categories of options, including a comprehensive 
reference list. Detailed assessment of ‘drastic’ adaptation options was beyond the scope 
and resources of this report. The four categories addressed are not exhaustive and new 
types of ideas emerge on a regular basis, such as facilitating excess heat flows from the 
bottom layers of the atmosphere to the stratosphere through giant chimney-like 
constructions (Runneboom and Feller, 2008). Initiatives, such as Richard Branson’s 
Earth Challenge Prize, may generate new solutions. In the limited time frame of this 
project, we focused on those options for which we identified substantive discussions in 
the scientific literature. 
 
A. Drastic emission reduction 
When climate change impacts are stronger or occur faster than expected, bringing 
ongoing GHG emissions to a minimum would be a first priority. Currently, most 
economic activities contribute (in)directly to GHG emissions. Moving to a low-carbon 
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economy has proven to take time and resources. However, options that provide deep 
emission reductions are known and available in all sectors, albeit at high costs. Some 
options involve stepping up current efforts, while others are more drastic and could 
potentially be disruptive. In the mind set of policymakers and experts alike, the 
preference is to look at stretching existing efforts to a maximum, rather than looking 
beyond the usual toolbox of options. Drastic and effective policies can be unpopular, as 
they may lower comfort, push privacy boundaries and personal freedoms, or be difficult 
to monitor and implement. This section explores such options for drastic emission 
reductions.  
 
The current ambition for GHG reduction in the Netherlands, codified in the ‘Clean and 
Efficient’ white paper (EZ, 2007), is to reduce GHG emissions by 30%, relative to 1990 
levels, by 2020. A 30% emission reduction is already seen as quite ambitious. So the 
question arises what ‘drastic’ emission reductions would mean in the context of the 
Dutch national policy landscape. For this report, we considered a case in which the often 
mentioned 80% reduction required by 2050 (IPCC, 2007c) would need to be achieved by 
2020. Furthermore, we assumed that all reductions would have to take place nationally 
and that national targets were the result of an internationally agreed effort to strongly 
mitigate emissions.  
 
The descriptions below present emission reduction options per sector. After the 
technical options, policy instruments are discussed with a distinction between extending 
current practice and implementing more drastic policy strategies.   
 
Power supply  
The supply of power is currently responsible for around 25% of global GHG emissions6 
(WRI, 2008). To drastically reduce the emissions from energy supply, there are two 
general approaches: switch to low-carbon energy sources or use carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) to prevent emissions from entering the atmosphere. Low-carbon energy 
supply can be achieved by using renewable energy sources or fission of nuclear material.  
 
• Many countries are currently moving to modest levels of renewable energy (i.e. 
tens of percentage points). At present, there is no mix of renewable energy 
sources available to replace the entire fossil-based energy system. With sufficient 
innovation and technological progress, however, it is expected that renewable 
energy can eventually completely replace traditional fossil fuel. Short-term 
barriers include costs, intermittency and the associated requirements of the 
transmission network. 
• Nuclear energy is readily available as a low-carbon alternative to fossil-fuelled 
base-load generation. Short-term barriers include high capital intensity and 
significant lead times of up to a decade, until a new power plant is built, making it 
less suitable for rapid drastic mitigation. Nuclear energy has several serious 
disadvantages compared to renewable energy, in the long term, including 
unavoidable proliferation risks and nuclear waste. Nuclear fusion is not an 
available technology. 
• Power generation from fossil fuels without releasing the emissions into the 
atmosphere can be achieved by using carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
Combined with bio-energy, it even offers the potential for negative-emission 
                                                          
6
 Note that there is a potential overlap between sectors and end uses. Emissions from energy supply should 
not be attributed to use in industry or buildings. 
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power production. While having a potential contribution to reducing emissions, 
CCS is not considered off-the-shelf technology, and numerous barriers, including 
costs, public perception and geological storage potential, exist before the option 
can be implemented. 
 
Current efforts to reduce emissions from energy production are mostly based on 
government procurement, regulation and financial incentive schemes. Policies can be 
extended considerably, using sufficient means, possibly moving to a situation where well 
over 50% of the power supply is based on renewable sources. Most serious low-carbon 
futures however, involve complete decarbonisation of the energy sector.  
 
Drastic measures on the energy supply side include very strict emission regulation, 
mandatory renewable energy shares for consumer and industrial supply (progressive 
shares), mandatory CCS for new power plants, and complete government-induced 
rethinking of the energy infrastructure to accommodate renewable energy. In a situation 
in which emission reductions greater than 80% need to be realised in the power sector by 
2020, decommissioning existing capital stock (e.g. coal and gas fired plants) and obliging 
CCS with biomass seem inevitable.  
 
Transport  
With over 14% of global GHG emissions, transport is notoriously difficult to address, 
policy-wise, because of the  number and diversity of actors involved and the relation with 
‘personal freedom’ of mobility. The technical potential in the medium term is substantial, 
especially for private transport: when electric or hydrogen cars are introduced on a large 
scale, technically this can result in 50 to 90% emission reduction, provided it is supplied 
from low-carbon power production.  
 
Reducing the carbon intensity for road transport per kilometre, however, would require 
large infrastructural adjustments outside the (time) scope of a drastic mitigation scenario. 
Relatively mild carbon standards for new vehicles are already considered and in some 
countries implemented. However, considering options beyond decreasing emissions per 
unit of vehicle-kilometre travelled, would be needed. Options that  affect overall mobility 
and behaviour may offer more rapid solutions.  
 
Introducing the infrastructure needed for large-scale use of electric vehicles is relatively 
easy, but implementation will put heavy pressure on the power grid (especially in peak 
hours). A significant increase in public transport availability will require large investments 
and inevitably involves inertia, due to urban planning constraints. 
 
Drastic mitigation options for air transport may include banning air freight and severely 
limiting personal air travel. Long-distance freight transport can be obligatorily shifted to 
rail and water, leaving road transport only for short-distance connection. Policy measures 
for air and sea transport are effective mainly if agreed internationally, while road and rail 
transport policies can be national. Personal transport can be limited by extremely 
progressive (‘explosive’) fuel taxes, prohibiting personal ownership of cars with internal 
combustion engines and impose aggressive parking policies. Each of these transport-
related options is likely to affect economic growth and (perceived) personal freedom.  
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Buildings and appliances 
Emissions from the building sector represent 17% of total global GHG emissions 
(including power use in buildings) and represent both building-related and non-building-
related emissions. Emissions in the first category stem from construction and provision 
of heating, cooling, ventilation and hot tap water. Non-building-related emissions are 
mainly associated with the use of electrical appliances. Technical options to reduce 
emissions from the building sector include better insulation, application of renewable 
energy options for water and space heating, and more efficient appliances.  
 
Current policies are mostly targeted at providing standards, information and financial 
incentives for new residential and commercial buildings. Regulation enforcing energy 
efficiency will often be economically attractive and is not expected to cause major 
implementation difficulties. Existing buildings are more difficult to address effectively by 
policy, given the long lifetime of existing buildings, high cost of replacement, social 
barriers and, in some jurisdictions, legal restrictions on changing regulation on existing 
property. Significant improvements in efficiency of electrical appliances do not require 
extreme measures, but could be achieved by internationally coordinated regulation: 
stringent appliance standards could be implemented within the course of five years, 
effectively banning all energy-intensive consumer goods from the shelves (although not 
from people’s living rooms!). Drastic measures will be needed to improve energy 
efficiency of existing buildings: mandatory energy scans and associated sanctions, either 
financial incentives for changing old appliances for newer, more efficient ones, or 
obligatory refurbishing of housing. Buildings represent a major capital stock in any 
society – rebuilding to new standards will require substantial resources. 
 
Industry 
Excluding power production, industrial activity contributes roughly 25% to global 
greenhouse gas emissions. Although very diverse by nature, industrial emissions are 
largely related to energy use (85%). Sectors with the highest emissions include production 
of iron and steel, paper and pulp, cement, and chemicals. Each of these sub-sectors has 
specific opportunities for process optimisation and integration, but some efforts are valid 
in all sectors: the use of efficient motors, heaters and the like, and overall procedure 
enhancement and insulation.  
 
Current policy measures, such as strong economic incentives and strict regulation, are 
expected to be very effective and industry is expected to respond fast and 
straightforward. International coordination is important, as many industrial sectors are 
especially vulnerable to competition issues (putting companies out of business may prove 
counterproductive). Common cap-and-trade policies are likely to be inadequate, as these 
are aimed at slow transition towards lower emissions through own investments and long-
term carbon price.  
 
Drastic measures in industry should necessarily be taken in an international context, to 
prevent the production from shifting towards regions with less strict regulation – with no 
net effect on emissions. Most realistic yet drastic short-term measures for industry are 
very tight (energy/material) efficiency standards, both for new and existing installations. 
This can go as far as prohibiting certain base materials and promoting bio-feedstock. In 
the short term, tight regulation concerning (excessive) packaging of goods can be 
implemented without problems. 
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Agriculture, Forestry and Land-use change (AFOLU)  
AFOLU is the single largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, with 30% of global 
GHG emissions. Consequently, the technical abatement potential is large, particularly in 
non-OECD countries. Land-use change from forest to agriculture (CO2), fertiliser 
application (N2O), and cattle and rice production (CH4), are the main sources of 
emissions and the human diet is a dominant factor. Some unsustainable practices in 
biofuel production, such as the clearing for ethanol production from sugar cane in Brazil, 
also contribute substantially to the increase of GHG emissions.  
 
Strict bans on deforestation, implementation of large-scale afforestation programmes, 
and forest and peat land management programmes could harness a large part of the 
potential against relatively low cost (see also the section on carbon dioxide removal 
below). Important characteristics are the high number of relevant actors, sovereignty 
issues, and the dispersion of emission sources, which make designing and implementing 
mitigation policies a large challenge.  
 
Drastic mitigation is possible, in principle, but in addition to financial and technical 
promotion, institutional capacity in areas vulnerable to change is paramount, and it is 
questionable whether this can be addressed in the short term. Influencing dietary choices 
involves efforts to enhance social acceptance contrary to the prevailing association in 
many cultures between increased consumption of meat and diary and increasing wealth. 
Dietary choices may need to be regulated higher up in the food chain, such as through 
production standards.  
 
Short-lived gases, methane and black carbon (soot)7   
Several non-CO2 GHGs and soot account for over one-third of current anthropogenic 
radiative forcing (IPCC, 2007a). This includes several substances with much shorter 
atmospheric lifetimes than the long-lived CO2: methane, tropospheric ozone, black 
carbon and several F gases all have lifetimes from several years up to several decades. In 
various world regions efforts are already underway to reduce emissions of several of 
these substances or their precursors to reduce air pollution. An extensive menu of end-
of-pipe technologies is available, providing opportunities for drastic mitigation that do 
not involve rapid retirement of industrial capital stock or lifestyle changes. Soot 
emissions from industry, power production and transport can be abated effectively by 
end-of-pipe technologies such as filters. However, several of the available options do not 
only abate soot, but also other aerosols and their precursors (nitrates, sulphates) that 
have a cooling effect.   
 
In addition, forest management to reduce fires could also greatly reduce soot emissions, 
although soot from open biomass burning is difficult to abate. Rapid phase-out of CFCs 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, or bans on substances, such as the refrigerants 
HCFC-22 and HFC-134a and foam blower HFC-152a, could be introduced. Methane 
emission reductions in addition to those mentioned under AFOLU include those from 
the energy sector and from landfills. 
 
Implementing the options: time delays and policy instruments in emergency circumstances 
Most of the above options have in common that under normal circumstances they will 
take time to change because of inertia in existing production and consumption systems, 
notably energy supply systems. During this implementation period, CO2 and other 
                                                          
7
 Ozone, possibly the third most important contributor to radiative forcing, is formed in complex chemical 
interactions involving carbon monoxide, NOx and volatile organic compounds.  
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GHGs will continue to be emitted into the atmosphere (and remain there for decades to 
centuries and more). Three non-exclusive exceptions that will not contribute to the 
GHG build-up are (a) demand reduction, (b) mandatory emission reductions of short-
lived substances with direct or indirect radiative effects,  and (c) application of CCS.  
 
All three options allow for continued reliance on fossil fuels, and can be implemented 
quickly and independent of an overall transition. CCS requires underground storage, 
which has some unresolved uncertainties. Reducing energy demand would involve 
behavioural changes –  effectiveness and speed depend on enforcement options available 
in a climate emergency situation. 
 
Can we speed up the implementation of (drastic) emission reductions? According to the 
IPCC, there is sufficient potential to reduce global GHG emissions below current levels 
in the coming decades at moderate costs, while in the longer term, costs to stabilise 
concentrations between 445 and 710 ppm CO2 eq are estimated to be between a 3% 
decrease in GDP and a small increase compared to the baseline (IPCC, 2007c). 
Mobilising this potential from a scientific assessment and turning it into effective policy 
is clearly a non-trivial matter. A case in point is the apparent negative costs associated 
with many energy efficiency options which are not implemented because of various non-
economic barriers.  
 
In order to realise the projected potential, a policy framework is needed that addresses 
this type of non-economic barriers.  Some relevant policy approaches that may be 
considered are: 
 
o Scale up current policy. The first step could be to push current policy to the extremes. 
For example, increase feed-in support and preferential access to renewable energy, 
tighten the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) caps, and strictly 
enforce all energy standards. 
o Government coordination of energy and industry. On the supply side of the economy, 
governments could  reverse privatisation and resort to coordination and control over 
energy and industry infrastructure and operation, just as governments increased 
control over the banking sector during the recent financial crisis.  
o Government interference with energy demand. Some policy measures are effective, but rather 
uncomfortable as they limit freedom and consumer choice, and interfere with 
individuals’ privacy. Examples are personal travel and transport budgets, obliging 
households and industry to use certain appliances (or discard others), limiting hot 
water use and space heating or cooling, and imposing dietary restrictions. 
o Overarching cross-sectoral coordination. The national and international climate policies have 
been developed in a piecemeal sector-by-sector approach focusing on improvements 
of individual technologies. This prevents a serious discussion on transitions at a 
systems level, not limited by national boundaries (e.g. mobility rather than car 
efficiency, food security rather than crop yields). 
 
B. Removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere 
 
This category of options not only allows for removing those GHGs from the 
atmosphere of which future emissions are impossible to avoid, but also for removing 
GHGs which have been emitted in the past. Dependent on the type of option and the 
scale at which it is applied, these options can limit GHG concentrations complementary 
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to emission reductions. They can have significant space and energy requirements, but 
generally do not require changes in production and consumption patterns. Although 
some biological options (such as algae) could also remove GHGs other than CO2 from 
the atmosphere, we focused on carbon dioxide removal, CO2  being by far the most 
important gas in this context. There are various possibilities, some of which have already 
been applied or tested on various scales, while others still have to be developed further 
before they can be deployed. Some options (such as sequestering carbon in a way that 
allows it to be used as biofuel, or storing it through CCS techniques) can be combined 
with drastic emission reductions, but have been placed in this category. 
 
Land use and forestry  
Options to sequester carbon through terrestrial ecosystems have been analysed 
extensively in the scientific literature and discussed politically for a long time. Indeed, 
carbon sequestration through land-use change and forestry is included at present in 
national and international climate mitigation schemes. It can have many positive side-
effects, but can also have risks, for example, for biodiversity and local livelihoods in case 
of large-scale plantation forestry. In a situation of accelerating climate change, carbon 
sequestration should be maximised, for instance, by large-scale afforestation 
programmes, not in the least because of synergies between mitigation, adaptation and 
other sustainable development objectives. A novel idea beyond the options usually 
considered today is the afforestation of the world’s deserts using desalinated water for 
irrigation. In theory, the potential of this option is limited to the available land, but if 
grown biomass is used for fuel and the emitted carbon stored, the benefits would be 
continuous. Using biomass as fuel has been placed in the section on drastic emission 
reduction.  
 
Aquatic carbon sequestration (algae)  
CO2 (and other GHGs) can also be drawn from the atmosphere through sequestration 
by algae in open aquatic systems or, more effectively, bio-reactors. The algae can be used 
as bio-energy, replacing other (fossil) fuels. Controlled systems are more efficient than 
unmanaged systems. Using flue gases from power plants or other large point sources 
rather than air would increase the sequestration effectiveness (see section on drastic 
emission reductions). Existing small commercial units for algae production produce only 
limited quantities of high value products and, hence, the volume of CO2 that they 
sequester is not of great importance; none of current pilot projects for biofuel 
production is at a commercial scale yet, but upgrading could produce large volumes of 
algae and would, therefore, have a more significant carbon sequestration potential. In this 
area, there are many technical challenges to address. 
 
Enhanced ocean sequestration 
This option mostly refers to the enhancement of the ‘biological pump’ which draws 
down carbon sequestered in biomass from the top to deeper layers of the oceans, or of 
the ‘solubility pump’, transferring and redistributing inorganic carbon into the ocean. The 
most studied option is adding nutrients to stimulate primary productivity. These can be 
macronutrients, such as nitrogen or phosphorus, or micronutrients, such as iron, 
facilitating more efficient usage of existing macronutrients. Tests with iron fertilisation 
have been implemented, but the potential to influence CO2 concentrations effectively for 
a long time remains very uncertain. Other possible ways to enhance ocean carbon uptake 
are to bring up nutrient-rich deep water, for example, by using pipes, or kinetic wave 
energy, or by enhancing oceanic uptake of CO2 by adding alkaline substances, such as 
limestone, but their feasibility still has to be proven. Because of the unknown risks, an 
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international moratorium has been agreed until ‘scientists better understand the potential 
risks and benefits of manipulating the oceanic food chain’ (Tollefson, 2008). Shell has 
recently revived the exploration of a separate chemical option to increase alkalinity of the 
ocean and subsequent carbon uptake through liming of the ocean. 
 
Biochar 
Biochar is a black carbon, produced by pyrolysis of biomass, allowing for carbon 
sequestration and long-term storage. It can be produced from wood, or from waste, 
which otherwise would release carbon dioxide. It is claimed to have additional positive 
environmental and economical effects, because it is a by-product from energy production 
and can be used as soil additive to improve soil quality and fertility. Co-production of 
biochar and energy involves a conflict of maximising them, simultaneously. Control of 
toxic substances, which are produced during pyrolysis, is required, dependent on the 
combination of feedstock and production conditions. 
 
Air capture  
Proposed artificial air capture systems remove CO2 from the air and deliver a pure CO2 
stream for sequestration and disposal. These schemes all use some ‘sorbent’ material 
(mostly a sodium hydroxide (NaOH) or calcium hydroxide (Ca(OH)2) solution) which 
reacts with CO2 and binds it. After that, CO2 is removed from the sorbent by using, for 
instance, a chemical reaction, heating or vacuum. Various designs are currently developed 
and tested. They all require much energy, but further development may decrease energy 
requirements. The proposed technologies vary from ‘artificial trees’ to making use of 
minerals, such as olivine. The problems with disposal could be avoided, if these devices 
are built at suitable places with large enough storage capacity and far enough from 
human settlements and vulnerable infrastructures. 
 
The aquatic sequestration and air capture technologies would work most effectively for 
high concentrations of CO2, that is, for flue gases, and, hence, could also be considered 
as part of our option category of drastic emission reductions. The above options appear 
to have in common that they can be implemented by individual countries, generally 
without major implications for other countries. However, the options which use the 
biospheric carbon sequestration capacity have various known or unknown ecological 
effects. Mechanical options raise major questions with regard to energy requirements, 
costs, efficiency and public acceptance. The rate at which the options can remove carbon 
from the atmosphere is limited, therefore, there will be delays in influencing carbon 
concentrations and radiative forcing.  
 
C. Influencing the radiative balance of the atmosphere (solar radiation 
management) 
 
The most direct and rapid way of counteracting the effects of increased GHG 
concentrations is to influence the short wave solar radiation. This category of proposed 
solutions has an immediate effect masking global warming, but also has many as yet 
unknown risks. These options are usually proposed in case other options would not work 
quickly enough, or appear not to be feasible. In an emergency situation, these options 
could be considered to be legitimate to avert negative impacts from climate change, and 
at least theoretically might be deployed unilaterally by a country or group of countries 
and even by some large commercial or private bodies. In order to avoid a rebound effect 
of rapidly increasing temperatures from unmasked high GHG concentrations, they 
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should be implemented until the concentration of greenhouse gases reaches the desired 
low level, to be achieved through parallel emission reduction or sequestration measures.  
 
Injections of aerosols or aerosol precursors into the stratosphere  
Various proposals to inject aerosols or reflecting particles into the atmosphere have been 
made and to a limited extent analysed in modelling studies. Because of the relatively long 
residence time (approximately two years), injection into the stratosphere would be most 
appropriate. The aerosols or precursors, such as SO2 or H2S, could be carried to the 
stratosphere on balloons, rockets and airplanes, or by artillery guns. Evidence of cooling 
after large volcanic eruptions has proven that this option can be effective. However, 
there are many known and unknown side-effects, including ozone depletion and 
regionally different effects on precipitation and other climate variables. 
Reflectors in space 
Another idea to directly influence the albedo of the earth would be to launch space-based 
‘sunshade’ shields, situated at the Lagrange point between the earth and the sun at a 
distance of about 1.5 million kilometres from our planet, averting the incoming solar 
radiation from the earth. They could be either large (e.g., a single 2000 km diameter 
shield of thin aluminium foil) or small reflectors (e.g., a cloud of many transparent metre-
sized spacecraft). While the aerosol option, described above, would require periodic 
renewal, the space reflectors would have a longer lifetime. At the same time, theoretically, 
they could be removed or turned off immediately if undesirable effects would occur. This 
apparent benefit is also a large risk, because the system would be very vulnerable to 
intentional or unintentional damage. Costs of these options are as yet estimated to be 
very high, although innovative solutions are sought to reduce them.  
Cloud modification through sea water injection 
Another idea concerns low-level maritime stratocumulus clouds, that could be seeded 
with seawater aerosol in order to increase their solar reflectivity by enhancing the overall 
droplet surface area or the longevity of clouds. Next to global applications, also a limited 
deployment of this technology has been proposed to counteract regional impacts, e.g., to 
cool vulnerable regions such as regions with coral reefs and polar ice8, but since regional 
climate change effects are very uncertain, the effectiveness of such regional applications 
is uncertain, both from a global and regional perspective. Remotely controlled unmanned 
spray vessels could be used, with limited additional energy requirements. The 
implementation of this technology will modify the distributions and magnitudes of ocean 
currents and regional and local meteorology: temperature, rainfall, wind and land–ocean 
temperature contrast. This option is sometimes suggested to be reversible because the 
lifetime of droplets is just a few hours or days at the most, but like the other albedo 
options, it does not avert ocean acidification and would have to be maintained until the 
atmospheric GHG concentration was brought back down.  
 
Albedo changes of terrestrial systems 
By increasing the reflectivity of surface areas, global warming could be counteracted. 
Proposals have been made to change the albedo of deserts, cropland, urban areas, and 
oceans. Floating foils or solids could change the ocean’s albedo, but the instability of the 
sea’s surface and the unknown effects on marine ecology make this a rather farfetched 
option, which was not further explored for this report. Because of their size and 
relatively low asserted ecological and economic value, deserts may be the most attractive 
                                                          
8
 A. Robock (personal communication) suggested, however, that there is so little sunlight in the polar 
regions, that it is a minor factor in the energy balance and that clouds can actually warm the surface due to 
their longwave properties. 
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type of land cover in this context, even if the albedo change to be gained is relatively 
minor. The world’s deserts would be covered with highly reflective, inexpensive, 
recyclable, tear-resistant and easy to install and maintain material that may have to be 
replaced every couple of years. In agriculture, new crop varieties may have a higher 
albedo but similar nutritional value as current varieties. The albedo of the expanding 
urban areas can be influenced through lighter roofs and surface pavement. It is as yet 
unknown what the regional climatic effects of large-scale application of this option would 
be. Evidently, there will be effects on local ecosystems and peoples in the regions 
themselves, as well as elsewhere (e.g. spreading of fertile Saharan dust would be blocked). 
Similar to the other options influencing the albedo, ocean acidification would continue 
and the option would be irreversible – until GHG concentrations would be brought back 
down. 
 
The potential of several of these options has been demonstrated in analogue situations in 
the past – for example, cooling from volcanic eruptions, stratospheric dispersion from 
radionuclides, and terrestrial albedo effects from current land cover differences – but for 
the purpose of counteracting climate change they can still be considered to be in the very 
early stages of research and development. The risks of the aerosol and space shades 
appear to be larger than those associated with modification of clouds and terrestrial 
surfaces, but all options  have the problem that they do not change the concentration of 
GHGs in the atmosphere and, hence, do not prevent ocean acidification and have to be 
maintained as long as is needed, until the concentrations will have been brought down,  
by emission reductions or carbon sequestration. In this context, they can be regarded as 
temporary emergency response options. The unknown risks pose ethical questions, 
which are described in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
D. Emergency adaptation 
 
Even if the categories of options A to C would be implemented successfully, for most 
options it will take some decades before they could have their full effect, because of the 
time needed for the development and large-scale deployment, and, for emission 
reductions and carbon dioxide removal, the delays in the climate system (see also Chapter 
4 and appendix D). Behavioural changes can be implemented very quickly, provided that 
public resistance can effectively be overcome in an emergency situation. Because of the 
more direct link between people’s behaviour and their climate resilience, this may be 
easier than for mitigation where the effects of changing behaviour are dependent on 
what others do. A swift implementation of the options A to C seems rather unlikely and, 
therefore, an assessment of the implications for adaptation to residual climate change 
impacts in the case of accelerating climate change is essential. Here, we distinguished 
between (a) local impacts in the Netherlands, and (b) global impacts and related risks for 
the Netherlands. It should be noted that while (a) has been the subject of a large body of 
research and assessments, (b) is as yet relatively unexplored. The latter may not only be 
important in case of accelerated climate change, but also for climate change as projected 
by the IPCC. Not withstanding a focus on Dutch policies, the generic nature of many of 
our findings may also make them relevant to other countries.  
 
Key questions in the context of this section are: in which way would adaptation policy 
today be different if extreme, rapid climate change would explicitly be taken into 
account? When do we have to step up adaptation efforts? Do we need separate 
emergency plans? The PBL (2009) provided an overview of the impacts and possible 
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response options for ’regular’ climate change, and we used the structure of this report 
also below. It should be noted that of the four categories of options, only A to C have 
been explored in detail and summarised in the appendices A to C. A full analysis of 
emergency and more radical adaptation options is yet to be done. 
 
a. Adapting to direct impacts in the Netherlands 
• Ensuring water safety. The safety of the Dutch water systems along the major rivers 
and coast line against flooding can be ensured during this century with the 
current methods of sand suppletion and reinforcement of the dykes, at a rate of 
sea level rise of 1.5 metres per century (Delta Commission, 2008; PBL, 2009). 
This rate is about twice as high as assessed by the IPCC, which did not take into 
account new insights into the potential accelerated deglaciation of Greenland and 
West Antarctica. This allows sufficient time to assess the implications of such 
high (or higher) rates of sea level rise in the next century, particularly with regard 
to investments that are meant to have a lifetime beyond a century, such as new 
urban or industrial developments. More radical options, such as managed retreat 
from the most vulnerable areas, changed prioritisation regarding the planning of 
new urban settlements, or even floating cities, do not seem to be urgent at this 
time. 
• Safeguarding fresh water supply. Salt water intrusion threatens agriculture and natural 
ecosystems, summer droughts present risks for the availability of sufficient fresh 
water for human consumption, industry and agriculture, and for the functioning 
of water transport systems, and high water temperatures affect aquatic 
ecosystems and cooling water availability. The capacity of the Netherlands to 
adapt to these threats is limited (PBL, 2009). Different responses are possible, 
some of which offering more flexibility than others, when the uncertainty of 
long-term climate change is taken into account (PBL, 2009). For example, closing 
off the Nieuwe Waterweg to protect the province of South Holland’s fresh water 
supply would not only have negative implications for river transport, but would 
also be difficult to change later on, while increasing the IJsselmeer level to 
increase fresh water supply offers more flexibility. Currently controversial 
options, such as fundamental changes in agricultural practices or particular spatial 
reservations for water storage, may become more acceptable under extreme 
climate change. 
• Protecting nature. Adaptation options aimed at natural ecosystems are limited, but 
nevertheless possible: nature areas can be linked nationally and internationally, 
overall environmental conditions can be improved, and in spatial planning more 
use can be made of natural gradients and the existing physical systems (PBL, 
2009). From a global point of view, other options may be considered if the 
climate would change faster than projected. For example, significant expansion of 
reserves or restoration or creation of new habitats would go beyond the current 
emphasis on defensive protection and linking of existing nature areas. For certain 
situations, captive breeding and translocation of species is suggested, but this 
would be limited to a number of individual species and, thus, could result in 
serious and unpredictable modifications of complex ecosystems.  
• Climate-proofing urban areas and protecting health. For urban areas, addressing water 
problems in cases of high intensity rainfall or droughts, as well as health problems 
related to the urban heat island effect and possible new infectious diseases, are 
the main problems. Various spatial (e.g., parks and water retention areas in cities, 
floating housing areas) and non-spatial (e.g., cool building designs, heat 
emergency plans, tightened air pollution control) response options are available, 
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but so far these have not been considered in the context of extreme climate 
change, whereby temperature increases of 6 °C or more in this century may not 
be excluded and the frequency and length of heat waves is likely to increase.  
• Climate-proofing transport and energy networks. The vulnerability of national and 
international infrastructural, energy and communication networks has not yet 
been assessed. The economy and human well-being are increasingly dependent on 
the functioning of these networks, which are also increasingly interconnected 
internationally. Possible impacts include flooding of low-lying infrastructure, 
damage to or changed stability of infrastructure due to heat or intensive rainfall, 
shifts in cooling water demand and possibilities for disposal, changes in electricity 
demand, and water transport problems with low water levels (e.g., Swart and 
Biesbroek, 2008). 
 
b. Adapting to indirect risks resulting from global climate impacts 
• Integrating climate into trade policies. The Netherlands may be low-lying, but its wealth 
and long history of managing water systems make the country less vulnerable to 
direct climate change impacts than many other countries. Projected climate 
change impacts will have a global impact on agriculture, hence on prices of food 
and non-food products, and hence on agricultural trade. In particular, food trade 
is projected to increase as a result of climate change, with increased dependence 
of most developing countries on food imports (IPCC, 2007). On the flipside of 
these negative impacts are the opportunities for export of knowledge and 
innovative adaptation technologies, for example, delta-technology and high-tech 
agricultural practices, such as drought and salt-tolerant crop varieties, or urban 
farm towers. If, as part of a response to projected or extreme climate change, the 
role of biofuels in the world energy supply increases, there will also be 
consequences for the Dutch agricultural sector. Furthermore, drastic emission 
reductions to address accelerated climate change will also have a major effect on 
world energy prices and, hence, have large implications for international and 
national economic development. How these possibilities could be taken into 
account in economic, trade, energy and agricultural policies, has not yet been 
systematically analysed. 
• Supporting vulnerable countries through development cooperation. Although problems other 
than climate change currently dominate the vulnerability of developing countries, 
in general, climate change is likely to exacerbate them, especially for those regions 
which are particularly vulnerable, such as semi-dry and low-lying coastal areas. 
Although climate change is not part of the Millennium Development Goals, it is 
likely to make reaching them more difficult, and to subsequently maintain or 
improve the conditions subsequently. Integrating climate change in development 
cooperation is required for reaching development cooperation goals in the 
coming decades, particularly if the climate were to change even faster than 
projected.  
• Avoiding or managing refugees. Already a share of the global numbers of refugees is 
suggested to be connected to climate and environmental problems. While climate 
change is likely to continue to be just one of many reasons for people to flee their 
homes, it is projected to become a factor of increasing importance (e.g., EACH-
FOR, 2008; Kollmanskog, 2008). Whether climate change will result in large 
international migrations of poor people is as yet quite uncertain, because of the 
lack of a direct relationship between the level of exposure to climatic risks and 
the likelihood of associated migration (McLeman and Smit, 2005). Nevertheless, 
Europe and the Netherlands may also be confronted with an increasing number 
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of refugees in case of a changing climate, and it would be useful to explore which 
role the Netherlands could play, internationally, to address the problems. Rather 
than a sign of failing adaptation, controlled migration may also be seen as an 
active adaptation option (Guillaume, 2009). 
• Avoiding or managing security implications of rapid climate change. In a changing climate, 
increased tensions related to resource scarcity and associated increased 
commodity prices are likely. Already, the UN Security Council, the United States 
(e.g., see CAN, 2007) but also the Netherlands (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 
2009) have recognised this threat. Security issues can be related to energy, food 
and water security. For example, major security issues are involved in the 
structure of the world energy system which may or may not continue to be 
dependent on energy from often instable regions. Physical or economic food 
shortages and water scarcity can lead to an increase in the numbers of refugees 
(both internally displaced people and international refugees) and associated risks 
of conflicts. Recent (public) military assessments have focused on reduction of 
vulnerability to climate change of politically unstable regions and military 
installations, but do not yet indicate specific measures to address climate-induced 
conflicts, may these arise. 
• Preventing impacts. From an engineering point of view, similar to the above options 
to remove GHGs from the atmosphere or influence the radiative balance of the 
atmosphere, proposals also have been made to prevent particular impacts after the 
climate has changed. For example, ocean acidification may be addressed by liming 
the ocean, the strengths of hurricanes and other storms might be reduced by 
seeding clouds, and even a fully artificial environment may protect mankind from 
an inhospitable outside climate. A long history of weather modification attempts 
in countries, such as the United States (see e.g. Fleming, 2007) and China, and a 
small number of projects to create and maintain an artificial environment (e.g., 
the ‘failed’ Biosphere 2-project, discontinued in 1994 and now a tourist attraction, 
see Marina and Odum, 1999), were all unsuccessful. Less extreme forms of 
ecological engineering are being considered. Because of the uncertainties and the 
serious ethical questions related to these options, we did not analyse these 
options in any detail. 
 
In general, the Netherlands appears to be on track to increase its resilience against 
climate change, especially with respect to vulnerabilities in the water safety system, in the 
coming century – a period for which the Delta Commission has already considered 
changes more extreme than projected by the IPCC. Following the recommendations of 
the National Adaptation Strategy, the Netherlands will also adequately prepare itself for 
projected climate change impacts in most other areas. The Netherlands being a 
frontrunner in many, notably water-related adaptation options, is likely to be in a good 
position to export knowledge and technologies. At the same time, the country does not 
seem to be prepared for potential indirect consequences from climate change impacts 
elsewhere in the world. 
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Governance issues of emergency climate policies  
• Emergency climate response options  involve new ethical questions that will have to be addressed, 
including the issue of intentional modification of the earth system; known and unknown risks; 
possible global effects of action by one or a small group of actors, including possible military 
implications; and the desirability of research. 
• Views on geoengineering options vary with world views: some may consider them as definite 
solutions (‘technological fix’ proponents), others as a temporary emergency measure that at least 
justifies research (risk managers), and some are strictly against any further development and 
research (environmentalists). 
• Countries which are particularly vulnerable to climate change, but have relatively limited global 
influence, such as the Netherlands, could stimulate exploratory discussions on controlled and 
coordinated research on emergency response options.  
• New  institutions or new coalitions may be more effective in dealing with the challenges of an 
emergency climate response than current multilateral institutions which focus on consensus 
building and gradual change, but may raise questions about the level of democratic control. 
 
Emergency policies and governance 
 
The emphasis in the descriptions of the four categories of options in the previous 
chapter and Appendices A to C (the fact sheets) is on their technical and economic 
aspects, reflecting the emphasis in the literature. Especially, since many of the options are 
either controversial at present or require major system changes, also governance and 
ethical considerations are important for the successful development of policy strategies. 
These subjects are covered in this chapter. Here, ‘governance’ refers to the set of national 
and international management and leadership arrangements, required for successfully 
responding to extreme climate change. We have first summarised governance 
implications for the four categories of options, and then specifically elaborated on the 
ethical aspects of what may be the most controversial set of options: solar radiation 
management.  
 
A. Drastic emission reduction 
 
Governance of drastic emission reduction options is determined by the economic effects 
of the options, the policy level of intervention (from domestic to multilateral) and the 
degree to which the options interfere with personal freedoms and disrupt markets. 
Drastic  emission controls can only be effective when implemented, coordinated and 
enforced at the global level. Current governance problems related to international 
negotiations in the context of the UNFCCC will be exacerbated, as the required drastic 
emission reductions are likely to involve rapid structural economic changes, premature 
retirement of capital stock and lifestyle changes.  
 
Emergency policies may differ between countries, leading to discontinuities in price 
levels, regulations, and tax systems, which could be at odds with a level playing field for 
economic actors (Ferguson, personal communication). Enforcement and sanctions – 
imposed on countries or other actors not adhering to emergency agreements – would 
become major issues.  The mandate of existing organisations, such as the UNFCCC, but 
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potentially also other currently more powerful organisations such as the WTO and UN 
Security Council, may need to be expanded. However, many current institutions are 
characterised by slow consensus-forming processes, which cannot adequately respond to 
emergency circumstances, and new institutions may be required. Questions related to the 
level of democratic control of new institutions have to be considered in such 
circumstances. Specific arrangements may be required for the energy sector. The 
Agreement on an International Energy Program (IEP, see IEA, 2008) to address oil 
crises in an internationally coordinated fashion may be an interesting source of ideas9, 
even if the nature of the climate problem surpasses the characteristics of usually more 
short-lived oil crises.  While currently international agreements such as the Convention 
on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) address air pollution at the 
continental scale, a new Global Atmospheric Pollution Convention could address air 
pollutants, including short-lived greenhouse gases not covered by the UNFCCC, at the 
global level. Such a Convention may also provide a framework for addressing the issue of 
solar radiation management through aerosol injection into the stratosphere (see below). 
 
B. Removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere 
 
Terrestrial carbon sequestration (forestry and land management, including biochar 
production) can be pursued by a limited number of nations with sufficiently large 
available land areas. International political issues may be related to the question of 
whether, and if so how, countries should be compensated for managing their lands for 
the global benefit. But these problems appear to be limited, compared to the other 
options discussed. Local and regional implications for forestry and land management 
options are discussed extensively in the literature (e.g, IPCC AR4).  Schellnhuber (2009) 
noted that with the world economy and population continuing to grow and a number of 
international crises (climate, water, food) developing, land becomes an increasingly scarce 
resource. He provocatively suggested that international management may be required for 
an optimal use of land, for example, earmarking the world‘s most fertile land as ‘Global 
Agricultural Commons’. While such ideas may look far-fetched and infeasible at present, 
increasing multiple pressures may change this in the future. In order to use land-use and 
forestry options effectively to address extreme climate change at the global level, many 
social, economic and political barriers will have to be removed, because dependent on 
the type of measure, the sovereignty of countries and land owners may be at stake. 
However, the options have already been discussed in a UN context (climate change, 
biodiversity and land degradation) for quite some time, and reasons other than climate 
change make them attractive. This may still make land use and forestry options a feasible 
and meaningful part of a climate emergency response programme. 
 
Artificial sequestration methods (air capture, enhanced mineral weathering) could also be done 
unilaterally. Apart from the considerable energy requirements, risks associated with air 
capture appear to be primarily related to CO2 disposal. Some questions relate to the 
inclusion of sequestration options other than those currently included in the UNFCCC in 
national GHG accounts, for example, questions of how carbon is sequestered through 
mechanical means technically measured and accounted for in carbon credit systems, and 
how monitoring is arranged? Such questions could be of limited importance in an 
emergency situation. 
 
                                                          
9
 The IEP not only calls for 60 days emergency oil reserves, but  also requires participating countries to 
have plans for contingent oil demand restraint, evaluated by a Standing Group on Emergency Questions 
which reports to a Governing Board which decides on a majority basis. 
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Ocean sequestration could also be pursued unilaterally. Some companies have been 
established, hoping to already be able to earn carbon credits. However, ocean 
fertilisation, even if it would draw carbon effectively from the atmosphere, can involve 
important yet unknown risks to marine ecosystems and geochemical cycles, which would 
affect other parts of the world, and thus would require international agreement and 
control. For this reason, in 2007, 200 countries agreed under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity on a moratorium on adding nutrients to the ocean in order to 
stimulate algal growth, with the exception of approved small-scale research in coastal 
waters (UNCBD, 2007). In 2008, the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter decided that ocean fertilisation is not 
scientifically justified (IMO, 2007). Nevertheless, if this type of carbon capture would 
eventually be allowed, similar questions regarding the accounting of air capture would 
have to be addressed, which would be minor in an emergency situation. 
 
C. Solar radiation management  
 
Changing the albedo of the earth through injection of stratospheric aerosols or reflectors in space has 
global consequences, but can be done unilaterally, because it may be considered relatively 
inexpensive, compared to emission reductions or ambient air capture (Barrett, 2006; Bles, 
2009; Bickel and Lane, 2009). Different from mitigation, changing the albedo may also be 
perceived as relatively easy to implement, because it only addresses climate change 
without targeting other social or environmental goals, and it does not require difficult 
changes in production and consumption patterns (Virgoe, 2008). Several authors have 
stressed that because of largely unknown effectiveness and risks, international agreement 
on research, development and possibly eventually deployment would be highly desirable 
(Ricke, 2008; Victor, 2009; Schneider, 2009), particularly, as the private sector could also 
enter this area because of the required technological capabilities.  
 
This set of options, in particular, may require governance arrangements beyond  
economy, technology and environment. The world has a long history of attempts to 
influence the weather, especially the United States and China. There are military interests 
in developing some geoengineering options, and new norms and control mechanisms 
may have to be developed urgently, since some experiments are already planned.  Several 
military applications have been tried with, generally, much smaller effects than expected, 
if any (Cascio, 2008; Fleming, 2007). In 1977, the Environmental Modification 
Convention (ENMOD, 1977) agreed to prohibit weather modification for military 
purposes. This Convention – even if it addresses weather rather than climate 
modification – may have been one of the starting points for new negotiations to develop 
an international mechanism to control or manage solar radiation management (SRM) 
activities. In terms of (different perspectives on) risks and benefits, SRM may have 
aspects in common with nuclear technologies, and, hence, the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) also might provide interesting experiences. The 
NPT tries to further the goal of non-proliferation and act as a confidence-building 
measure between countries, with a safeguard system under the responsibility of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Another option is clearly the UNFCCC, of which 
the ultimate objective is to avoid dangerous interference in the climate system, something 
SRM may be at odds with. Sulphur injections into the stratosphere may be in conflict 
with the aims of the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(CLRTAP). Many large countries, such as the United States and the Russian Federation, 
which could theoretically take unilateral action, are party to these Conventions. China 
however is not a party to the ENMOD and LRTAP Conventions. Because existing 
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processes and institutions such as the above may be inadequate to deal with this kind of 
option (Parsons, 2006), new arrangements may be required.  
 
Changing the albedo of the earth by changing the reflective properties of land or clouds is similar to the 
stratosphere and space-based options in its albedo changing features, but can be applied 
regionally, having regional effects. Because of this, it may be perceived as less threatening 
than the options with more direct global effects. However, to make a difference, the scale 
of application should be large enough, and the interconnectedness of the global climate 
system implies that regional changes in reflective properties of land and clouds can have 
effects in other regions. Therefore, it seems that the governance implications are similar 
to the option discussed above. All raise serious ethical questions (see below). 
 
D. Emergency adaptation 
 
Finally, emergency adaptation options can also have very challenging requirements for 
national and international governance. Internationally, many of these are related to 
‘climate refugees’, tensions or conflicts over scarce natural resources, such as water and 
land, which may be associated with climate change, and threats to the world’s supporting 
ecosystems. Addressing the problems of large numbers of climate refugees is just one of the 
major issues that the world community would have to deal with, but one which already 
attracts attention. The number of environmentally induced migrants has been suggested 
to increase from about 24 million around the turn of the century to about 50 million by 
2010, around 200 million by 2050, and 700 million after 2070 (Warner, 2009). However, 
because of the complex interactions, with climate just being one of the factors forcing 
people to move in a wide array of social, economic and environmental factors 
(Kolmannskog, 2008), predictions are hard to make. The EU project ‘Environmental 
Change and Forced Migration Scenarios’ is developing scenarios for environmentally 
forced migration (EACH-FOR, 2008). There are various international mechanisms to 
address the problems related to large flows of refugees or forced migrants, notably the 
UNHCR (UNHCR, 2008). The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies has established a special centre to address the climate risks for the poor 
(RC/RC, 2007). In 2008, the Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance 
(CCEMA) was established by the United Nations University (UNU), the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) and the Munich Re Foundation (MRF), to encourage the mainstreaming of 
environmental and climate change considerations into migration management policies 
and practices, and conversely, also add migration issues to the global environmental and 
climate change agendas (Mortin et al., 2008). It remains to be seen to what extent the 
current system can cope with increasing numbers of people. According to Kolmannskog 
(2008), existing law and protection possibilities should be further investigated to identify 
and address potential protection gaps in climate change-related displacement. WBGU 
(2006) recommended to consider a burden-sharing arrangement or quota system for 
refugees, related to a country’s greenhouse gas emissions. Guillame (2009) suggested that 
migration could be an intentional adaptation option. Biermann and Boas (2008) 
proposed the establishment of a global regime to protect climate refugees, inter alia, 
because the numbers of people may overwhelm the capacity of the current institutions 
and systems, and the character of refugee problems would be different from current 
ones. They discussed the disadvantages of addressing the problem through existing 
refugee or security institutions and suggested a new UNFCCC Protocol on Recognition, 
Protection, and Resettlement of Climate Refugees and an associated Climate Refugee 
Protection and Resettlement Fund. 
Alterra-Policy_implications_of_extreme_climate_change_scenarios[2].doc 38 
 
As to security problems, scarcity or increasingly unequal distribution of vital resources like 
water and food are likely to lead to conflicts, possibly violent. According to CNA (2007), 
climate change could be considered a ‘threat multiplier for instability in the most volatile 
regions of the world’ and, hence, should be integrated into national security and national 
defence strategies. Based on this report, the New York Times (8 August 2009) concluded 
that ‘climate-induced crises could topple governments, feed terrorist movements or 
destabilise entire regions’. At the first UN Security Council meeting on climate change in 
2007, delegates still differed in views on the role of the Council regarding climate change, 
but in 2009 picked up the issue again. This development adds ‘security’ to other aspects 
of prevention of ‘dangerous interference with the climate system’, which in article 2 of 
the UNFCCC is associated with natural adaptation of ecosystems, food security and 
sustainable economic development. At present, there is no common understanding on 
the long-term goals and the criteria to evaluate dangerous interference (Sprinz et al., 
2007). The term ‘dangerous’ is inherently related to normative questions and cannot be 
reduced to a strict scientific meaning. And not only in the United States, but also in the 
Netherlands, the issue of climate change and security has been the focus of attention: an 
interdepartmental group is currently assessing the associated future risks (Dutch Ministry 
of Defence, 2009). The interest from the military may enhance the urgency of the 
problem, inject further impetus to the climate negotiations, and, as a consequence, to 
mitigation efforts, but also the historical interest in the military in engineering solutions 
(weather modification) may increase the attention for such solutions. It is unclear what 
this may imply for non-military governance of (extreme or projected) climate change. 
 
In general, for all four categories of options, a key question is whether the slow and 
bureaucratic UNFCCC is still the most appropriate international mechanism in a 
situation of accelerated climate change which requires rapid response. Alternatively, other 
existing or new institutions may be required, parallel to the UNFCCC, to respond to the 
challenges in a peaceful and internationally coordinated fashion. In that case, a global 
effort can be imagined, but coordinated action by a smaller group of key countries could 
be faster and more effective. This would raise questions as to the desirable democratic 
control of the actions.  
 
Solar radiation management and ethics 
Climate change involves a large number of ethical questions (e.g., see Program on the 
Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change: Brown et al., 2006). Mostly, the scientific debate 
focuses on issues relating to the question of responsibility, fair allocation of emission 
rights and costs, access to technologies, or procedural equity. Although we recognised 
that all categories of options involve ethical questions, we focused on solar radiation 
management options, many of which pose a ‘moral hazard’, possibly reducing the 
pressure for emissions reductions, and raise new ethical and legal challenges. In the 
context of extreme climate change, the pertinent question may change from a mainly 
economic one: ‘what level of dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system do we want to avoid at which cost’ into a more ethical one: ‘what level of 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system do we want to avoid by 
using which currently controversial and risky solutions?’ Brown et al. (2007) distinguished 
four ethical issues related to aerosol injection into the stratosphere, which are also 
relevant for other types of SRM: 
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• The difference between inadvertent and intentional interference with the climate system. 
Different from the collective development of a world economy based on fossil 
energy with initially no knowledge about the climate effects, SRM involves 
intentional modification of the world climate, which would require attention in 
new or existing international treaties. Especially the interest of the military 
(Fleming, 2007; Tollefson, 2008) is an important consideration here. 
• Scientific uncertainties related to the deployment of these technologies. SRM involves 
uncertainties with respect to the sensitivity of the climate system to the actions, 
the effects on the atmospheric composition, possible irreversibility, and the 
remaining impacts of CO2 concentrations. Some options which are claimed to be 
reversible in the sense that they can be turned off quickly, are not reversible in the 
other sense that if turned off after some time, warming due to high levels of 
greenhouse gas concentrations would be unleashed. Ethical questions relate to 
the burden of proof (attribution of responsibility, level of proof required), the 
rights of protection or compensation of possible victims, and the appropriate use 
of the precautionary principle. 
• The issue that one or a small group of countries (or companies) can determine the ‘optimal’ 
climate for the planet. What are the rights of those implementing the options, absent 
any democratically empowered institution? Here the status of the implementing 
group is important, for instance, the UN Security Council is an example of an 
established multilateral institution not elected democratically. At present, there do 
not seem to be any countries – or other actors – that have a clear motivation to 
act unilaterally10. However, this may change in emergency circumstances. In an 
emergency situation, it is likely that a strict multilateral institution, such as the 
UNFCCC with its unanimity rule, will be overruled by a ‘coalitions of the willing’ 
(Metz, personal communication).  
• The need for or desirability of further research. Usually, SRM researchers acknowledge 
the various questions regarding associated risks, and call for more research to 
address the uncertainties. However, the mere decision to do research or not 
involves ethical questions. Such a decision may lead to less efforts to reduce 
emissions, to lower mitigation research budgets, impacts from the research on 
others, or deployment or tests without international consent. 
 
The validity of these points varies between different types of options. The ethical 
challenges are the most serious for options that have potential long-lasting, maybe 
irreversible, large-scale effects and can be deployed by one or a small group of countries 
(e.g., stratospheric aerosols, space reflectors, ocean fertilisation). In addition, other 
options which may be reversible to some extent, have mainly regional implications, or 
require international cooperation to be effective (e.g., regional albedo changes), raise 
similar questions. The exception may be air capture of carbon dioxide, which can be 
implemented unilaterally, and has no effects on others, apart from the large energy 
requirements and risks related to the disposal of captured carbon.  
 
Tests of some SRM options have already been proposed, and pressure to take them 
seriously can be expected to increase, because cost estimates for some options by 
proponents may be relatively low, at least if unknown side effects are not priced (Barrett, 
2008; Bles, 2009; Bickel and Lane, 2009). A dilemma for those not in favour of these 
                                                          
10 Russia may expect less negative impacts than other countries, and may even experience some positive 
impacts, Europe - at least in the past - strongly favoured the precautionary principle, and other security and 
competitiveness concerns, and concerns about unpredictable effects on rainfall, may dominate in countries 
such as the United States and China. 
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options is that setting up or participating in research, as well as starting an international 
debate about them, has the implication that these options will enter the political agenda, 
from which they may be hard to remove. In the United Kingdom, the Royal Society 
(2009) recently published a climate engineering assessment, and in the United States, 
NOVIM (a group of experts, Blackstock et al., 2009) developed a blueprint for a major 
research programme, which also addresses conditions for research, field experiments and 
deployment.  
 
Inherent to such ethical issues, different people have different views. Proponents of 
geoengineering as a technological fix may see these options as a solution that can at least 
partially counteract the radiative forcing of greenhouse gases, for example, by allowing 
for higher levels of stabilised concentrations than would be desirable without them. Such 
a view would decrease the urgency and importance of greenhouse gas emission 
reductions. On the other side of the spectrum are those who do not agree with any form 
of geoengineering, including research, because of the risks involved. These are usually in 
favour of what we have called drastic emission reductions. In between are those who see 
geoengineering options as a potential temporary emergency measure that may not be 
desirable, but perhaps unavoidable if major climate impacts are to be prevented. In the 
latter case, the options are to be maintained until greenhouse gas concentrations have 
been reduced through measures with less risks involved, but with longer lead times. 
Table 1 gives an overview of some arguments of geoengineering proponents and 
adversaries in the four categories of ethical questions described above. Countries which 
are particularly vulnerable to climate change, but have relatively limited global influence, 
such as the Netherlands, could stimulate such exploratory discussions on ethical 
questions, most urgently on controlled and coordinated, open research. Because once 
started, work on geoengineering may be hard to stop, international agreements on rules 
are urgent (Victor, 2008). At the same time it should not be forgotten that also other 
options, such as those for drastic emission reduction through controversial technologies 
or behavioural changes, have ethical implications, and should also be further explored. 
 
Table 1. Selected arguments of geoengineering proponents and adversaries 
 Proponents of geoengineering Adversaries of geoengineering 
Inadvertent vs. 
intentional 
In an emergency situation this distinction 
becomes obsolete 
Also GHG emissions imply human 
modification of the earth system 
The planet should not be gambled with 
in any circumstances 
There are unacceptable liability 
questions, military risks 
Scientific 
uncertainties 
We can act and learn 
Several options are reversible 
GHG induced warming also has 
unresolved uncertainties 
There may be unacceptable, unknown, 
irreversible effects 
An ‘optimal’ climate can never be agreed 
on or achieved 
The burden of proof can most probably 
never be established 
Unilateral vs 
multilateral 
Coalitions are quite acceptable in an 
emergency situation, to avoid 
bureaucratic delays 
Side payments to countries which do not 
want to join are possible 
Solutions with global effects without 
global control are unacceptable 
Agreement on compensation of possible 
victims will be difficult 
Need for research Research is essential to optimise 
effectiveness and reduce risks 
Research is crucial to having a ‘plan B’ 
Research will move the attention away 
from emission reductions 
Research is undesirable, but if done at all, 
then only under very strict rules and 
international control 
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Assessment and discussion  
• Many technologies and practices for major carbon dioxide emission reductions or removal from 
the atmosphere are well-known today, but implementation will take up to decades, and an 
additional time lag exists due to earth system delays. The effects of solar radiation management 
(SRM) are more immediate, but the required research, development and deployment can also be 
expected to take some decades. 
• Therefore, at present, none of the major emergency response options are expected to be available 
in time to effectively address rapid climate change in the coming decades, leaving adaptation as 
the main short-term solution.  
• There is a trade-off between categories of options: the less drastic emission reduction proves  to be 
viable, the more carbon dioxide removal and solar radiation  management is needed to avoid 
increasing impacts in a situation of accelerating climate change. If drastic emission reductions and 
geoengineering both appear to be infeasible (technologically, economically or politically), enhanced 
efforts to adapt to the exacerbated consequences would be unavoidable. 
• Recent insights and preliminary model calculations suggest that, theoretically, global GHG 
emission reduction rates of 4% per annum, or more, may be possible. In comparison, SRM can 
only match the effectiveness if applied globally and maintained over a long period of time. 
Discontinuation of such SLR would lead to immediate rapid temperature increases. 
 
In the appendices, the options are evaluated that are available to respond to rapid climate 
change against our of criteria. In a situation of rapid climate change, one single option is 
most likely insufficient, and the full portfolio of options would need to be considered 
seriously, in spite of the associated environmental, economic or ethical concerns. 
Depending on different perspectives on how the world may develop and how the 
changes should be managed, different combinations of options are likely to be preferred 
by different stakeholders. In this chapter, a summary is given in an overview of our 
assessment, on how the groups of options are interlinked, and how the international 
community may politically react to rapid climate change. 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the various options for responding to accelerating 
climate change, for the four criteria that we distinguished. In their assessment of 
geoengineering, the Royal Society (2009) included tables with scores for the various 
options and a summary graph with four dimensions. Notwithstanding suggestions from 
various reviewers of this report, we have not provided such a scoring, nor did we 
provided a comprehensive graphical overview, for the following reasons:  
• The four categories of options include a variety of individual options that vary in 
terms of their effectiveness, feasibility and environmental and socio-economic 
implications; 
• Moreover, the criteria are in fact composite criteria: one particular option may score 
positive for one aspect and negative for another;  
• Scoring would also only represent current views of the scorers, ignoring that the 
evaluation is likely to change as the impacts of an accelerating climate change would 
gradually become more apparent and constraints on implementing particular options 
that may exist at present could disappear11. 
                                                          
11 New insights or arguments may change attitudes. For example, while initially geoengineering options 
were primarily discussed as a global option to address a global problem, increasingly it is suggested that 
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• The information basis for providing scores is very uneven and scoring would be very 
subjective; 
 
In addition to the qualitative synthesis in Table 2, we organised some of the options in 
the graphs and tables below for a limited set of the many relevant dimensions. For 
example, Figure 5 illustrates these spatial dimensions of some of the options, ignoring 
that at least some of the regionally applied options may have consequences for other 
regions or globally.  
 
 
Multilateral action 
necessary to be 
effective
Effective 
unilateral action 
possible
Crash 
mitigation
Emergency 
adaptation
GHG captureAlbedo change: 
space/strato-
sphere options
Albedo change: 
land-cover and 
cloud seeding 
options
Regional 
impacts
Global 
impacts
Local 
impacts
Action by a consortium 
of states as 
intermediate solution?   
 
Figure 5. Response options and spatial scales of governance and impacts 
 
Figure 5 also shows that, at least theoretically, some options need full international 
collaboration to be effective, while others can be effective also if one country or a small 
group of countries (or other actors, such as private companies) take action. Literature 
finds that the ethical questions related to the possibility of unilateral action are important. 
In reality, one may expect that, in an emergency situation, a small group of countries may 
step forward to take the lead in all options, not in the least due to the difficulties involved 
in and time necessary for UN-style international decision-making. This does not 
necessarily imply that high risk (geoengineering) options would be selected more easily, 
because there may be few individual countries (if any) which see a competitive advantage 
in taking such risks (see Chapter 3). 
 
Time delays 
The various options have different time delays: 
 
- Research, development and demonstration: the time needed to develop the options, from 
conceptual idea to available technology or practice; 
                                                                                                                                                                      
some of these options may be applied regionally to address regional impacts. While this point of view 
downplays the risk of effects outside the region where the option is applied, such arguments might have 
the potential to make these options more acceptable. 
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- Development and implementation of policy instruments: the time needed to move from an 
initial policy initiative to the effective implementation of the policy, including the 
time needed to move from niche applications to full international deployment and in 
some cases the time required to gain public support or reach international agreement 
about their deployment; 
- Earth system delays: the time needed to have the desired effect, which can be immediate 
for adaptation options, very rapid for solar radiation management options, and 
slower for options aimed at reducing emissions or concentrations.  
 
Time delays in society and in the earth system differ between the various options, making 
an overall prioritisation difficult. Table 3 gives an assessment of the relative time delays, 
but does not say much about effectiveness and nothing about the feasibility of the 
options. The societal time lags can be influenced by policy, and can be reduced in a 
climate emergency situation. For example, solar radiative management options may have 
a rapid cooling effect, but will probably take some decades to develop, from the drawing 
board to actual application, and until the desirable international agreement about their 
deployment would be reached. Conversely, several drastic emission reductions may 
already be technically available, but even after they have been introduced, take some time 
to affect the radiative balance, because there is a small delay in changing the atmospheric 
composition and, subsequently, a larger delay to affect the earth system’s heat balance. At 
present, none of the emergency options described in this report appears to be ready to 
counter an accelerating climate change, effectively, within a period of at least a few 
decades. 
 
Interrelationships between options 
The stylised Figure 6 provides a framework for comparing the potential contribution 
from the four categories of options. The middle thin line depicts the stylised level of 
‘impacts’ that could be associated with a baseline scenario in which emissions increase for 
some time, to decrease in the course of the next century, comparable to the A1B scenario 
of the IPCC SRES. It is generally acknowledged that this scenario would not lead to 
stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations that is sufficiently low to avoid ‘dangerous 
interference with the climate system’, for example, by limiting the global average 
temperature to 2 oC, being the EU target. Therefore, the bottom of the range depicts a 
scenario in which these impacts would be decreased through the kind of mitigation 
policy considered today. If, in the coming decades, climate change would accelerate, 
depicted by the top of the range, we assumed that the world would continue to aim for a 
similar level of low impacts, as it would in a world without accelerated climate change 
(bottom of range).  If stepping up mitigation efforts would not be sufficient to lower the 
impacts, additional options (carbon dioxide removal, solar radiation management) would 
be required, to lower the impacts and/or buy time to reduce atmospheric concentrations 
of greenhouse gases.  
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Table 2. Summary overview of emergency response options  
 
 Effectiveness Feasibility Environmental implications Political implications 
Drastic emission 
reductions 
• Generally, these options 
have the most sustainable 
effect 
• Most rapid effect: carbon 
capture and storage, 
reduction short-lived 
substances, behavioural 
changes  
• Other options: long 
transition time (30 years or 
more) 
• Some options have an energy 
penalty (CCS, biochar) 
• Most options well-
developed, some in 
demonstration phase 
• Requires  fundamental 
transition 
• Economic costs suggested to 
be limited (<1-2 % of global 
GDP)  
• Some options require 
difficult behavioural or 
structural economic changes, 
or are politically 
controversial 
• Most options have 
environmental co-benefits 
(e.g., air pollution abatement) 
• Some options entail 
environmental risks 
(biofuels, biochar, nuclear) 
• Reduced dependence on fossil-
fuel exporters can have positive 
and negative security 
implications 
• Some options (biofuels) may 
lead to land-use conflicts 
• Global cooperation is required  
• Boundary conflicts to be 
resolved for uncoordinated 
policies 
• Emergency policy instruments 
yet to be developed 
Removing 
carbon from 
atmosphere 
• Scale of application 
determines effectiveness  
• Effectiveness marine options 
questioned 
• Most options require 
decades to be fully deployed 
• Some options have an energy 
penalty (air capture, large-
scale ocean fertilisation) 
• Terrestrial ecosystem 
sequestration well-known, 
other options less mature 
• Until GHG concentrations 
are sufficiently reduced  
• Costs largely unknown, by 
some suggested to be limited 
(excl. negative effects) 
• No behavioural change 
required 
• Some options 
(protection/enhancement of 
soils and terrestrial natural 
ecosystems) can have 
environmental co-benefits 
• Some other options can have 
environmental risks (e.g., 
biodiversity) depending on 
how they are implemented 
• Air capture has few effects 
• Options generally have little 
societal risks, compared to other 
options 
• Some options can lead to land-
use conflicts 
• No risks associated with 
unilateral application 
 
Influencing 
radiative balance 
(solar radiation 
management) 
• Stratospheric aerosols/space 
reflectors: global effect  
• Cloud 
modification/terrestrial 
albedo change: smaller 
effects  
• Shortest climate response 
time when deployed 
• Many options have energy 
• Full implementation may 
require some decades 
• Costs estimated to be 
relatively low, depending on 
scale of application 
• Options to be maintained 
until GHG concentrations 
have reached safe levels 
• Ocean acidification 
unaddressed 
• Acid deposition (for 
aerosols) 
• Effects on regional climate 
as yet largely unknown 
• Stratospheric aerosols have 
air pollution implications 
• Unilateral deployment affects 
the power balance and may be 
susceptible to intentional 
damage 
• Ethical questions involved in 
intentional modification of the 
atmospheric system 
• Terrestrial albedo changes may 
involve land-use conflicts 
Alterra-Policy_implications_of_extreme_climate_change_scenarios[2].doc 46 
penalty • Terrestrial albedo 
modification can have 
ecosystem effects 
Emergency 
adaptation 
• Can be relatively quick, when 
other options do not work 
• Limits to adaptation: victims 
and damage cannot be 
avoided 
• Several options have energy 
penalty (cooling, irrigation, 
etc). 
• Most adaptation options are 
known, but costs can be high 
• To be maintained until the 
climate is stabilised 
• Coastal and river bank 
protection can have 
ecosystem implications 
• Migration can increase 
ecosystem pressures 
• Developing countries may not 
have the capacity to adapt 
• Refugee and security issues to 
be addressed 
• Land-use conflicts likely after 
major sea level rise 
• Can be done by countries 
individually 
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Table 3.  Author’s assessment of the relative time lags associated with various emergency response options (the 
darker, the longer the delays; the table does not address the relative effectiveness, risks or desirability  of the options) 
 
 
Option                      Time delays 
RDD policy earth 
system 
Move to high cost emission reduction options of 
current technology menu 
   
Behavioural changes; controversial technological 
options, such as nuclear, CCS 
   
D
ra
st
ic
 
e
m
is
si
o
n
 
re
d
u
c
ti
o
n
s 
Fundamental infrastructural/economic transitions    
Afforestation, reforestation, soil carbon 
enhancement 
   
Mineral sequestration    
Ocean fertilisation    
Aquatic sequestration (algae)    
Biochar    
C
a
rb
o
n
 d
io
x
id
e
 
re
m
o
v
a
l 
Air capture    
Aerosol injections into stratosphere    
Reflectors in space    
Cloud modification through sea water injection    
Terrestrial albedo changes (ecosystems)    S
o
la
r 
ra
d
ia
ti
o
n
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
Terrestrial albedo changes (urban areas)    
Adaptation through available technologies (water 
safety, cooling, desalinisation, irrigation, etc.) 
   
Adaptation through behavioural changes    
Drought-resistant varieties    
D
ra
st
ic
 
a
d
a
p
ta
ti
o
n
 
Fundamental infrastructural/economic adaptive 
transitions, relocations 
   
 
shading Relative RDD 
status 
Policy: relative societal 
resistance 
Earth system 
effect on 
 Conceptual idea Highly controversial;  
no effective instruments 
Emission sources 
 Model studies; few 
experiences 
Controversial; some 
Instruments known 
Concentrations 
 Prototype; some 
experiences/tests 
Moderately controversial; 
limited experiments 
Radiative forcing 
 Technology/practice 
available 
Non-controversial; already 
practiced 
Impacts 
 
Mitigation might be given priority, because of the unknown feasibility and risks of 
solar radiation management, reducing the need for such measures. Conversely, if 
solar radiation management would be applied, this would allow for much more time 
to successfully mitigate greenhouse gas emissions or capture carbon from the 
atmosphere. The impacts that cannot be avoided require adaptation. Also, without 
accelerating climate change, solar radiation management and/or emergency 
adaptation would be required if actual global emissions could not be kept below the 
level at which unacceptable dangerous interference with the climate system would 
occur, that is, if the agreement to be reached in Copenhagen would prove to be 
insufficient. In that case, emergency options, such as solar radiation management, 
could be considered to reduce the time and degree to which greenhouse gas 
concentrations would overshoot levels that would be considered safe. Options that 
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draw greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, such as the capture of ambient air, 
appear to have less negative side effects than solar radiation management and have a 
longer response time. They could be considered an option, complementary to 
emission reductions (Bles, 2009). 
 
Rapid change through 
climate feedbacks
Climate 
impacts
Time
‘Drastic’
emission 
reductions
CO2 removal
Adaptation to 
remaining 
damages
Solar radiation 
management
Geoengineering: less 
needed as drastic 
emissions reductions 
would be more effective
baseline
rapid changes 
through feedbacks
‘Regular’
mitigation
Figure 6. Four categories of options to respond to accelerating climate change: lowering impacts and buying time; see 
main text for explanation 
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Text box 4.1. Rapid climate change – rapid emission reductions? 
 
A key question in the emission reductions–climate change relationship is how fast global 
emissions can be reduced and how fast the climate system would respond to such 
reductions. While in the past, maximum emission reductions were often estimated to be 
between 2 and 4% per year, recent model analysis suggests that in a theoretical case, analysed 
with the IMAGE/TIMER modelling framework, rates of up to 6% would be possible, if a 
combination of biofuels with carbon capture and storage is assumed (Van Vuuren and 
Stehfest, see Appendix D). This analysis assumes a relatively high climate sensitivity of 4.5 oC 
and does not take into account premature retirement of capital stock, behavioural changes, 
or maximum rates of carbon sequestration, which would lead to even higher reduction rates. 
Figure 7 shows the effects of radiative forcing, temperature change and sea level rise, for a 
scenario in which a 4%/yr GHG emission reduction after a global peak in 2020 is assumed, a 
scenario in which radiative forcing would be kept stable through geoengineering methods at 
the level of 2030 (3.6 W/m2), and a scenario in which the radiative forcing would be brought 
back to levels equivalent to a 400 ppm CO2 eq scenario (2 W/m2).12  
 
Preliminarily, we concluded from these analyses that a drastic emission reduction strategy, 
that would reduce GHG emissions by around 4% per year, may be able to effectively limit 
climate change to only a few tenths of a degree after the introduction of the policy. 
However, inertia implies that a peak in temperature would only occur around 30 years after 
the introduction of the policy – and after 70 years, the temperature still will not have 
returned to the level of the introduction year. Solar radiation management can lead to more 
rapid results, depending on the extent to which the measure is introduced. A modest strategy 
to limit radiative forcing would not do much better than the rapid mitigation strategy. 
However, an extreme strategy that would instantly bring radiative forcing back to a low level 
could have more immediate results. This would obviously also significantly increase the risks 
associated with such a strategy: should the measures that mask the radiative forcing be 
discontinued, global temperatures would soar, as a result of unabated GHGs from the 
radiative forcing. More rigorous work is required to corroborate our preliminary finding that 
solar radiation management options are only more effective than drastic emission reductions 
if applied globally and maintained over a long period of time. 
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Figure 7. Radiative forcing, temperature change and sea level rise in the various scenarios 
                                                          
12
 If greenhouse gas emissions would continue to increase, the efforts to counteract their 
radiative forcing would also have to increase in these scenarios (e.g., increasing the sulfur 
load), while these measures could not be discontinued without unmasking the warming 
associated with the greenhouse gases. Acid deposition and acidification of the ocean would be 
sustained collateral effects. 
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Scenarios for level of international collaboration and perceived urgency 
The eventual response to accelerating climate change will depend on many different 
factors and there may be large differences in political priorities between countries. 
National governments in small countries, such as the Netherlands, will have to 
consider how other, larger countries may act, and design their own response 
accordingly. Next to the sense of urgency, a very important dimension in this context 
is the level of international coordination that will characterise tomorrow’s world. The 
slowness of existing mechanisms, such as the UNFCCC, may cause countries to 
follow their own paths, individually or in coalitions. This may have advantages in 
terms of decisive responses, but would also add risks, should these actions have 
consequences for others.  A second factor influencing the policy choice is the sense 
of urgency amongst the population and decision makers (see also Text box 4.2). With 
good climate monitoring systems in place, and clear attribution of observed changes 
to human-induced climate change, this sense of urgency may be high. However, in 
case of poor monitoring and continued controversy over attribution, political issues 
other than climate change may get priority.  
 
Text box 4.2. Detection of extreme climate change and sense of urgency 
 
In ‘regular’ climate change scenarios, as well as in more extreme (high or low) 
scenarios, climate change impacts are likely to be most apparent through changing 
intensity and frequency of extreme events. Because of the interdecadal variability, 
even very targeted monitoring programmes may only gradually reveal that climate 
change is indeed happening faster than was  assessed by the IPCC. Therefore, it is 
possible that an accelerating climate change will reveal itself only through a gradually 
increasing series of observed changes and events that can be fully or partly attributed 
to climatic change, although abrupt climate change equivalents of ‘the hole in the 
ozone layer’ cannot be excluded. The targeted monitoring programmes would build 
an evidence base that would not convince everyone at the same time. Different 
stakeholders will react differently to the evolving evidence base, leading to different 
senses of urgency, similar to the climate change policy developments of the last 
decades. With good monitoring systems in place, and clear attribution of observed 
changes to climate change, this sense of urgency may be high. However, in case of 
poor  monitoring and continued controversy over attribution, political issues other 
than climate change may get priority, because – parallel to climate change – other 
world tensions are also likely to occur.  
 
 
Figure 8 suggests four scenarios along these dimensions, based on a background 
paper drawn up for an expert meeting in the Netherlands, in spring 2009 (Zoeteman 
and Kersten, 2009). The likelihood of effectively responding to accelerating climate 
change is highest in a world with a high risk perception and consensus about the 
need to respond, and the wish to do this in an internationally coordinated fashion 
(top right, scenario 1: ‘global green endeavour’). In such a scenario, the success of a 
drastic emission reduction programme and coordinated responses to support those 
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who are most vulnerable in adapting to the remaining changes, is most likely. If there 
is a high sense of urgency, internationally, but the political differences prevent an 
effective international coordination, all countries will try to find their own solutions 
through adaptation, but the application of geoengineering options also could be an 
attractive option in this scenario, for example, for large countries (top left, scenario 2: 
‘sauve qui peut’). In a third scenario, with effective international coordination, but a 
low sense of urgency to respond to climate change because there are too many other 
issues to address (bottom right, ‘together through the other crises’), internationally 
coordinated programmes may be preferred to address problems that are exacerbated 
by climate change (such as management of climate refugees, food and water security). 
Finally, in a fourth scenario, in which there is no will for international coordination 
but also no great sense of urgency, protecting only one’s own country appears to be 
the most attractive response (bottom left, ‘survival of the fittest’).  
 
Extreme climate change is likely to change income and power distribution between 
nations and other public and private actors, and put tension on current political and 
social structures. Different possible futures with respect to international response to 
extreme climate change are characterised by very different constraints and 
opportunities, for the various options discussed in the report. The scenario analysis 
also raised the question of whether, in such a situation, current national and 
international decision-making structures are adequate to deal with climate emergency 
situations.  
 
Figure 8. Four scenarios for global political responses to rapid climate change (Source: Zoeteman and Kersten, 2009) 
 
There may be a tendency to shape a policy response to accelerating climate change, 
under the assumption that countries share a common perception of urgency, 
recognising the need for global cooperation. However, it would be prudent to 
anticipate a future in which this would not be the case. The expert meeting identified 
risk perception 
Low shared 
risk perception 
High shared 
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a number of options which would be robust, that is, useful in each of the four 
scenarios (Zoeteman and Kersten (2009): 
- enhance climate resilience of water and food supplies; 
- improve monitoring of climate change variables, notably of indicators of 
tipping points in the global climate system;  
- develop and agree on rules for research and application of geoengineering 
options; 
- enhance the flexibility of the infrastructure and constructions with regard to 
high sea level and flood levels; 
- develop and export adaptation knowledge and technologies;  
- improve international agreements on (legal status) of climate refugees; 
- decrease dependence on unsustainable energy sources; 
- increase public support for mitigation options, such as wind energy and CCS. 
 
In reality, none of the above stylised scenarios will materialise exactly in the way 
described, and it will become only gradually clear in which direction the world will 
evolve. The actual future also depends on the way in which a possible rapid climate 
change will become ‘visible’, over time, through an evolving evidence base, and on 
the response of society and politicians to such evidence (Text box 4.2). From the 
perspective that a faster climate change than projected by the IPCC cannot be ruled 
out, policy choices and investment decisions should leave the door open for future 
course corrections. Important questions are not only about the specific additional 
policies that should be developed now, but also about which particular investments 
or development plans would likely be adequate for which level of climate change, 
and when that level may be reached.  The next and final chapter presents possible 
policy strategies. 
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Priorities for policy development  
 
• A timely assessment of possible drastic policy measures to counter extreme climate change, 
allows for a balanced evaluation of the pros and cons of each of the options, in case an 
urgent situation would arise in the future.  
• Geoengineering  options are mostly considered a temporary solution, to win time, but in case 
emission reductions or carbon sequestering would fail, it may become a more permanent 
solution. Given the risks involved, development and implementation should be subject to 
international control, in both cases. 
• Individual countries should acknowledge the possibility of international failure to address 
climate change, in which case even more attention to national adaptation will be required. 
• A portfolio of policy options for small countries, such as the Netherlands, would include: the 
explicit inclusion of considerations of extreme climate change in various foreign (climate and 
non-climate) policy areas; integrating appropriate flexibility for long lifetime investment 
decisions; stepwise intensification of national mitigation and adaptation actions, as more 
information about rapid climate change would become available; accounting for the 
possibility that the country will be indirectly affected by climate impacts elsewhere; support 
for climate research and monitoring of potential tipping points; research targeting innovation 
and knowledge export; and a strategy to cope with climate refugees. 
 
What can we learn from the above for the possibilities to respond to extreme climate 
change? More specifically, what would be possible implications for Dutch 
policymakers, involved in both national climate and relevant sectoral policies, and 
international climate policy and other foreign policies? In any case, policymakers 
should take into account that the rest of the world may respond to an accelerating 
change in climate in very different and, as yet unpredictable, ways. Basically, all 
options would work best and with the least negative consequences if they would be 
developed and implemented in an internationally coordinated manner, not in the 
least because, in that way, costs and liabilities could be shared. However, examples of 
countries that have transferred national sovereignty to an international body in the 
area of resource management in the past, are scarce. The difficulty of developing an 
effective internationally coordinated climate change mitigation regime in the 
UNFCCC, is just one example.  
 
In this context,  it probably would be prudent not to exclude any of the non-optimal 
responses, at this stage, including controversial solutions, such as most of the 
geoengineering options. Indeed, countries and companies already have tested iron 
fertilisation of the ocean, and some countries are about to start substantive research 
programmes. It is also clear that different options have different characteristics, in 
terms of risks and feasibility. The best way of dealing with new options, such as 
geoengineering, may not be to treat them as one, but to distinguish between different 
variants. In our assessment, we concluded that the knowledge about most of the 
options is insufficient, at present, to perform a satisfactory comprehensive 
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assessment, and it is too early to exclude any of them. A main dilemma concerns the 
fact that the option with the least risks (emission reduction) requires effective 
globally coordinated action that appears to be very difficult to realise, while some of 
the other options can be deployed by just a limited number of actors but can have 
large but uncertain impacts and risks. However, they could do this either on their 
own initiative or be sanctioned by the world community.  
 
Our assessment has led to the following potential approaches, not in order of priority 
(see also Table 3 for a summary): 
 
a. International climate policy and other foreign policy  
The Netherlands is only a relatively small player in the world economy, and, in 
case of a globally accelerating climate change, the country would be very 
dependent on international cooperation and action. Nevertheless, in the area of 
climate change, the country has played a sometimes defining role in international 
negotiations, which could be a basis for a future international role, in case of 
extreme climate change. Several areas for international policy interventions can 
be identified: 
• Emergency climate change response negotiations. If climate change would accelerate, 
and geoengineering options would remain politically controversial, enhanced 
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would be required, globally. The 
UNFCCC provides a framework for negotiating such increased emission 
reductions, but parallel efforts with coalitions of countries (including the EU) 
may be warranted. This includes efforts to mainstream climate change 
mitigation in relevant sectoral policies that are strongly dependent on 
international developments, such as those of energy and agriculture, but also 
the development of new financing mechanisms, building on CDM and 
similar experiences. Drastic emission reductions may include forced 
behavioural or structural economic changes, of which the political and ethical 
implications require careful evaluation. The International Energy Program 
(IEP), which forms the basis of the International Energy Agency, may inspire 
arrangements to address extreme climate change. The IEP is a legally binding 
treaty, addressing emergency oil stocking and sharing arrangements, to 
effectively respond to oil crises (IEA, 1973, amended 2008). Also, pressure 
on or sanctions for countries which refuse to participate cannot be excluded. 
• Development of rules for research, testing and deployment of geoengineering options. As 
discussed above, many of the geoengineering options have serious risks, and 
can be associated with many ethical and even security-related questions. 
International agreement on research and application can be pursued using the 
existing mechanisms (e.g., ocean fertilisation has been addressed in the 
context of LOS (Law Of the Sea) and CBD (Convention on Biological 
Diversity), and weather modification in the Environmental Modification 
(ENMOD) convention, but new mechanisms might be required.  Proponents 
of geoengineering, such as the NOVIM group (Blackstone et al., 2009), and 
adversaries, such as Greenpeace, have proposed a number of rules for 
research (Santilo and Johnston, 2009). Greenpeace does not support any 
research into geoengineering, because it distracts from the real solutions, and 
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because large-scale manipulation of natural systems should be avoided. 
However, if research is proposed anyway, they say ‘it must, at the very least, 
be scientifically justified, carefully and consistently assessed and regulated 
with precaution’. It should also be transparent, subject to international 
consultation and consent, non-commercial, and liability and redress should 
be clear (Santillo and Johnston, 2009).  
The American Meteorological Society (AMS, 2009) recommends: 
1) Enhanced research on the scientific and technological potential for 
geoengineering the climate system, including research on intended 
and unintended environmental responses. 
2) Coordinated study of historical, ethical, legal, and social 
implications of geoengineering that integrates international, 
interdisciplinary, and intergenerational issues and perspectives, and 
includes lessons from past efforts to modify weather and climate. 
3) Development and analysis of policy options to promote 
transparency and international cooperation in exploring 
geoengineering options, along with restrictions on reckless efforts to 
manipulate the climate system. 
The Royal Society (2009) recommends to consider which types and scales of 
research require regulation, validation and monitoring; to establish de 
minimis standards for regulation of research; and to develop guidance on the 
evaluation of methods, including relevant criteria, and life cycle and 
carbon/climate accounting. In order to have a say in the development and 
application of controversial emergency response options, small countries, 
such as the Netherlands, could put the issue on the agenda and work towards 
international cooperation and control. Before doing so, a national view on 
these options would need to be developed. 
• Limitation and protection of climate refugees. In parallel, increasing impacts of 
climate change in the most vulnerable parts of the world requires attention in 
the area of development collaboration, refugee management and international 
security. While there are legal mechanisms for environmentally displaced 
people, ‘climate refugees’ are not well-defined. Identifying hotpots and 
providing support to those areas, to limit vulnerability and enhance adaptive 
capacity, can limit the number of refugees, but those who cannot be avoided 
will have to be properly protected. Since one of the manifestations of rapid 
climate change will be increasing (frequency and/or magnitude of) extreme 
weather events, enhanced disaster prevention programmes also will be 
important. Particularly, innovative schemes to support the poor in coping 
with the economic impacts of disasters, such as risk transfer programmes, 
can be effective (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2005). In some cases, intentional 
migration as an adaptation mechanism may be considered. 
• International cooperation on knowledge and technology transfer. International 
cooperation on knowledge and technology transfer should not be limited to 
developing countries, not in the least because the boundaries between 
developed and developing countries are increasingly fuzzy. Maximum 
support to large industrialising countries would be required to limit their 
emissions, because this is where most of the increases are expected. 
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Countries, such as China and India, are already rapidly catching up in 
developing new environmentally sound technologies, and countries, such as 
the Netherlands, can collaborate in these developments in priority niches. 
This also applies to adaptation methods and technologies, which could 
include enhanced technology transfer, targeted foreign investments, and 
novel instruments for knowledge and resource transfers. 
• Enhancing emission reductions in the Netherlands. Limiting Dutch emissions can 
ultimately only make a marginal dent in global emissions. However, there are 
reasons to seriously consider preparing for drastic and innovative emission 
reductions. First, a serious reduction target may become part of an 
internationally agreed emergency response package. Knowledge of potential 
national policy options and impacts on economy and society is essential 
before entering into such an agreement. Second, drastic reduction targets, 
well beyond the current Clean and Efficient white paper, would need to 
seriously incorporate and integrate different policy areas – especially 
concerning the ministries of environment and spatial planning, economic 
affairs, agriculture and the treasury department. Third, there may be a first 
mover advantage, creating economic benefits. In the Netherlands, this may 
be particularly relevant for CCS, potentially a key technology to achieve 
drastic emission reductions. The Netherlands, with a large number of point 
sources, pipeline infrastructure and storage capacity, could be an international 
hub for CCS knowledge and experience.  Policies and technology options for 
serious emission reduction are likely to affect consumers directly, maybe 
curtailing freedom. Moreover, some policies and options are outright 
controversial, including CCS and others, such as nuclear energy and various 
forms of renewable energy. Any preparation for drastic emission reduction, 
therefore, should include a strategy on handling public acceptance. 
 
b. Enhanced adaptation action in The Netherlands. With the recent adoption of the 
National Adaptation Strategy ‘Make Space for Climate’, the recommendations of 
the Delta Commission to make The Netherlands safer and more climate-resilient 
and the National Water Plan, already major steps have been taken to prepare the 
country also for projected, but also for accelerating climate change. However, in 
parallel with the three above options it may be wise to start thinking more 
seriously than hitherto about alternative, or additional adaptation options.  
 
- Broadening the portfolio of adaptation options. In a situation of ‘recognised 
ignorance’, enhancement of adaptive capacity with ‘soft’ measures, such as 
insurance and disaster planning, may prevent investments that later would be 
deemed unnecessary.  Also, adaptation options that are more radical than the 
currently considered incremental options, may be required and deserve 
further exploration. 
- Flexibility and anticipation. Another option is anticipating design, at little extra 
cost, taking into account the possibility that, at a later stage, constructions 
may have to be enlarged or changed to respond to the impacts of an 
accelerating climate change, at the same time minimising the risk that 
investments already made, may prove to have been unnecessary. In addition, 
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if different adaptation pathways appear possible, the strategy with the highest 
degree of flexibility may be preferable. Evidently, the optimal solution 
depends on the lifetime of the investment; ranging from decades for 
sewerage systems, to more than a century for urban and industrial areas.  
 
Main knowledge gaps 
Presently, the possibility of rapid climate change and sea level rise cannot be ruled 
out, but their probability cannot be established. For a timely response, it is crucial to 
monitor changes in the climate, atmosphere and ocean, as well as in marine and 
terrestrial systems, and to strengthen research into these systems and their 
interrelations.  
Therefore, the bad news is that extreme climate change cannot be excluded. The 
good news is that there is still time to develop innovative responses by strengthening 
and possibly redirecting research priorities. Ongoing research aimed at increasing the 
understanding of the climate system, climate change impacts, and the economic, 
environmental and social dimensions of mitigation and adaptation options, remains 
valid and urgent. At the same time, a recognition of the possibility of extreme climate 
change suggests a number of specific areas where research can be strengthened or 
initiated:  
• Feedbacks and tipping points. Because of the large risks involved, future 
climate change research could more explicitly include work on the 
feedbacks that may trigger more extreme climate changes than was 
assessed by the IPCC, focusing on those feedbacks that appear to lead to 
the highest risks. Several potential tipping points have been identified, 
often related to specific (positive) feedbacks in the climate-ocean-
biosphere system.  
• Triggering points. In addition to ‘tipping points’ that reflect elements of the 
coupled ocean-atmosphere-biosphere system, which are susceptible to 
threshold behaviour, one could also distinguish ‘triggering points’ in the 
social-political system. Triggering points are factors that raise the sense of 
urgency and generate sufficient social concern to move the political 
system to the adoption of measures. In the area of the environment, 
dying forests and the ‘ozone hole’ are examples of such triggering points 
in the past, for climate change, melting glaciers and ice caps appear to 
fulfil such a role, globally. For the Netherlands, an example is the 
unlikelihood of the popular, historic ‘Eleven Cities’ skating tour taking 
place in the future. Exploring the dynamics of such triggering points in 
the context of climate change would be an interesting topic for research, 
complementary to the tipping points.   
• Upgrade of monitoring and early warning systems. Related to the above tipping 
points and triggering points, additional monitoring efforts may be needed, 
because the current monitoring systems may not be best equipped to 
identify signs of accelerating climate change, for example, related to the 
eventualities in the climate system discussed in Kattenberg and Verver 
(2009). The Netherlands could play an active role in stimulating such 
enhanced monitoring, and possibly by providing financial and 
organisational support. 
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• Worst case climate impact research. Most impact research focuses on the IPCC 
range. It would be useful to analyse the risks of low probability/high 
impact events for vulnerable sectors, not only within the boundaries of 
the Netherlands or Europe, but also including indirect risks through 
global impacts. 
• Modelling analysis of long-term effectiveness of emergency response options. Scenario 
and modelling analyses of combinations of the four options discussed in 
this report, and their deployment, over time, is recommended. Research 
aimed at increasing the understanding of these issues may be more 
important than attempts to achieve higher resolution climate projections.  
• Environmental, technical and socio-economic assessment of innovative emergency 
response options. Comprehensive multidisciplinary research into emergency 
response options would become increasingly important, including:  
- System transitions. Extreme climate change would require mitigation 
and adaptation responses that go beyond incremental improvements 
of current technologies. This suggests that (additional) research 
should focus on system changes, for instance, mobility rather than 
automobiles, energy security rather than power plants, global food 
security rather than crop yields. 
- Geoengineering. Geo-engineering, particularly ‘solar radiation 
management’ options that would quickly counteract warming by 
changing the earth’s radiative balance, is increasingly proposed as a 
safety valve in case of an accelerating climate change, and research 
started in the United States and other countries. However, these 
options are still surrounded by very important questions about risks 
and ethics. Participation in internationally organised and controlled 
research might be preferable to non-participation and the associated 
lack of influence. Options which are currently assumed to have 
relatively low risks (such as cloud seeding, or methods to artificially 
capture carbon from the atmosphere) may be priority candidates. 
- Policy instruments. The current assessment focused on the physical 
characteristics and where possible economic and societal implications 
of emergency response options. Follow-up work is required on 
possible policy instruments that can be used to implement the 
options, and their consequences. 
- Global crisis management. A climate crisis may develop on top of food, 
water and financial crises. More fundamental transitions in 
consumption and production patterns that may be needed to respond 
to such crises are likely to require behavioural or structural economic 
changes, and may involve shifts in the international power balance, 
with associated international security implications. Here, the social 
sciences have an important role to play, and we may learn from the 
area of disaster management. 
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Table 4. Selected options for ‘worst case’ policies in the Netherlands (in italics: options often called 
‘geoengineering’) 
 
Worst case policy option Foreign policy National 
mitigation 
policy 
National 
adaptation 
policy 
Monitoring and 
research 
Drastic 
emission 
reductions 
 • Intensify EU, 
UNFCCC 
action 
• Support 
international 
debate on 
emergency 
emission 
reductions 
(IEA+) 
• Bilateral 
agreements 
• Integrate in 
development 
collaboration, 
technology 
cooperation 
• Stimulate 
pioneerin
g low-
carbon 
technolo
gy 
experime
nts 
• Maintain 
national 
policies 
at 
forefront 
of 
internati
onal 
initiatives 
• Explore 
options for 
using 
synergies 
and 
avoiding 
trade-offs 
• Research on 
system transitions 
and national niche 
areas 
• Stimulate 
knowledge and 
innovation for 
export 
Terrestrial 
options 
• Address in 
UNFCCC, 
CBD 
• N/A for 
small 
countries 
• Explore 
using 
synergies 
and 
avoiding 
trade-offs 
• Continue ongoing 
research 
Marine options • Address in 
IMO, CBD 
• Promote rules 
for research 
• N/A • N/A • Follow/participate 
in international 
research 
Aquatic 
options 
• Promote 
coordination 
international 
research 
•  •  • Intensify ongoing 
research 
CO2 
sequestration 
Air capture • Promote 
coordination 
international 
research 
• N/A • N/A • Follow/participate 
in international 
research 
Space/stratosp
here 
• Promote rules 
for research 
• Avoid 
unilateral 
action 
• N/A • N/A • Follow/participate 
in international 
research 
Albedo 
change 
Surface options 
(cropland, 
desert, urban), 
cloud seeding 
(e.g., sea salt) 
• Avoid 
unilateral 
action; develop 
international 
rules 
(ENMOD, 
other), 
coordination or 
moratorium 
• N/A • N/A • Follow/participate 
in international 
research 
Adaptation Global 
impacts: 
refugees, 
security 
• Enter issue in 
existing 
international 
mechanisms, 
explore need 
• Explore 
options 
for using 
synergies 
and 
• Broaden 
portfolio 
• Integrate 
flexibility 
and 
• Contribute to 
international 
monitoring of 
potential tipping 
points, and their 
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for new ones  
• Focus 
development 
collaboration 
on most 
vulnerable 
hotspots  
• Develop 
mechanism for 
extra support 
vulnerable 
regions/ 
compensation
  
• Integrate in 
trade, food, 
security 
policies 
avoiding 
trade-
offs 
anticipatio
n in policy 
developme
nt 
• Prepare for 
unconventi
onal 
emergency 
options 
societal impacts  
• Scenario analyses 
emergency 
response options  
• Research on 
robust, flexible 
and innovative 
options 
• Stimulate 
knowledge and 
innovation for 
export 
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Appendix 1  A. Drastic emission reduction 
A.1. CO2 capture and storage 
 
1. Short description of options  
CO2 capture and storage (CCS) is a process whereby CO2 is captured from a large 
point source, transporting it to a storage location and isolating it from the 
atmosphere, underground or in the lower regions of oceans. It can be applied most 
effectively to large CO2 point sources in industry, power production and (fossil) fuel 
production (IPCC, 2005). CCS applied to biomass-fuelled plants would result in 
‘negative’ CO2 emissions. 
 
On a global level, industrial and energy sectors emitted 22 GtCO2 eq in 2004, or 45% 
of total GHG emissions including Land use and Land-Use Change and Forestry 
(LULUCF, IPCC, 2007). CCS is considered a promising option for reducing 
emissions from industry and energy supply (IPCC, 2007), and most modelling studies 
consider it to contribute around 20% to the total mitigation effort in a 450 ppm 
long-term policy scenario (IEA, 2008a). In the Netherlands, industry and power 
production account for 100 Mt or 57% of CO2 emissions in 2002, and are projected 
to steadily increase to 125 Mt by 2020 (Van Dril et al., 2005).  
 
2. Effectiveness 
CCS is the only technology that allows for deep cuts in CO2 emissions while allowing 
for the continued use of fossil fuels in industry and energy production (Bakker et al., 
2008). The importance of CCS is particularly large in scenarios based on electricity, 
hydrogen and gas/coal-to-liquids without a full transition to renewable power 
generation or drastic reductions in energy demand. 
 
The entire process chain of CCS, that is, capture, transportation and storage of CO2, 
has not been demonstrated on a full scale. However, most of its components have 
been demonstrated individually, on smaller scales. As such, CCS is not expected to 
pose major technological challenges, but scaling up would take time, costs are still 
high, and questions of social acceptance remain. The geological storage capacity for 
CCS is also a source of uncertainty. Having commercial CCS up and running by 2020 
(G8, 2008) is aimed for, but this requires far-reaching additional policies to 
incentivise CCS.  
 
In several scenarios, CCS plays a large role from 2020 onwards. For example, several 
gigatonnes are projected to be stored in the Blue Map scenario of the IEA Energy 
Technology Perspectives to 2050 (IEA, 2008a). In the IEA ACT scenarios (IEA, 
2006), CCS accounts for 20 to 30% of the total global GHG reduction by 2050, 
aiming for 550 ppmv CO2 eq stabilisation levels. This is broken down into 12 to 18% 
for the power sector, 3 to 5% for coal-to-liquids and gas-to-liquids technology and 
hydrogen production, and 4 to 6% in industry. Projections by the IPCC (2005) 
assumed that, by 2050, 10 GtCO2/yr can be stored, accounting for 15 to 55% of the 
total GHG reduction achieved in a range of scenarios. 
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Physical leakage of CO2 from storage reservoirs back into the atmosphere is called 
seepage. Potential seepage pathways include faults in the cap rock, migration through 
the ground water, and in particular through injection wells. It is not straightforward 
to predict leakage of CCS as this would depend on the specific reservoir features. 
The IPCC (2005), however, considered that ‘the fraction retained is likely to exceed 
99% over 1000 years’. This number should be considered an educated guess, based 
on natural analogues, geological knowledge and modelling, but not on empirical data 
of long-term storage in geological reservoirs. In general, there is widespread faith in 
permanent storage of CO2 in geological reservoirs, as long as the storage locations 
are well selected, maintained, monitored and, if necessary, repaired.  
 
The CO2 capturing process is rather energy-intensive and reduces the efficiency of a 
power plant or manufacturing facility. For a coal-fired power station, the decrease in 
conversion efficiency is around 10 %, for instance, from 45 to 35% (IPCC, 2005). 
This results in significantly higher power generation costs, and if these are the 
marginal cost of production, in higher prices. This may, at least in theory, shift 
production of energy-intensive products, such as aluminium and steel, to other 
regions where CCS is not applied. It has been difficult, however, to quantify this 
‘carbon leakage’ effect. Reinaud (2008) concluded that there are currently no 
indications that increases in power prices due to the ETS, have resulted in a shift of 
production to outside the EU. Apart from driving up the costs, the energy penalty 
results in significant upstream emissions, as more coal mining needs to take place. 
Life-cycle emissions have been quantified by, for instance, Koornneef et al. (2008), 
and led to the conclusion that CCS could reduce emissions from a coal-fired power 
plant by some 70 to 80%, compared to a conventional plant. Its effectiveness can be 
enhanced by co-firing with sustainable biomass.  
 
3. Feasibility  
The immediate feasibility of CCS is limited because of the costs, the lead times for 
implementation and storage potential. It is estimated that a stable carbon price of at 
least 50 USD/tCO2 eq (around 35 euros/tCO2 eq) is needed for CCS to be 
commercially viable (IEA, 2008b). For some industrial sources of CO2, including 
ammonia, some stacks in refineries, and natural gas processing, the costs are likely to 
be lower. For other industries, such as steel and cement, the costs are estimated to be 
higher, at some 100 euros/tCO2 or more. 
 
These costs are made up of investment cost and fuel costs in the capturing process 
and, to a small extent, costs for transportation and storage. As CCS is applied to large 
point sources, the investment costs are also high, for example, 0.5 to 1 billion USD 
for a large coal-fired power station. 
 
The largest technical challenge is that of a full-scale demonstration of CCS on a range 
of CO2 sources, and storage in different types of reservoirs in different countries. 
Once the technology has been proven on this scale, in technological terms, only a 
CO2 pipeline network would be required. However, also important is the availability 
of suitable storage sites within reasonable distances. These can be in empty oil or gas 
fields, on-shore or off-shore, or in saline aquifers. Most estimates of global storage 
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capacity are of the order of 1000 to 2000 GtCO2 (IPCC, 2005), but this number is 
surrounded by uncertainty, and the large-scale and long-term feasibility of CCS 
would depend more on local geology than on global capacity. The Netherlands is 
estimated to have significant storage potential, but over half of this potential is 
located at the huge Slochteren gas field, which will not become available until after 
2050. 
 
Application of CCS requires a range of planning activities: 
• Designing of the capture installation 
• Planning and obtaining licences for a CO2 pipeline (or ship network) and 
compression and injection facilities 
• Selecting and characterising a suitable storage reservoir 
• Implementing procedures for monitoring and safety 
• Acquiring the required licenses 
• Financing and liability arrangements 
Subsequently, the capturing installation (possibly integrated in power or other 
industrial installations), the pipeline or other transport mode, and the storage 
injection facilities, need to be constructed. Assuming the technology has been 
demonstrated for a wide range of applications, and that policy frameworks for 
monitoring and licensing are in place, the minimum lead time for implementing CCS 
in industrial and power generation facilities would be around five  years. 
 
As CCS is an end-of-pipe solution to CO2 emissions, it requires no structural changes 
in the economy. Apart from the abatement costs, no significant welfare effects from 
application of CCS are currently projected. 
 
4. Political implications  
Large-scale application of CCS could be achieved through economic incentives or 
command-and-control regulation. Carbon pricing, however, is only likely to be 
sufficient, if the required price level would be maintained and secured for a long 
period of time (the economic lifetime of the plant). There is much uncertainty about 
the costs, and estimates vary between 30 to over 80  euros/tCO2 eq, which is higher 
than price levels attained by the EU ETS. Therefore, could be concluded that 
additional policies are necessary. These may include, for instance, a CCS mandate, 
emission portfolio standards at plant level, sectoral level or national level, and a 
variety of financial instruments, such as soft loans and grants, and various forms of 
public and private partnerships (Groenenberg & De Coninck 2008). Mandatory CCS 
or emission portfolio standards would come at a cost to plant operators and could be 
covered by a fund, or by increased electricity or product prices. 
 
Because of the possible ‘leakage effects’13 in industrial sectors that operate in a global 
market, it is preferable to implement strong CCS incentives on a global scale. 
However, in the absence of an adequate global policy framework for GHG 
reductions, incentives for CCS on a global level are difficult to implement. Therefore, 
                                                          
13 In this context, leakage refers to the relocation of emission intensive activities to countries or 
regions that have more favourable policies. The net global emission reduction in such cases is nil. 
Alterra-Policy_implications_of_extreme_climate_change_scenarios[2].doc 70 
implementing them regionally (EU) would be a suitable policy level. For power 
production, ‘leakage effects’ are limited, as electricity is not easily transported over 
long distances.  
 
Application of CCS in industry and power production can be seen as an option that, 
given the need for substantial GHG emission reductions, protects the interest of the 
large players in the current economy, that is, the fossil-fuel industry and energy-
intensive industries. This can be seen either as an advantage or a drawback: an often 
highlighted concern is that large-scale introduction of CCS may lead to a lock-in of a 
fossil-fuel based economy, and reduce the chances for renewables (or nuclear 
energy). 
 
A significant social issue is related to the (perceived) risks of on-shore CO2 storage. 
For the Netherlands, this became apparent through the amount of public resistance 
to a CO2 storage project at Barendrecht (Dutch daily newspaper De Telegraaf, 2009). 
Local public resistance is expected to decrease with successful demonstration 
projects providing confidence in the feasibility of safe on-shore storage, as well as 
better public communication and community engagement methods. 
 
5. Options and consequences for the Netherlands 
In sum, CCS plays an important role in recently developed mitigation scenarios and 
could also be important in drastic mitigation. It can be applied to all large stationary 
CO2 sources, which make up more than half of domestic CO2 emissions in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, CCS could facilitate low-carbon transportation if used in 
electricity or hydrogen production, and in combination with biomass-fuelled plants, 
even in situations of negative emissions. The lead time is modest, around (at least) 
five years, particularly if a CO2 pipeline network would be in place. The abatement 
costs are most, below 60 euros/tCO2 avoided. 
 
Wide application of CCS could be achieved by strong economic incentives, with 
certainty over the longer term, or by mandating it for new and existing large CO2 
point sources. When CCS policy is implemented at a national level only, this may 
cause relocation of economic activity (so-called carbon leakage), although this is not 
likely at a European level.  
 
As a policy option for drastic emission reduction in the Netherlands, CCS has 
significant potential, as well as some major challenges. First, there is still substantial 
uncertainty surrounding full-scale implementation – in terms of both costs and 
feasibility. Second, even in a situation where the necessity of drastic emission 
reduction is widely shared, implementation of CCS can only be effective when there 
is sufficient public acceptance, and this is by no means a certainty. Third, CCS policy 
can potentially increase the attractiveness of fossil energy over renewable energy. 
This notion should be taken into account, to avoid policy competition and adverse 
effects. In the fourth place, geological storage capacity may not be available, 
immediately, and gas fields may need to be abandoned or depleted faster to allow for 
immediate storage of CO2.  
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A. 2. Power Supply – Nuclear Energy 
 
1. Short description of option  
Nuclear power plants use fission of radioactive material to produce heat, which is 
then transformed to power via steam. Theoretically, nuclear fusion can also be used, 
but this is  currently still in an early experimental phase and not likely to become 
available before the middle of this century (Clery, 2009).  
 
At present, 370 GW (436 reactors) in 30 countries provide 15% of the global power 
supply, with 39 GW under construction. Over the past decades, nuclear power has 
developed slowly. The IEA and IAEA expect that, under current economic growth 
expectations, global capacity may double by 2030, or possibly triple, under a stringent 
climate regime. Sixty per cent of the currently installed capacity is in France, the 
United States and Japan. Most new capacity will be realised in Asia, Russia and 
transition economies (IAEA, 2007; IEA, 2007; IEA, 2008). 
 
Nuclear power provides base load electricity, typically, in large power plants with 
output of 500 to 1000 MWe. Smaller units are being developed, allowing for regional 
power generation and use with desalination plants – but this concept is not yet widely 
available. Although proponents claim that it is technically feasible to create an 
inherently safe reactor (so-called type IV), the current generation of reactors is 
expected to stay mainstream for the coming decades (Van der Zwaan, 2008). 
 
2. Effectiveness 
The technical mitigation potential of nuclear energy is large (IPCC, 2007) and fuel is 
available in abundance for the coming decades. The speed needed for drastic 
measures, such as emergency response, cannot be met by nuclear plant construction. 
Building a new nuclear power plant takes up to eight years, permit procedures take 
around five year. The lead time until the mitigation effect occurs is instantaneous 
once the reactor starts operating.  
 
Greenhouse gas emissions from nuclear energy, even with a LCA approach, is 
several percent, maximally (IAEA, 2008). The lifetime of a nuclear plant is long, so 
deciding on the expansion of nuclear energy now will, from an economic perspective, 
lead to decommissioning in 65+ years from now (lead time of at least 5 years,  
economic lifetime of 40 years, with two optional extension periods of 10 years).  
 
The (negative) spillover effects of scaling up nuclear energy are significant and relate 
to three main problems that have not been solved, yet. First, nuclear waste will 
remain radioactive for 10,000 years, even if processed. Second, proliferation of 
nuclear technology for non-peaceful purposes is still a concern and the basis for 
several initiatives, such as the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). Besides state supported 
development of weapons, terrorist attacks on storage and transport facilities or 
reactors pose a real threat. Finally, the third problem that has not been addressed, 
yet, is reactor safety and accident risks, which pose a potential health hazard 
(Bruggink and Van der Zwaan, 2001). Substitution and rebound effects of nuclear 
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energy consumption are non-existent, since it is only the production process that is 
different – the resulting energy is physically the same. 
 
3. Feasibility  
The production costs of nuclear energy vary somewhat per location, but are typically 
similar to costs of coal or on-shore wind energy (IEA, 2008). As a result, the 
abatement costs in euros/tCO2  are (very) low. Fuel, operation and maintenance costs 
are small, compared to capital costs (Scheepers et al., 2007).  The private sector, 
however, is hesitant to invest in nuclear energy, since (1) the regulatory risk over the 
lifetime of the reactor is high, and (2) the capital intensity leads to the requirement of 
large initial investments.  
 
Although a nuclear power plant can be easily integrated in the power grid of most 
countries, technology for construction and fuel production is not globally available. 
Concern about the use of nuclear technology for non-peaceful purposes prevents 
free transfer of technology, severely limiting possibilities for global deployment.  
 
4. Political implications  
The costs of nuclear power are comparable to those of coal, even under a very 
modest carbon price. The main obstacle to scaling up nuclear capacity is public 
acceptance and associated permit restrictions. In the light of the significant risks 
involved, national governments take a certain amount of control over the question of 
whether or not new installations should be built – even if the energy sector is market-
based and deregulated. Policy instruments to effectively increase nuclear capacity are 
mainly guaranteeing long-term stability with respect to regulation (i.e. minimise the 
regulatory risk). Addressing proliferation concerns in a world that increasingly relies 
on nuclear power, would be a major challenge. 
 
5. Options and consequences for the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, a single nuclear power plant is in operation for energy 
production at Borssele, which produces around 3% of the total demand. Technically, 
there is no reason why the current coal-fired plants cannot be replaced by nuclear 
plants, especially if the main aim is to further decarbonise the energy sector.  
 
As a policy option for drastic emission reduction in the Netherlands, nuclear energy 
is not useful in the short term, since the lead time is too long. Nuclear energy, 
however, can play a role in the medium term, to help phase out fossil-fuelled power 
plants until a full-scale renewable energy alternative is available.  
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A. 3. Energy  Supply – Renewable Electricity 
 
1. Short description  
Renewable energy is derived from natural processes that are replenished constantly. 
In its various forms, it derives directly from the sun, or from heat generated deep 
within the earth. It includes electricity and heat generated from solar, wind, ocean, 
hydropower, biomass, geothermal resources, and biofuels and hydrogen derived 
from renewable resources (IEA, 2002). In short, in developing countries, of the 15% 
in renewable energy, 7 to 8% is traditional and potentially unsustainable biomass, and 
5.3% is large hydropower, which leaves only 2.5% in ‘new’ renewables (IPCC, 2007). 
Typically, a distinction is made between renewable energy sources for heat (RES-H), 
power (RES-E) and transport fuel (RES-F).  
 
• Heating and cooling from renewable sources consists of geothermal, solar 
thermal and biomass combustion, and takes on 6% of total heat demand 
worldwide (IEA, 2008). There is a substantial potential for solar water heating 
which can be implemented in urban areas at low cost. 
• Electricity from renewable sources amounted to 18%, in 2006, of which 16% 
hydropower (IEA, 2008: 162-165). Wind power installed capacity has been 
growing very fast in some countries, but still only accounts for less than 1% of 
global power production (IEA, 2008). Contributions of Solar PV and 
Concentrated Solar Power are  only marginal, but have huge potential (IEA, 
2008). Biomass accounts for only 1.3% of power production.  
• Transport fuel from renewable sources is limited to 1.5% of all road transport 
fuel demand. Most is bioethanol, replacing petrol, with major producers in Brazil 
and North America. Biodiesel replaces a small fraction of the total fossil-diesel 
market for transport, and is currently mainly used in Europe.  
 
This fact sheet mainly deals with renewable power production. Transport fuels are 
discussed in the fact sheet on transport, whereas heating and cooling is typically 
related to the building sector. IEA projections show that renewable energy, excluding 
traditional biomass, will grow from 7% in 2006, to 10% by 2030, under influence of 
high fossil-fuel prices and what they refer to as strong policy support. In the climate 
policy scenario that targets 450 ppm, the amount nearly doubles by 2030 (IEA, 
2008). 
 
Intermittency 
Renewable energy supply is mostly intermittent, following natural fluxes of sun light, 
wind and water. Energy demand is dictated by human behaviour, and does not 
necessarily coincide with supply.  
 
Technological maturity 
Renewable energy technologies vary widely in their stages of technological maturity. 
A number of technologies are considered ‘mature’, such as bioethanol production, 
biomass combustion, on-shore wind energy and hydropower. Technologies, such as 
off-shore wind energy, solar-PV and concentrated solar power, are in the deployment 
phase, but still gain much from ongoing research. In addition, a number of new 
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concepts are in the (very) early stages of development, such as artificial 
photosynthesis and nanotechnology photocells (IPCC, 2007). 
 
In the absence of efficient means 
to store energy on a large scale, a 
large share of renewable energy in 
the total energy mix can cause 
problems. Moving towards 
renewable energy shares of over 
50% requires increasing 
decentralised production, more 
sophisticated demand management 
and enhancing battery storage or 
pump storage capacity. Various 
innovative ideas have been 
launched to address the 
intermittency problems: linking 
grids across the North Sea to 
absorb large shares of off-shore 
wind energy, creating energy hubs 
with pump storage capacity, and 
even creating a huge new 
infrastructure linking the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) to 
Western Europe, to link solar 
abundance areas with high energy 
consumption areas . 
 
 
 
Figure A.4.1. DESERTEC, a German 
Industry Initiative, aims at connecting Europe 
(high energy demand) to the Middle East and 
North Africa (high renewable energy potential) by 
means of an advanced high voltage direct current 
network. 
 
 
2. Effectiveness 
Although, currently, there is not one technology that can replace all carbon-intensive 
uses of energy, the technical potential for renewable energy is substantial. 
Geothermal and solar PV represent the largest share with 6600 EJ/y, followed by 
wind and biomass combined at 850 EJ/y, and hydro and ocean at around 80 EJ/y 
(IPCC, 2007). The greenhouse gas abatement potential is substantial at reasonable 
costs if pursued aggressively – McKinsey, for example, projected a combined share 
of CCS, nuclear and renewables at 70%, by 2030 (McKinsey, 2008).  
 
Coal-based and renewables-based power productions are complementary: coal runs 
in baseloads and does not easily react to fluctuations in demand, whereas renewables 
typically run either in baseloads or intermittently. A combination of 
intermittent/baseload renewable power and a variable source, such as natural gas, 
makes more sense than completely replacing all fossil capacity with renewable energy. 
The luxury of choosing or prioritising between different types of renewables is not 
available with drastic mitigation, since all available and achievable options are needed 
to reach a significant share of renewable power.  
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Implementation and lead time 
Most renewable technologies can be implemented quickly, with construction times 
from six months to two years. Lead times cover environmental assessments and 
permit procedures, and currently take anywhere between 1 and 7 years. The typical 
economic lifetime of a plant is anywhere between 12 and 20 years. Once installed, the 
effect on emission reduction is direct.  
 
Indirect effects 
Positive spillover effects from renewable energy include enhanced energy security, 
potential access to energy in developing countries and increased employment. 
Negative spillover effects include local environmental pollution (e.g., through 
biomass combustion or pv-panel production). Substitution and rebound effects of 
renewable energy consumption are non existent, since it is only the production 
process that is different – the resulting energy is physically the same. 
 
3. Feasibility  
In terms of feasibility, renewable energy is one of the most promising solutions for 
mitigation of greenhouse gases. The implementation speed is limited by a number of 
factors: cost and local potential, intermittency, and environmental and sustainability 
concerns. In a drastic mitigation scenario, the local availability of renewable sources 
and problems concerning intermittency are most prominent. Costs of renewable 
energy depend on the technology and the availability of resources, varying from 0-20 
euros/tCO2 for biomass waste combustion to 750 euros/tCO2 for small-scale grid-
connected solar PV. As many technologies are in their early stages of technological 
maturity, the costs are expected to decline rapidly (IEA, 2007).  
 
Welfare and equity considerations 
As most renewable energy technologies are more costly than the non-renewable 
alternative, this will increase the price of energy, either through the increased market 
prices or through government policy intervention. Renewable energy resources are 
not spread evenly14 across the globe, so increasing the share of renewables will place 
an unequal burden on different countries. Note that countries closer to the equator, 
typically, have more solar and biomass potential than those further removed from 
the equator.  
 
Structural change and technological availability 
Renewable energy requires relatively limited changes to the energy infrastructure, 
even at high levels of penetration, since the energy itself is not significantly different 
from the high-carbon alternative. The main challenge for increased shares of RES-E 
is dealing with intermittency (matching demand and supply).  
 
4. Political implications  
To increase the share of renewable energy, possibly by actively displacing existing 
carbon-intensive production, two types of instruments are available. The first type is 
market-based, either price based (direct subsidies, feed-in tariffs) or quantity-based 
                                                          
14 The EU, for example, reflects this in the specification of the 20% goal for 2020: countries have a national target according to potential and GDP. 
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(tradable obligation, portfolio standard). The second type is command and control, 
using minimum standards and requirements to direct production away from carbon-
intensive energy and towards renewables. In case of extreme mitigation, a mix of 
command and control (to displace coal) and market-based instruments (to create a 
balanced mix) are most likely to be effective. Price-based mechanisms are slightly less 
efficient, but much more effective and flexible than quantity-based instruments. 
 
Pro-renewable energy policy can be implemented at all policy levels, but in practice it 
is most effective on national government level. Support schemes on regional levels 
(e.g. EU) can improve efficiency, but involve burden-sharing agreements between 
nations. 
 
Renewable energy consumption is not distinguishable from ‘grey’ energy 
consumption and, as such, consumers are neutral towards renewable energy. 
Therefore, there is no change in behaviour required, although the price of energy will 
increase substantially, in most situations. Wind parks in populated areas are typically 
met with resistance; biomass is accepted only if the production sufficiently addresses 
sustainability issues.  
 
5. Options and consequences for the Netherlands 
As a policy option for drastic emission reduction in the Netherlands, moving to 
renewable energy is paramount. However, being a densely populated country, the 
natural resource base in the Netherlands is limited. The main resources available are 
imported biomass for power, heat and transport, and (off-shore) wind power. Solar 
energy use in urban environments is an option, but still costly for large-scale 
application in the Netherlands and, therefore, a less likely candidate for drastic 
mitigation. 
 
The technical potential for off-shore wind energy production in the North Sea is at 
least 10 GW, 20 to 25% of total demand. The potential for on-shore wind energy 
production in the Netherlands is limited; 5 GW, 6% of total demand15. Current coal-
fired plants representing over 4 GW in production capacity, of which 30% can be 
replaced by direct co-firing of biomass with minor plant modifications – and with 
major modifications and gasification plants this can increase to over 80%. Current 
gas-fired capacity of 8 GW can almost entirely replace natural gas by synthetic natural 
gas (SNG). Note that the biomass required to displace coal and gas is all import-
based, and requires an increase in the market size by about one or two orders of 
magnitude.  
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A. 4. Transport and its infrastructure 
 
1. Short description of option  
In this fact sheet, the transport sector covers road, rail, water, air and non-motorised 
transport, based on full chain emissions (i.e., including emissions from fuel and 
power production, although not all emission figures cover these). 
 
Globally, the transport sector accounted for 6 GtCO2 eq
16, or 13% of 2004 emissions 
(Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2007) and is projected to double by 2050, with the bulk of the 
increase taking place in non-Annex I countries. In 2005, CO2 emissions
17 from the 
transport sector in the Netherlands were 39 Mt, almost 20% of the national 
emissions (Hanschke, 2009), which also includes non-road transport. Road traffic 
(responsible for about 85% of GHG emissions in the sector) is projected to increase 
by about 10% in the period up to 2040, assuming continuation of current policy 
(Hanschke et al., 2009). It is generally accepted to be a crucial but difficult sector to 
address, when it comes to GHG reduction. 
 
GHG emissions in the transport sector can be reduced by (after Grütter, 2007; 
VROM-council (VROM-raad), the Dutch Council for Housing, Spatial Planning and 
the Environment, 2008): 
1. Limiting the demand for transport 
2. Improving efficiency in transport on a person/tonne-km basis (i.e., modal 
shift) 
3. Reducing the carbon intensity of vehicles on a km basis (energy efficiency, 
low-carbon fuels and reduction in CH4, N2O and F gases) 
 
 
2. Effectiveness 
The first two mitigation categories mainly relate to behavioural changes, while the 
third contains measures of a more technical nature. Examples of mitigation policies 
and measures include: 
1) Limit (private) vehicle use or amount of air travel allowed, possibly broken down 
by subsector, such as ‘for leisure’, or ‘commodity air travel’; 
2) Promoting or mandating more use of non-motorised transport, mass-transit public 
transport and shipping; 
3) More efficient driving and improving energy efficiency and setting standards for 
emission factors for vehicles, ships and aircraft and /or mandating 
biofuel/electrical/hydrogen-based transportation (with appropriate measures for 
upstream emissions, notably CCS); and reduction in emissions from air 
conditioners. 
 
The measures mentioned above can add up to a large technical mitigation potential, 
that is, transport emissions can be reduced by over 90% (given a decarbonised power 
and hydrogen production). Generally, bunker fuels for aviation and shipping are 
more difficult to decarbonise than those for road transport (Hoen et al., 2009; 
                                                          
16 Including bunker fuels; excluding indirect emissions 
17 Conform IPCC definition, excluding bunker fuels 
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Hileman et al., 2009). The report Saving oil in a hurry (OECD/IEA, 2005) provides an 
overview of a number of oil demand reducing measures that could be used during an 
extended oil crisis. Most of these also reduce GHG emissions, and may also be 
‘acceptable’ in case of an extreme mitigation scenario. 
 
Hanschke et al. (2009), in a scenario analysis for the road transport sector in the 
Netherlands, estimated that a 30 to 35% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2040, 
compared to the business-as-usual scenario (BAU) (including current policy), is 
possible, assuming gradual introduction of power or hydrogen. However, because of 
the projected growth, the emissions in 2040 will be around 1990 levels, on a well-to-
wheel basis18. Hoen et al. (2009) estimated a 65 to 95% reduction in emissions from 
private vehicles, in the long term, by a combination of low-carbon fuels and 
advanced vehicle technology. The freight transport sector appears more difficult to 
address. 
 
It is likely that a mix of both the behaviour/demand side (options 1 and 2) and 
supply side (3) are necessary, in order to achieve deep emission reductions, as the 
technical measures are not likely to be sufficient (Hoen et al., 2009; Johansson, 2009; 
CE Delft, 2007). 
 
Options 1 and 2 mainly require behavioural changes, and to some extent 
infrastructure (e.g., improved public transport or ports, and system changes in the 
economy related to freight transport). Under strong policies, these measures could be 
implemented within 5 to 10 years. As energy efficiency improvement of the internal 
combustion engine has a limited potential (Hoen et al., 2009), decarbonisation of the 
transport sector (option 3) requires large-scale infrastructural changes (hydrogen 
production and distribution, CCS, or large-scale renewable power), and would 
require more than 10 years to take effect. In addition, a change in the vehicle stock is 
generally slow, as the average economic lifetime of vehicles is more than 10 years. 
Large-scale biofuel use would not require such infrastructural changes but the 
potential for emission reduction could be much smaller. The main limiting factor is 
on the supply side, that is, the amount of agricultural land available to produce 
biofuels19. In addition, second-generation biofuel production facilities need to be 
built. On the end-user side, there are no major issues, but in order to use more than 
20% ethanol, flex-fuel vehicles need to be introduced.  
 
With regard to substitution effects and carbon leakage, we note that freight transport 
might be sensitive to policy changes and shift to other world regions, leading to 
carbon leakage. A limit on travel demand may shift economic activities to other 
sectors. Changing to ‘zero-emission’ fuel carriers may increase emissions in other 
sectors, such and power production or agriculture, if these are not covered by 
ambitious climate policy. 
                                                          
18 Given substantial share of biofuels and hydrogen/electricity, this provides a better indication than 
the IPCC methodology, where the emissions for the production of these energy carriers are included 
mainly in other sectors. 
19 If dietary changes towards less animal protein are achieved, this will increase the potential 
substantially. 
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3. Feasibility  
To limit the demand for transport (option 1), both the investment and abatement 
costs are generally low. The OECD (2005) estimated the cost of driving bans, 
telecommuting and a compressed work week, below 1 USD/tCO2 eq. Modal shift 
(option 2) may imply high investment cost (e.g. infrastructure for public 
transportation) but abatement costs are generally low (carpooling)  to medium (>50 
USD/tCO2). No data were found on modal shift in the freight transport sector. For 
decarbonisation (option 3) of the road transport sector, the investment costs are 
often high, while abatement costs, in the short term, are 200 to 300 euros/tonne, and 
in the longer term, <100 euros/tCO2 eq. Biofuel abatement costs are of the order of 
100 to 200  euros/tCO2 eq (Hanschke et al., 2009). When oil prices are around 150 
USD/barrel, abatement costs may come down by 200 euros/tonne (Bakker et al., 
2009). Ecodriving and speed limits have low investment and abatement costs 
(OECD, 2005). 
  
Welfare effects, in terms of constraints on the choices of the individual, and 
productivity, could be significant for several options. Limiting transport demand 
implies reduced opportunities for travel and trade and availability of goods, assuming 
options such as telecommuting/teleworking and urban planning yield only a small 
emission reduction. Modal shift implies reduced use of private vehicles and, thus, less 
freedom of choice. For the decarbonisation options the impacts are much smaller, 
although smaller vehicles and carpooling could also lead to loss in welfare (OECD, 
2005). Therefore, the public acceptance is likely to be higher for option 3 than for 
options 1 and 2. For those options, the required change in behaviour is also larger 
than for option 3. 
 
However, for large-scale decarbonisation, the technological options are not fully 
market ready (Hoen et al., 2009). More research and demonstration is required for 
hydrogen/electric vehicles, CCS and second-generation biofuels. A large-scale shift 
to public transport is likely to require a long lead time. For all options, the structural 
changes in technological and economic organisation are large. 
 
On the positive side, we should note that there are large co-benefits associated with 
GHG reduction in the transport sector, in terms of reduction in air pollution, noise 
and congestion, and improved security of supply and biodiversity (EEA, 2009). 
These are important drivers for transport policy and enhance feasibility and 
acceptability. 
 
4. Political implications  
For the different types of options, a broad range of policy instruments is available: 
• Limiting demand (1): Travel or fuel budgets for personal and commercial 
purposes, such as for air and private vehicle travel (possibly with the element of 
trading allowances); road-pricing or other taxes; driving bans, for instance, car-
free Sundays. 
• Modal shift (2): Very strong financial incentives (taxing and subsidising), 
combined with implementation of excellent mass transit infrastructure. 
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• Decarbonisation (3): Emission standards in gCO2 eq/km for vehicles, ships and 
aircraft, possibly applied to the manufacturers; an emission trading system for the 
same; mandatory diffusion of hydrogen/electric vehicles, and CCS for fossil-fuel-
based production; scrapping of existing cars; banning of (particular types of) cars 
from the market; and implementation of speed limits. 
 
Command-and-control measures are likely to be most effective, but may imply more 
public resistance. Financial instruments may be effective, but changing system 
dynamics (car-pooling, car-sharing, compressed work weeks) could work, as well. 
Therefore, a combination may be preferable. 
 
Options 1 and 2 can be implemented on a national level; option 3 would be best 
implemented on regional or global levels as manufacturers are not located in the 
Netherlands, and an emissions trading scheme is very difficult to implement in a 
small country. Mandatory diffusion, however, could be implemented on a national 
level. 
 
Implications for the political economy and vested interested may be large: 
1) Limiting transport demand may have substantial impacts on the sector itself 
(e.g., airlines/airports or freight transport), particularly, for the Netherlands 
as a freight transport country, but also for tourism. 
2) By a modal shift, equity may be enhanced (more bicycles and trains) but there 
will be an impact on the automobile sector. 
3) For large-scale decarbonisation, very substantial changes in the fuel chain are 
required, which implies an impact on oil production and conversion and the 
automobile sector. There can be positive impacts on equity, due to reduced 
air pollution (though limited for biofuels), particularly, for regions where 
Euro V norms are not implemented. 
 
5. Options and consequences for the Netherlands 
For drastic GHG reduction, it is essential to address the transport sector. Although 
emission reductions are not achieved easily, there are significant opportunities in the 
Netherlands, which reduce air pollution and congestion and improve energy supply 
security as co-benefits. Policy options, first of all, need to look at limiting the demand 
for transport, as much as possible, for example, by people teleworking, driving or 
flying bans and a reduction in freight transport demand. Secondly, a modal shift away 
from private vehicles can be achieved through large investments in excellent public 
transport systems alongside strong financial incentives, together with incentives for 
non-motorised transport. For a shift from road to rail and ships, in freight transport 
financial incentives can be used, as well.  
 
In the longer term, the largest reductions may be achieved by decarbonisation of 
transport. For private vehicles, this should be done internationally through binding 
agreements with car manufacturers. The Netherlands, however, has an advantage 
when it comes to providing decarbonised fuels (electricity or hydrogen), due its high 
population density, and potential and infrastructure for CCS. GHG reduction in the 
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freight transport sector can be achieved through large-scale application of biofuels, 
while for rail decarbonisation of power supply is sufficient.  
 
The implications of such large GHG emission reductions in the transport sector are 
diverse. In general, it can be stated that the transport sector would be moving 
towards sustainability, reducing negative impacts on the environment and society. 
However, the options require significant investments in infrastructure, and the 
limiting of transport demand may have negative implications for the economy and 
society. 
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A. 5. Industry  
 
1. Short description of option  
With 12 Gt CO2 eq, industrial activity is responsible for 19% of global GHG 
emissions (IPCC, 2007). Given the great diversity of industrial activities, several 
approaches to mitigation can be distinguished (IPCC, 2007). Sector-wide options 
(e.g., efficient motors, boilers, heaters), process specific options (highly tailored, 
process integration and optimisation) and operating procedure enhancement 
(insulation, use of steam, etc.). Since 85% of emissions from industrial activity are 
directly related to energy use, mitigation options in industry tend to be energy-related 
with a useful distinction between increasing energy efficiency, switching to 
environmentally friendly fuel types and using better energy recovery and waste 
management techniques.  
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Figure A.5.1. schematic representation of mitigation options (Source: ECN, Bert Daniels) 
 
Characteristics of the main sectors within industry 
The most significant industrial sectors in terms of emissions and mitigation potential 
are basic metal (steel), cement, paper and pulp, and chemicals.  
 
• Iron and steel has limited opportunities for increasing process efficiency, 
switching fuel or recovering power, since most CO2 comes from the chemical 
process of turning iron ore into metal, rather than from energy production20. 
For the metal industry, the most promising directions for drastic mitigation 
are drastic demand reduction and introduction of end-of-pipe solutions, such 
as CCS. 
                                                          
20 The amount of CO2 that results is determined by a chemical formula. For processing two units of 
Fe (iron), one unit of CO2 is produced. New processes are able to work with a four-to-three ratio. 
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• Paper (and pulp) production is energy intensive, and the key to mitigation lies 
mainly in increasing energy efficiency.  
• Cement production is around 10% of industrial emissions and responsible for 
4 to 5% of all anthropogenic emissions worldwide (McKinsey, 2008). It is 
energy intensive by its very nature (Worrell et al., 2001). CO2 is emitted from 
the calcination and mineralisation of limestone (around half) and from heat 
and power production needed in the production process (also around half). 
Demand for cement and concrete is directly related to economic 
development, since concrete is used for buildings and infrastructure. 
Production emissions can be reduced by substituting the main ingredient 
clinker with alternatives, such as fly ash or slag (McKinsey, 2008). 
Alternatively, demand can be reduced by adopting less concrete intensive 
construction methods. Switching to wood-frame construction would greatly 
reduce demand for cement, but can be problematic with the construction of 
high-rise buildings.  
• Chemicals are responsible for around 15% of industrial emissions. The sector 
is energy intensive, but there is ample potential for process integration and 
design optimisation. Reductions in fossil energy use of 50 to 80% are 
technically achievable, although this would require process innovation – 
short-term actions are mainly end-of-pipe, better use of heat and 
management of waste materials. 
 
2. Effectiveness 
Industrial plants and processes are capital intensive, typically have a long lifetime (10 
years and longer) and a significant lead time for construction (up to 5 years). 
Replacement is costly as it does not coincide with a ‘natural moment’, such as the 
end of the economic lifetime or large planned maintenance. In a situation of drastic 
mitigation, there is no time to wait for ‘natural’ replacement moments. With drastic 
mitigation, replacing active plants and developing end-of-pipe21 solutions are two 
likely paths. With end-of-pipe solutions, such as carbon capture and storage, the 
original installation is allowed to remain more or less unchanged. Note that adjusting 
the actual process from raw material to end product generally requires innovation 
and time, as it cannot rely on techniques that are readily available. 
 
Drivers behind development of environmentally friendly ways of industrial 
production are mainly economic and based on increasing demand and lowering 
costs. Policy efforts that take into account requirements for economic viability are 
likely to be effective, as the social and behavioural aspects to policy effectiveness are 
limited. Industrial activity is very energy- and resource intensive. For a concerted, 
global action to lower the environmental impact of industry, the bottleneck is likely 
to be the huge demand for, and mobilisation of capital goods and labour.  
Substitution and rebound effects as a result of lowering industrial emissions, are not 
likely to occur. As with any change in economic activity, spillover effects are likely – 
                                                          
21 End-of-pipe solutions take the original installation emissions, and make sure that these emissions 
do not end up in the atmosphere. One of the most promising end-of-pipe solutions for large 
installations is carbon capture and storage. 
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but it is not clear beforehand which sectors and activities will benefit and to what 
extent. 
 
3. Feasibility  
Industrial production has traditionally been confronted with (very) low and often 
subsidised energy costs, in the interest of national employment and international 
competitiveness. As a result, cutting back energy use has never been a priority, and 
there was little or no incentive to invest in emission reduction innovation and R&D. 
As a peculiar result, medium term extreme mitigation is more feasible than short-
term moderate mitigation – because mitigation options need time to develop. 
Currently, not all necessary mitigation options are available22. 
 
The costs of mitigation options for industrial activities range from negative costs to 
moderately high costs. The capital intensity of the mitigation options is far less than 
with transport or building-related mitigation (McKinsey, 2008). In a situation where 
global emission reduction is taken seriously, it makes sense to invest in mitigation in 
industry (and energy supply): a significant number of low cost mitigation options 
exist and acceptance and behavioural barriers are limited. With extreme targets, 
however, marginal costs rise steeply – especially in the absence of off-the-shelf 
mitigation technologies (as mentioned above). 
 
Note that the cost of energy (and hence of emissions) is often a relatively small part 
of the price of the end product. Price-based policies targeting end products are, 
therefore, unlikely to be very effective. Focus should be on introducing minimum 
standards and on facilitating,  and suitable options should be found in decreasing 
emissions from energy rather than trying to decrease demand by price incentives. 
 
4. Political implications  
Curbing emissions from industrial activity makes sense only when pursued 
internationally, as it is relatively easy for a company to move its resource- and 
emission-intensive activities abroad. Consequently, unilateral national policy efforts 
may lead to emission ‘leakage’, limiting the effect on overall emissions. A notable 
exception is the situation where countries consciously present themselves as front-
runners, showcasing that it is possible to develop low-carbon industry (and gaining a 
competitive advantage from it).  
 
Several instruments are available to induce far-reaching mitigation in industry.  
• A cap-and-trade system, such as the current EU ETS, is likely to be effective 
only when it is strict enough. In a fast reduction scenario, it is worth 
considering refinements, such as benchmark-based emission trading, which 
provides an even stronger incentive to move towards a low-emission sector.  
• Subsidies and taxes are very effective for targeting specific sectors and 
developments, and help innovation, demonstration and deployment.  
                                                          
22 Industry representatives in the Netherlands state that 30% by 2020 is much harder than 80% by 
2050. 
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• Sectoral agreements may have a coordinating role, but in cases of extreme 
mitigation, this instrument is not expected to be very effective. Note that 
some industries may be suited to international sector-wide agreements 
because of their medium to high international exposure, the high 
concentration of actors, and uniformity of production processes (IEA, 2008).  
• Technology standards are usually a good incentive for those technologies that 
stay behind, regardless of stimulus. In a drastic mitigation scenario, such 
standards may be used more seriously.  
 
For drastic mitigation in industry, the likely core elements of an international policy 
package are technology standards and a strict cap-and-trade system. To overcome 
specific barriers, align efforts and support specific developments, a combination of 
taxes/subsidies and sectoral agreements are useful as supporting policy, creating an 
environment in which the core cap-and-trade and technology standards are most 
effective. Ideally, the focus of the incentive is on the marginal abatement and not on 
the entire production costs – this increases the incentive and the acceptance (e.g., 
tax/subsidy that starts only from a certain benchmark value). 
 
Most of the mitigation options in industry take place within the facilities, so members 
of the public are not confronted with it directly. Notable exception is carbon capture 
and storage, for which public acceptance is a very important issue.  
 
Industrial mitigation potential is large and relatively low cost. Extending or replacing 
production facilities requires extensive permit and local (spatial) planning procedures 
with ample room for societal involvement. Given that typical industrial plants have a 
building period of up to five years, in a drastic mitigation scenario it is worth 
considering the situation in which new plants are built in parallel to existing plants, 
which are decommissioned only when the new one comes online. This approach, 
however, requires flexibility and possibly limitations to public interference.  
 
5. Options and consequences for the Netherlands 
In the most developed economies, industrial output grows less fast than overall 
output, since these economies tend to focus more on goods and services. Developing 
economies, however, usually have greatly expanding industrial sectors. In the past 
decades, Europe has profited from the booming industrial sector in Southeast Asia. 
The Netherlands is somewhat of an exception, as the energy-intensive industry is 
quite progressed. Three drivers behind this are the exploration of coal in the south of 
the Netherlands, up until the 1960s, the discovery of natural gas, in the 1950s, and 
the large Rotterdam sea port providing opportunities for industrial activity. 
 
The Netherlands has no industrial activity for which it has a natural competitive 
advantage, except for the activities that benefit from Rotterdam as gateway to north-
western Europe. Adjusting infrastructure to facilitate new industry takes up too 
much time and resources, so initially, it is reasonable to start with extending existing 
locations.  
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A. 7. Building sector 
 
1. Short description of option  
Energy use in residential and commercial buildings is responsible for about 18% of 
global greenhouse gas emissions, of which 38% is from commercial buildings and 
62% is from residential buildings (McKinsey, 2009) . Apart from construction, the 
emissions come from space heating, ventilation and cooling, provision of hot tap 
water, lighting, and the use of appliances. For accounting clarity, emissions from 
electricity production are attributed to the power supply sector. 
 
There is a logical distinction between emissions directly related to the buildings and 
those from the use of appliances. Building-related emissions depend strongly on 
choices made in the design and construction of the building – changing this is so 
costly that it is practically limited to ‘natural’ moments when houses are built, being 
renovated or change owner. Appliances, however, have a lifetime of only several 
years and do not represent as much ‘stored’ capital as buildings do.  
 
Building-related emissions 
Technically, building-related emissions can be reduced, substantially, and in most 
cases it is possible to create energy-neutral buildings23. It is, however, not possible to 
make existing buildings energy-neutral, since this would require design and specific 
features, such as physical orientation to the sun and the use of specific materials. In 
existing buildings,  insulation and energy supply can be optimised, but it is near 
impossible to achieve this without consent of the owner, since most countries 
prescribe that the government cannot impose new rules on existing property. 
Addressing time restrictions is one of the main challenges in designing policy for 
reducing building-related emissions. 
 
For space heating and cooling, and warm tap water, the order in which curbing 
emissions is most effective is first to reduce demand, for example, by insulation or by 
the use of passive solar heating. Next, as much of the remaining energy demand as 
possible should be supplied by renewable energy sources, such as solar boilers and 
heat pumps24. Finally, use of fossil fuels can be optimised, by using micro CHP or 
highly efficient conversion technologies. The energy sources used to provide 
buildings with heating, cooling and warm water differ greatly; most developing 
countries use wood and coal, but natural gas, oil and electricity from hydro or nuclear 
facilities is also used.  
 
Non-building-related emissions 
Long lifetimes and limited windows of opportunity for reduction measures do not 
apply to non-building-related emissions, coming from operating appliances with 
lifetimes between a few year to 10 years maximum.  
 
                                                          
23 Or buildings that need external energy supply only under periodic extreme weather conditions in 
mid-summer or mid-winter.  
24 Heat pumps use energy for pumping, but are able to recover four units of energy for every unit 
used to operate them. 
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Note that the absolute number of appliances still increases. Economic development 
almost everywhere translates to an increase in demand for comfort and electric 
appliances. This is true for the developing world, but, in affluent countries, the 
number of appliances per household also still increases. Note that the observed trend 
is that people work toward an imaginary budget for energy use: when the building 
they live or work in is very energy-conscious, people tend to be less careful with the 
number of appliances they use. The number of computers and external devices, and 
the demand for space cooling still increase rapidly in commercial (office) buildings.  
 
2. Effectiveness 
The technical mitigation potential for building-related emissions is substantial, but 
time is a serious limitation. Drastic mitigation policy should, therefore, not be limited 
to programmes for new buildings, but also target optimising existing buildings. The 
lifespan of existing buildings is 35 to 70 years, with averages in developed countries 
of around 65 to 70 years (i.e., 2% of existing buildings will be replaced annually).  
 
Average appliances for kitchen use, entertainment and work (i.e., computers) can 
generally be made 50 to 60% more energy efficient. Switching lighting from 
traditional bulbs to energy saving or LED based lighting can save up to 90% in use 
and emissions. Producers are capable of quickly making the appliances energy 
efficient, if technology standards are introduced. Unlike buildings, appliances have 
short lifetimes, with new product lines every 2 to 3 years and maximum economic 
lifetimes of near 10 years. Any policy aimed at improving energy use (i.e., emissions 
characteristics) of appliances is potentially very effective. Traditionally, buildings are 
not very thoroughly isolated, which has the advantage of ventilation – with tighter 
construction specifications, the ventilation also needs to be improved consciously. 
 
There are several potential indirect effects in greenhouse gas mitigation in the 
building sector. When buying an energy-efficient appliance, the existing appliance 
often stays in the house – imagine for example TVs in bedrooms or in children’s 
rooms. In the building sector, taking half measures will create a lock-in situation for 
the decades afterwards.  
 
3. Feasibility  
Costs of mitigation of direct building-related emissions are low, compared to the 
long lifetime of the buildings, but require rather high upfront costs. For appliances, 
the initial costs will increase somewhat for more energy efficient alternatives.  
 
Building in an energy neutral fashion requires very good communication between the 
different contractors in a building project and a keen eye for detail. Also, building 
methods will need to change to more tight-fitting pre-fabricated units, instead of 
making extensive use of concrete and cement on site. Note that many large building 
companies own concrete factories and are quite conservative in their operating 
habits; vested interests are barriers to swift implementation of structural changes in 
the building sector. 
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For non-building-related emissions, implementation is feasible in a relatively short 
time, even without lack of functionality. 
 
4. Political implications  
Policies for reducing building-related emissions can be implemented on a local level, 
since the choice of moving to a certain location is not likely to be affected by 
emission constraints. Limiting measures can be imposed directly on the users of 
buildings, but it may be more effective to involve the energy supplier25 (e.g., using 
white certificates) or the owner of the building, rather than the end user. Imposing 
standards is the preferable policy option. For new buildings this is likely to be 
successful, but for existing buildings this will pose legal implementation difficulties in 
most countries. Since the upfront capital costs for most building-related 
improvements are high, financial incentives addressing this barrier may be effective.  
 
For appliances, the most promising policy instrument is imposing strict technology 
standards on producers in an international setting. Restricting end use of appliances 
is much more difficult to implement. 
 
The acceptance of imposing tight standards for building-related emissions is likely to 
be low, since it involves interference with choices ‘behind the front door’. Most 
individuals are very keen on keeping full control over their private lives. 
 
The acceptance of energy efficiency standards for non-building-related emissions in 
the building sector (i.e., appliances) is likely to meet with little or no resistance, as 
long as the same functionalities are offered. If the consequence of technology 
standards is that certain appliances are no longer available (e.g., saunas, terrace 
heaters, leaf blowers) then resistance can be expected, although it is culturally 
dependent to what extent individuals tend to accept government interference in their 
individual choices. 
 
5. Options and consequences for the Netherlands 
The building sector in the Netherlands is quite conservative and the process of 
building is not yet equipped to the communication and detailed standards required 
for very low-energy building. Changing workers knowledge and project infrastructure 
to meet the required standards takes time and is a potential barrier to drastic 
implementation of tight regulation for new buildings. Wood frame building, which 
requires less concrete, is only being used sporadically, and vested interest around use 
of concrete and on site construction may prove to be a barrier to quick introduction. 
Potential for improved insulation and energy efficiency in existing buildings is quite 
large, but hard to implement, for reasons of high upfront costs, timing and lack of 
information and skilled implementation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Whether this will work with extreme mitigation efforts such as 80% reduction is questionable. 
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Appendix 2  B. Removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere 
 
B.1. Agriculture, Forestry and other Land Use (AFOLU) 
 
1. Short description of option  
AFOLU is an important sector and source of emissions, badly covered by the Kyoto 
Protocol (Trines et al., 2006). AFOLU options include, reduction of agricultural 
emissions of methane and nitrous oxide, and sequestration in soils, forests, or the 
type of land cover. The former two formally fit under the category in Appendix A, 
but we have included the latter two in this Appendix B, and biofuels under renewable 
energy in Appendix A. Agricultural emissions accounted for approximately 10 to 
12% of global GHG emissions in 2005, mainly methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide 
(N2O) (Smith et al., 2007). Emissions in non-Annex I countries are about three 
quarters of the total and rising, while, in Annex I, they are declining. AFOLU-related 
CH4 is emitted mostly by ruminant livestock,  and from stored manures and rice 
cultivation, while N2O mainly comes from the transformation of nitrogen in soils 
and manures. In a situation of accelerating climate change, especially methane 
emission reductions can be effective, because of the relatively limited lifetime in the 
atmosphere. 
 
The rate of deforestation between 2000 and 2005 was 13 million ha/yr, mainly due to 
the conversion of forests to agricultural land, but also expansion of settlements, 
infrastructure and unsustainable logging (Nabuurs et al., 2007). Compensated by 
afforestation, natural forest expansion and land restoration, on balance, the net 
deforestation rate is approximately seven million ha/yr. Deforestation and forest 
degradation contributes about 20% to global GHGs (Pirard, 2008). Most studies 
project the rate of deforestation, mainly in the tropics, to continue in the coming 
decades, though there are great differences, and in some regions it is likely to increase 
(e.g., Congo Basin) and decrease (e.g., Malaysia) (Nabuurs et al., 2007). 
 
The AFOLU sector can be characterised by a high number of relevant actors 
(farmers, loggers), dispersed sources of emissions (livestock, soils, forests) and large 
uncertainty with respect to monitoring emissions and establishing baselines. There 
are important links with human diet (Stehfest et al., 2009), bio-energy and sustainable 
development (Nabuurs et al., 2007). 
 
2. Effectiveness 
Given the large share of AFOLU in global emissions, the abatement potential is very 
substantial. Agricultural emission reduction options include improved crop and 
grazing land management, restoration of drained organic soils and degraded lands, 
improved livestock and manure management, water and rice management, land-use 
change and agroforestry. The technical abatement potential is estimated to be 5.5 to 
6.0 GtCO2 eq/yr, by 2030, with the economic potential up to 100 USD/tCO2 eq, 
approximately 4 GtCO2/yr (i.e., 8% of global emissions of 2004). About 70% of this 
potential is in non-OECD countries (Smith et al., 2007). 
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Thomson et al. (2008) estimated that the highest rate of 1.8 to 2.6 GtCO2/yr of 
terrestrial sequestration will be reached by mid-century. The contributions from 
agricultural soils, reforestation and pasture will be about 0.77 GtCO2/yr, 1.14 
GtCO2/yr and 0.55 GtCO2/yr, respectively. They calculated that the total 
contribution of terrestrial sequestration over the next century will be between 84 to 
150 GtCO2/yr, depending on the used scenario.  
 
The realistic potential in agriculture, however, may be much lower, because of several 
barriers (see below) and uncertainty with respect to the effectiveness and persistence 
of CO2 soil sequestration and CH4 and N2O mitigation. Van Minnen et al. (2008) 
suggested that social, economic and institutional barriers could decrease by more 
than 75 to 80% of the physical potential of forest carbon sequestration, by 
preventing carbon plantations in natural vegetation areas.  
 
In the forestry sector, REDD26 is the single most important mitigation option (Trines 
et al., 2007). Forest management and afforestation also contribute to the potential. 
The estimates on abatement potential vary widely: from 2 to 4 Gt/yr by 2030 
according to bottom-up models, to over 13 Gt/yr by top-down models, if options 
with a cost up to 100 $/tCO2-eq  are included(Trines et al., 2006; Nabuurs et al., 
2007). An important part of this is located in South and Central America, with 
significant shares also for non-Annex I countries in Asia, Africa and North America. 
Van Minnen et al. (2008) estimated that, even in the most conservative scenario, 
carbon plantation could compensates for 5 to 7% of the total CO2 emissions by 
2100. This would consist of large-scale afforestation and reforestation programmes, 
soil carbon management, and forest management. Very recently, Ornstein et al. 
(2009) suggested large forestation programmes for the world’s deserts, using 
desalinated seawater for irrigation. While such a scheme would not be cheap, and 
would have uncertain side effects (e.g., on weather and Saharan dust transport), the 
proposal illustrates that innovative options can still be explored. 
Biochar – injecting charcoal in soils – could be a method for long-term 
(centuries/millennia) storage of carbon. However, the dynamics in the soil are not 
well understood, and leakage effects may also occur, yielding significant uncertainty 
regarding the overall GHG balance (Reijnders, 2009, see also Appendix B5). 
 
In addition to the technical options mentioned above, changing the human diet could 
also be a very important mitigation option, as the livestock sector (i.e., meat and 
dairy) accounts for 18% of global GHG emissions and 80% of land-use emissions, 
including the emissions from the production of fodder. Changing from our current 
and projected consumption practices to a ‘Healthy diet’27 (consisting of 52% of beef, 
35% of pork and 44% of poultry/eggs, compared to the 2050 baseline diet) would 
reduce 4.4 GtCO2 eq by 2050. This would reduce the total abatement cost of 
                                                          
26 UN Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in 
Developing Countries. 
27 Based on dietary recommendations by the Harvard Medical School (Willet, 2001, cited in Stehfest 
et al., 2009) 
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reaching a 450 ppm CO2 eq stabilisation target, by more than 50% (Stehfest et al., 
2009). 
 
All options can be implemented directly, as they rely on changing current practices 
(although setting up monitoring systems may take time). Construction time for 
technical options, such as manure management, is short, in the order of years. The 
abatement effect will be immediate (although with afforestation it stops when the 
forest is fully grown). One of the key issues is successful implementation, however, 
this may be difficult (see below). Leakage is a key issue when it comes to forestry: 
shifting of activities may lead to land-use change elsewhere, and a leakage rate of 
50% has been associated with forestry projects (Reijnders, 2009). National 
programmes could reduce the leakage rates (Nabuurs et al., 2007). An important 
positive effect of most of these abatement options is the increased potential for bio-
energy from dedicated lands, due to more efficient use of agricultural land (Nabuurs 
et al., 2007). 
 
 
3. Feasibility  
The economic costs of the main part of the technical potential for the AFOLU 
emission mitigation options are below 100 USD/tCO2. The potential is more or less 
equally divided into the cost classes of 0 to 20, 20 to 50 and 50 to 100 USD/tCO2 eq 
(Smith et al., 2007; Nabuurs et al., 2007). Most of the forestry options require 
significant financing upfront. The options generally rely on current technologies, but, 
in the agricultural sector, technological advancement is a key driver for future 
mitigation (Smith et al., 2007). 
 
Harnessing the total economic potential, however, might be challenging, because of 
several reasons; it requires institutional capacity, investment capital, technology R&D 
and transfer, as well as appropriate policies and incentives, and international 
cooperation. Broadly, there are three major barriers to enacting effective policies to 
reduce forest loss: (i) profitability incentives often run counter to forest conservation 
and sustainable forest management; (ii) many direct and indirect drivers of 
deforestation lie outside of the forest sector, especially in agricultural policies and 
markets; and (iii) limited regulatory and institutional capacity and insufficient 
resources constrain the ability of many governments to implement forest and related 
sectoral policies on the ground (Nabuurs et al., 2007). Pirard (2008), therefore, noted 
that ‘readiness is a major and necessary component for any REDD strategy to 
counter deforestation and forest degradation in the tropics. This encompasses 
institutional, technical and political measures.’ Also social and economic implications 
need to be considered (see below). Environmental impacts of virtually all AFOLU 
options are positive (Smith et al., 2007; Nabuurs et al., 2007). 
 
4. Political implications  
In general, many of the AFOLU options have to be considered from a much wider 
perspective, which includes issues around the production of food, fodder and fuel, 
biodiversity protection, water management, and other issues. Considering the barriers 
mentioned above, designing proper policy is crucial. Historically, AFOLU climate 
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policies have had little impact (Smith et al., 2007). Designing international and 
national policies, including financing for REDD, is currently a priority. Pirard (2008) 
argued that, broadly, two options are available for providing the necessary finance: 1) 
rewards based on demonstrated emission reductions, and 2) sponsoring of relevant 
policies and measures, that is, providing financing upfront. The former is compatible 
with carbon markets, but the latter may provide better incentives and could be more 
effective as GHG impacts are hardly measurable in a quantitative manner, 
particularly, in the short term. Hybrid forms of these options can also be designed. 
 
Trines et al. (2006) highlighted the importance of capacity building for emission 
inventories and monitoring technologies. The Brazilian Government (2008) 
highlighted the following actions in order to achieve zero deforestation: protection, 
preservation and management of public forests; territorial and land organisation, 
including incentives for sustainable production; high precision monitoring; 
strengthen capabilities for enforcement; raise financial resources for the Amazon 
Fund and the Climate Fund; and setting minimum prices for non-timber forestry 
products. 
 
The multiplicity of actors, land sovereignty issues, and ingrained cultural and 
behavioural practices make the adequacy of AFOLU options in an emergency 
situation questionable. Nevertheless, drastic mitigation policy options, such as meat 
and dairy consumption policies, or a ban on deforestation, can be considered, and at 
least in theory, can be introduced quickly, if properly enforced. A complication is that 
most of the emissions and sequestration potential is in non-Annex I countries, and 
equity and sovereignty considerations, therefore, have to be taken into account. 
Effective reduction of smoking in several industrialised countries suggests that 
policies and awareness campaigns can in fact change behaviour, which may set an 
example for changing diets in climate-friendly directions. 
 
For some of the options, the societal impacts could be significant, notably the 
necessary change of livelihoods or reduced income, as a result of REDD. 
Afforestation may have positive or negative impacts, while sustainable forest 
management has positive social and economic consequences (Nabuurs et al., 2007). 
Dietary changes may also encounter substantial social barriers, even though desirable 
from a health perspective. Most of the agricultural options have a limited or positive 
impact, though there is also some uncertainty (Smith et al., 2007). 
 
5. Options and consequences for the Netherlands 
The largest share of the potential is outside the EU, and most of the options above 
pertain predominantly to the developing/EIT countries. For a densely populated 
country with a relatively large agricultural sector, such as the Netherlands, there is a 
set of specific options: 
• Reduce emissions from greenhouse horticulture, either by turning it into a 
zero-emission sector, abolish lighting practices, or abandon energy 
consuming greenhouses altogether. The last option, however, would 
obviously have substantial impacts. 
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• Technologies, such as CHP, biodigesters, improved feeding practices for 
livestock, manure management, and bio-energy, have a significant potential, 
against costs of up to 200 USD/tCO2 eq (Daniels and Farla, 2005) and 
limited societal impacts. 
• If there is an acceptable way of substantially reducing meat and dairy 
consumption, preferably in international context, this would also be highly 
effective. 
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B.2. Enhanced ocean sequestration 
 
1. Short description of option  
Because the availability of nutrients in the oceans exhibits considerable regional 
variations, many authors suggested to increase the efficiency of the oceanic 
‘biological pump’ (see Text box 1), via addition of nutrients in areas with nutrient 
deficiency, in order to stimulate the net primary production in the top layer. While a 
fraction of this additional biomass will be recycled in the upper zone, another part 
will sink and will be incorporated into the ocean sediments, and thus be drawn from 
the global carbon cycle (e. g. Martin and Gordon, 1988; Hutchins and Bruland, 
1998). Two types of macronutrients are proposed as ‘ocean fertilisers’:, those that are 
required in relatively high concentrations, such as nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P), 
and those of which much smaller quantities would suffice, such as iron (Fe) and zinc 
(Zn). The role of the micronutrients is to facilitate more efficient usage of existing 
macronutrients (Lampitt et al., 2008). 
 
Enhanced phytoplankton productivity affects the climate through one feedback 
process, that may have even greater effect than the direct sequestration of CO2 - that 
of increased emissions of dimethyl sulphide (DMS) (e.g., Charlson et al., 1987; Ayers 
and Gillet, 2000; Wingenter et al., 2007). DMS emissions play an important role as 
cloud condensation nuclei, especially in the Southern Hemisphere, where 
anthropogenic sulphate emission is low (Gondwe et al., 2003). Gondwe et al. 
calculated that DMS accounts for 43% of the atmospheric nss-sulphate28 burden in 
the Southern Hemisphere, with a regional peak of more than 80% in the Southern 
Ocean during the summer. For a comparison, DMS contribution to the global nss-
sulphate burden is only 19%.   
 
In addition to the biological options, also chemical uptake of CO2  by the ocean, 
theoretically, can be enhanced. In total, three different schemes to enhance oceanic 
carbon uptake can be distinguished: 
 
A ) Adding macro- and micronutrients. In the experiments carried out so far, macro and 
micronutrients were just dumped from ships into the ocean. For large-scale 
implementation, however, it is proposed that fertiliser cocktails of macro- and 
micronutrients should be manufactured on land and transported by submarine pipe 
to a region significantly beyond the edge of the continental shelf. The nutrient ratios 
and the temporal supply rates could be controlled so that biological populations that 
optimise sequestration can develop. Such environmental manipulation is carried out, 
today, in a sophisticated manner in terrestrial glasshouses (Lampitt et al., 2008). 
 
B) Bringing up nutrient-rich deep water. Lovelock and Rapley (2007) suggested to enhance 
the production and sequestration of organic carbon, by bringing up to the surface 
                                                          
28 Dimethyl sulphide (DMS) is a semi-volatile organic sulphur compound, which is oxidised to 
sulphur dioxide (SO2) and other products in the atmosphere. From SO2, non-sea-salt (nss) sulphate is 
produced, which, in turn, can form sulphate (SO 4 2− ) particles, that act as condensation nuclei for 
water vapour (Stefels et al., 2007) 
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layer nutrient-rich deep ocean water by the means of pipes, using kinetic wave 
energy.  
 
 
Text box 1: The Biological and Solubility pumps 
 
The oceans are a huge CO2 sink – containing 50 times more CO2 than the 
atmosphere, and having absorbed almost 30% of the anthropogenic CO2, emitted 
since the beginning of the industrial revolution (Raven and Falkowski, 1999). The 
oceans are involved in the carbon cycle through two mechanisms: the first one, called 
‘solubility pump’, is driven by ocean circulation and by the solubility of CO2 in 
seawater; the other one is called ‘biological pump’. The latter is determined by two 
counteracting processes, namely primary production and calcification, and the rate 
with which organic matter is transferred to the deep sea (Figure B.2.1). The two 
pumps create a vertical carbon gradient, because they tend to increase carbon 
concentration of the deep water. Only carbon from the zone below the depth of 
winter mixing can be considered as sequestered. The depth of winter mixing 
demonstrates high regional variability in the range of 200 to 1000 metres (Lampitt et 
al., 2008). 
Solar radiation warms and illuminates much more surface ocean water than nutrient-
rich deep ocean water, thus, giving rise to a thermal gradient. The upper layer is well-
mixed, with higher CO2 concentration and abundance of phytoplankton. While the 
thermal gradient isolates phytoplankton in the upper layer, seasonal heating and 
cooling, storms, eddies, high 
frequency internal waves and coastal 
upwelling driven by winds, improve 
the mixing and, hence, accelerate the 
transfer of nutrients from deeper 
waters to the surface. (Raven and 
Falkowski, 1999). Moreover, the 
mixing brings cold water to the 
surface and, thereby. enhances the 
ability of the ocean to sequester  
CO2, as the solubility of CO2 
increases in cold water. 
 
 Figure B.2.1. Schematic of the decrease in 
downward flux of organic carbon as a 
function of depth in the water column 
(Source: Lampitt, 2008 ) 
 
C ) Enhancing oceanic uptake of CO2 by addition of limestone. The idea to enhance the 
absorption of CO2 by adding alkaline minerals to the ocean was first explored by 
Kheshgi (1995) and further developed by Rau and Caldeira (1999). Kheshgi (1995) 
proposed to heat limestone (CaCO3 ) to about 850 
oC, in order to split it into CO2 
and CaO. CO2 could be sequestered directly, for instance, and the soluble CaO could 
be added to the surface layer. Rau and Caldeira (1999) also considered reaction of 
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CO2 with limestone in chambers on land prior to releasing them into the ocean. 
Appropriate locations would be in regions that have a combination of low-cost 
'stranded' energy, considered too remote to be economically viable to exploit – such 
as flared natural gas or solar energy in deserts – and regions that are rich in 
limestone, making it feasible for calcination to take place on site. Seawater would be 
able to take in more CO2 than is generated by the lime creation process (quote Tim 
Kruger of Cquestrate, http://www.scienceblog.com/cms/dash-lime-new-twist-may-
cut-co2-levels-back-pre-industrial-levels-16931.html). However, Harvey found that 
the process could be performed without this first step – his idea was to sprinkle 
crushed limestone directly over the ocean surface (Harvey, 2008).  
 
2. Effectiveness  
Lenton and Vaughan (2007) assessed the potential effect on radiative forcing of 
various fertilisation options, using a climate model (Table 1). As can be seen from 
this table, some options, such as ocean upwelling and downwelling have very small 
mitigation potential and, therefore, their deployment would have very tiny impact on 
the GHG emission reduction. Moreover, this assessment  was based on the 
assumption  that the proposed schemes are effective in drawing down CO2, while the 
question of whether ocean fertilisation is effective is not persuasively answered yet 
(Boyd et al., 2007; Lampitt et al., 2008). Lutz et al. (2007) discovered, for instance, 
that the transport of organic matter to deep water is less in the summer during algal 
blooms than during the rest of the year, because, instead of sinking, the organic 
matter is recycled within the food web and stays in the upper ocean layer. The 
enhancement of oceanic uptake of CO2 by addition of limestone is also questioned. 
Shepherd et al. (2007) argued that, as deep waters contain high concentrations of 
CO2, when this CO2 is brought to the ocean surface and consequently released, it 
may offset the CO2 sequestration, because of higher primary production and cooling 
the upper layer. Karl and Letelier (2008) identified a new mechanism of CO2 
sequestration via secondary blooms, however, pointing out that higher sequestration 
rates are plausible. Further research is needed in order to assess the real sequestration 
potential of this method, too.  
 
Table B.2.1. Effectiveness of fertilisation options (Source: Lenton and Vaughan, 2009) 
  
 
 
Effectiveness also depends on the speed with which the option can be deployed. 
Ocean fertilisation through the addition of macro- and micronutrients and limestone 
could be implemented immediately, if proved efficient. The enhancement of CO2 
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sequestration by bringing up nutrient-rich deep water could be employed within a 
decade. How quickly the climate system responds, will depend on the removal rate of 
CO2. Harvey (2008) argued that the full effect of adding limestone powder on the 
eventual change in radiative forcing may be delayed by up to 100 years. The process 
should be continued until the desired atmospheric CO2 concentration levels are 
reached.  
Major questions exist with respect to the ratio between the energy required and the 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with that energy consumption, and the carbon 
removed. Lampitt et al. (2008) suggested that ‘the energy costs of producing the 
cocktail (of macronutrients) and piping it from the land to regions of nutrient 
limitation, are likely to be large with a carbon footprint that may be greater than the 
carbon sequestered’. In general, this is also the conclusion about the energy efficiency 
of heating limestone on land in order to split it into lime and CO2 (Harvey, 2008). An 
open source project, studying the practicality of limestone addition 
(http://www.cquestrate.com/) has calculated that ‘to offset current emissions (in the 
region of 7GtC per year) would consume 10.5 km3 per year, and require some 80 
billion GJ in heat energy – equivalent to a power output of 2500 GW. At double that 
power output, the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere could be reduced 
back to pre-industrial levels in about forty years.’  
3. Feasibility 
A number of tests for adding nutrients to the ocean have already been performed, 
including ship-based experiments (e.g., Boyd et al., 2007). The US Department of 
Energy is carrying out laboratory tests on limestone addition (Golomb et al., 2005). 
The company Atmocean carried out the first experiment, bringing up nutrient-rich 
cold water from 300 metres depth using ‘wave pumps’. 
(http://www.atmocean.com/sequestration.htm).  
 
Although there are global biogeochemical models available, gaps in knowledge and 
insufficient data hinder the accurate prediction of ecosystem response, upper ocean 
production and the transport of organic carbon to deep waters (Lampitt et al., 2008). 
For some possible fertilisers, such as phosphorus, resource limitations may be an 
issue. 
 
As to the economic feasibility, many of the published calculations of the costs of 
different ocean fertilisation options are very rough and incomplete and, therefore, 
often very low. In addition, the lack of understanding of key processes and, thus, the 
effectiveness of different options, make such estimation even less reliable. In the case 
of macronutrient addition, Lampitt et al. (2008) estimated the costs of phosphorus 
and nitrogen fertilisation at about 45 and 25 USD (12 and 7 USD per tonne CO2 
avoided) per tonne sequestered carbon, respectively, excluding the costs of 
purification and injection. For iron fertilisation, Barber (2001) estimated a price of 4 
to 8 USD per tonne C sequestered (1 to 2 USD per tonne CO2 avoided ). In much 
more detailed calculations, where the costs for fisheries, such as downstream losses 
of productivity, delivery systems (multiple vessels or aircraft), monitoring and 
verification, and research and development, are taken into account, the cost of C 
sequestered using ocean iron fertilisation would be between 30 and 300 USD (8 to 80 
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USD per tonne CO2 avoided)(Boyd, 2008). Rau et al.(2007) estimated the cost for 
limestone addition and concluded that costs of 11 to 15 USD per tonne C (3 to 4 
USD per tonne CO2 avoided) are plausible for certain locations with most favourable 
conditions. 
 
4. Earth system risks and co-benefits  
Direct and indirect climate effects other than radiative forcing, such as effects on 
GHG concentrations and other positive and negative environmental and ecological 
side effects include: 
  
• Changes in the structure and function of the ecosystems and biogeochemical cycles. Ocean 
fertilisation most probably will lead to changes in the structure and function 
of marine ecosystems. As a result, lowering of biological diversity, decreasing 
ecosystem services, eutrophication and anoxia due to algal blooms, and 
alteration of ocean chemistry, can be expected with both positive and 
negative effects on fisheries (Lampitt et al., 2008). Our current level of 
knowledge does not yet allow us  to estimate the potential magnitude of these 
side effects.  
• Dimethyl sulphide production. Nutrient abundance plays a secondary role in DMS 
production. Other factors, such as species composition, light and temperature 
have much higher impact, but we cannot control them. Therefore, our ability 
to stimulate DMS production via ocean fertilisation is very limited. (Stefels et 
al., 2007). Moreover, ocean fertilisation is not always accompanied by an 
increase in DMS – the experiments show that fertilisation could makes the 
Southern Ocean a DMS source and the subarctic Pacific a DMS sink (e.g., 
Wingenter et al., 2004; Levasseur et al., 2006). 
• Increase in trace and greenhouse gas emissions. In addition to DMS, marine 
microorganisms produce and consume many other trace gases (e.g., Jin and 
Gruber 2003; Wingenter et al., 2004). While increase in DMS is considered a 
valuable side effect of ocean fertilisation, increase in emissions of other gases, 
such as halocarbons, methane, and nitrous oxide, raises concerns, as the first 
gas contributes to ozone destruction and the last two have high global 
warming potential.  
• Increase of ocean pH. Ocean fertilisation probably counteracts the current trend 
of increasing ocean acidification, caused by decreasing pH in the surface zone 
(Harvey, 2008; Lampitt et al., 2008) . Therefore, addition of alkaline 
substances, such as limestone, is proposed as an approach to mitigate ocean 
acidification. This approach has its own drawbacks, however, because adding 
high amounts of alkalinity could potentially also lead to ecosystem changes. 
Moreover, mining of huge amounts of limestone will have adverse 
environmental effect, too. (Raven et al., 2005). 
• Unknown effects. Finally, the possibility of unforeseen, cumulative, and long-
term adverse consequences cannot be ruled out (see Sulfur injections). 
 
As to irreversibility, ocean fertilisation can be stopped at any moment and, hence, 
could be considered as a reversible option, but some side effects may have 
irreversible results. The option does not have a rebound effect. 
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5. Political implications  
Ocean fertilisation can relatively easily be implemented by individual (or groups of) 
nations or private companies. To date, a few companies have already been 
established, hoping to acquire future carbon credits. However, because of the above 
risks and uncertainties, international control is required, and some existing 
mechanisms provide a basis for such control. The United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (LOSC, 1982) regulates the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, stipulating that all states, including those which are not party to 
the LOSC, are obliged to take individually and jointly all measures necessary to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment. It also prohibits 
dumping, defined as ‘any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, 
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea’ (Article 1(5)).  
 
A number of other global and regional treaties, among which the London Dumping 
Convention (1972) and its London Protocol (1996), regulate further dumping of 
wastes in the ocean. The London Convention lists wastes and other matter, of which 
dumping is prohibited or requires a special prior permit, while for all non-listed 
substances a general prior permit is required. The London Protocol introduces the 
precautionary principle in regulating disposal activities in the ocean, requiring a total 
prohibition on all dumping unless it is shown there are no alternatives and it can be 
proven harmless to the environment.  
 
There is ongoing debate over whether or not ocean fertilisation practices is exempt 
from this ban on dumping. However, given the lack of scientific consensus on its 
efficacy, and the apprehension about its potentially serious side effects, the 
contracting parties to the London Convention and London Protocol agreed in 
November 2007 to ban large-scale fertilisation activities and to allow only scientific 
research (Freestone and Rayfuse, 2008; Rayfuse et al., 2008). This was followed by a 
moratorium on large-scale commercial ocean fertilisation schemes, adopted by 191 
nations on 30 May 2008, at a meeting of the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity (1992), in Bonn, Germany. The moratorium will remain in force 
until ‘scientists better understand the potential risks and benefits of manipulating the 
oceanic food chain’ (Tollefson, 2008). 
 
6. Options and consequences for the Netherlands  
The Netherlands could take part in research and development and monitoring of 
large-scale tests. 
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B.3. Aquatic carbon sequestration (algae) 
 
1. Short description of option  
 
Principle 
CO2 cannot only be removed from the atmosphere or from flue gases through 
terrestrial systems, but also through algae in aquatic systems. After sequestration, the 
algae can be used as a renewable energy source and further contribute to mitigation. 
From this perspective, this option could also have been included in Appendix A. The 
name algae is given to a large group (more than 100,000) of organisms with very 
different cell morphologies. These organisms are photoautotrophic, converting 
sunlight via a photosynthetic process into biochemical energy, fixing carbon dioxide 
and producing oxygen. Algae can be found in any habitat on the planet where water 
or at least moisture might be present for some time; from hot springs and deserts to 
snow; in fresh and saline water and in the sea. Some of them are free-floating in large 
water bodies in the form of  phytoplankton, forming the base of food webs, while 
others live attached to the bottom and are called benthic algae. Photosynthesis of the 
algae is oxygenic and involves a set of chemical reactions where solar energy is used 
to split water into electrons, hydrogen ions, oxygen and carbohydrates, storing 
carbon dioxide as chemical energy in the form of organic compounds. This can be 
summarised by the following stylised equation (different algae have different 
compositions and different molecular weights):  
        
6CO2 + 12H2O    C6H12O6 + 6O2 + 6 H2O   
 
Cultivation of algae is of interest, because of their fast growing rates, production of 
valuable components, such as proteins and fats, their ability to fix CO2 and to be 
grown on marginal lands with utilisation of waste or brackish water (Chaumont, 
1993). The extreme diversity in their preferred habitats and physiology has led to 
many different technical solutions for mass cultivation (Pulz, 2001). These could be 
divided into two big groups: open systems and systems providing an artificial 
environment to grow, called photobioreactors, each having its advantages and 
disadvantages.  
 
Open systems 
Open systems comprise of natural waters, artificial shallow ponds, tanks, circulation 
ponds and raceway ponds (Ugwu et al., 2007). They are relatively cheap and easy to 
construct and maintain, but do not allow controlling key factors, such as 
temperature, pH and light conditions, and are vulnerable to invasive species and 
plagues. In dry, hot conditions evaporation could be significant, while dilution due to 
rainfall may decrease salinity much below the requirement of some strains. Open 
ponds have to be shallow, in order to prevent mutual shading of the cells and this 
increases their land requirements. Paddle wheels are often used to mix the air, in 
order to increase the CO2 levels in the water and to improve the light conditions for 
the average cell, impeding the development of a thin dense upper layer (Pulz 2001; 
Chaumont 1993; Ugwu et al., 2007). 
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Photobioreactors 
Most of the problems that plague open systems are solved by the use of 
photobioreactors, as these offer much greater control of most parameters and, 
hence, offer higher productivity. Theoretically, when all factors are optimised, they 
can provide an up to 10 times higher productivity than current open ponds. There 
are many designs: horizontal, vertical and inclined; tubular, plate-type (Pulz, 2001; 
Janssen et al., 2003), triangular (Vunjak-Novakovic et al., 2005), ultrathin 
immobilised configurations with inclined lanes (Doucha et al., 2005), and membrane 
technology using solar collectors (Byless et al., 2001). Algae reactors could be directly 
fed by the flue gases from coal-fired power plants. Companies in the United States 
and Israel are currently testing this technology. 
 
 
 
Figure B.3.1. Left: GreenFuels photobioreactors, source: GreenFuels Inc. Right: Pilot plant in 
Hawaii, source: Nakamura et al.,2005     
 
2. Effectiveness  
For the production of 1 MT of algae, up to 1.83 MT CO2 can be fixed. The 
technology is available, but requires optimisation and upscaling to play a role on a 
global level, to be able to respond to accelerating climate change. Contamination with 
other algae, bacteria, yeast, and fungi, is one of the mayor problems for the algal 
cultivation systems, especially for the open ones. It could reduce the yield or even 
completely destroy the culture (Chaumont, 1993). 
Our knowledge about algae photosynthesis having direct influence on the 
productivity of the algae, is still limit, especially the enzyme processes and feedback 
mechanisms. The number of well-known algae species is very low, approximately 
400. A comprehensive inventory of species in all regions and sufficient knowledge of 
their metabolites, which will allow strains with desired features to be obtained, are 
still lacking.  
 
One of the Dutch producers of algae oil reaches a ratio of approximately 3:1 for 
fossil oil as input: algae oil as output, using photobioreactors, but the technology of 
this company is not highly energy optimised. The companies, researching production 
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of algae for biofuels, claim that their energy efficiency is much better, but we could 
find no reliable numbers in the literature.  If the system would work well with 
adequate efficiency, it could be continuously used as a renewable energy source, for 
as long as it is needed. 
 
 
3. Feasibility  
There are already small commercial units for algae production, but they produce only 
limited quantities of high-value products and, hence, the volume of CO2 that they 
sequester is not of great importance. The number of pilot projects for production of 
algae biofuels is growing, but none of them is at a commercial scale, yet. If they 
would succeed, they could produce large volumes of algae. The algae technology is 
relative new and, therefore, far from optimised. There are many remaining technical 
challenges, for example, the multitude of different algae species. The first difficulty is 
to choose the right species, for instance, for specific climate conditions, production 
design, and productivity. Routine agricultural techniques, such as breeding, have not 
been employed, so far. In addition to the species selection, there are many 
parameters which can hinder the system performance, such as the duration of the 
light–dark cycle, utilisation of the light without photo-inhibition, temperature, pH, 
and removal of O2. The methods for wall cleaning and effective sterilisation of the 
reactor’s interior need improvement, too. Availability and impacts of fertilisers may 
be another issue, unless the nutrients can be recycled in closed systems. It is 
estimated that it would take about 10 to 15 years before large-scale application of 
algae for bioenergy could be realised (AER , 2008) 
 
System integration is also in the initial phase and the scale-up poses significant 
engineering challenges. One class of problems is directly associated with the size of 
reactors. The requirements for maintenance of optimal mixing, light conditions and 
temperature, oxygen concentration and stability, impose limits on the diameter, width 
and height of reactors. The distance between bioreactors has to be optimised, too, 
because there is an obvious trade-off between the requirement of minimised shading, 
thus, setting the reactors wide apart, and the economical considerations for more 
compact configurations, in order to minimise expenses on infrastructure and land 
(Janssen et al., 2003; Ugwu, 2007; Vunjak-Novakovic et al., 2005). Other types of 
problems emerge when more units have to be put together, because each unit needs 
separate equipment for maintaining and controlling the optimal conditions within 
photobioreactors (Janssen et al., 2003). As there is still so little experience with 
scaling up, obviously, much could be achieved, not only through improving of each 
element of the system, but also through system integration. Unfortunately, the 
existence of many designs and many algae strains does not allow for uniform 
solutions, therefore, it is expected that each case has to be optimised separately.  
 
One of the most expensive processes in the algal production is the harvesting. 
Further developments have to make it more economically feasible. Grobbelaar et al. 
(2000) calculated that for the fixation of 50% of CO2, emitted from 300 MW coal-
fired power plant, approximately 100 km2 of algal culture would be needed.  In this 
case, the investment costs would be 2.8 billion USD, and operational costs would be 
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more than 0.6 billion USD, per year. These costs are highly speculative, however, as 
there is no such big unit operational, yet. ( It should be noted that the efficiency of 
open pond systems is much lower than that of bioreactors). The AER (2008) 
estimated that current prices of 50 to 100 euros/kg can be reduced through upscaling 
and optimisation to less than 1 euro/kg, provided that sufficient capital will be 
invested. 
 
4. Earth system risks and co-benefits  
Algal systems are able not only to fix CO2, but also other GHG emissions (CH4 and 
NOx) from flue gases, and during waste-water treatment, to recycle nutrients from 
agricultural wastes. Algae can be used, among other things, for the production of 
animal feed, for aquaculture, and fertilisers, and, therefore, their production can 
contribute to the reduction in energy use and GHG emissions, indirectly.  
 
Some of the biggest advantages of the algae-based systems, however, is that they do 
not need arable land, and that algae are able to grow in brackish water, and, hence, 
do not compete with food production. Algae were found to be tolerant to a wide 
range of salinity. Salinity changes, due to evaporation and rainfall in open cultivation 
systems, and could be controlled by adding either fresh water or NaCl. High oil 
content in some algae and their high-rate growth make these organisms one of the 
best candidates for biofuel production. Producing algae-based bio-diesel, for 
instance, will require from 5 to 70 times less space than that based on rapeseed. The 
production of bio-diesel is not the only algae-based fuel; ethanol, methane, gas from 
gasification processes, and methanol (as a by-product), are other possibilities. 
Another direction of research is hydrogen production. Algae are able to produce H2 
photosynthetically. At the moment, however, the production of O2 hampers the 
production of H2. If scientists are able to overcome this problem, genuine clean fuel 
would become available. At present, algae biofuels cannot yet compete economically 
with fossil fuels. 
 
Algae can also be used in waste-water treatment. Sijtsma and Reith (2006) estimated 
that 500 million m2  of water could be cleaned in the Netherlands with algae systems, 
by 2030, fixing 1 Mton (1,000,000 MT) CO2. These systems have some drawbacks, 
however:  
• they are expensive; 
• they are relatively slow (hours to days), compared to chemical systems;  
• the algal biomass concentration is rather low, what makes harvesting difficult 
and costly; 
• for the optimal result, light and specific temperatures are required, which 
makes these systems quite often unstable and very dependable on weather 
conditions, while waste water has to be cleaned all year round. 
 
High protein content in some of the algae species, availability of unsaturated ω3 and 
ω6 fatty acids, pigments, and almost all essential vitamins, make algae very attractive 
for commercial production. The current market for algae products is 5000 t/year, 
with a turnover of approximately 1.25 billion USD/year and is expected to grow 
(Pulz and Gross, 2004). Algal products are CO2 neutral, and because of the high 
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price of some of them, they can offset the high costs for CO2 fixation and biofuel 
production. The present market is only a niche market, however, and development 
of new markets would be needed if algae are to play a role in global GHG emissions 
reductions. 
 
5. Political implications  
Compared to other options discussed in this report, the political implications appear 
to be limited. When applied unilaterally as a source of energy, or as a way of 
removing CO2 from flue gases, it can be a local way of reducing CO2 emissions 
without significant risks to other countries. In these cases, but also if the method 
would be used to draw CO2 from the atmosphere, such as sequestration in forestry, 
reliable methods to quantify the net effect on national emissions would have to be 
developed.  
 
6. Options and consequences for the Netherlands  
The Netherlands is already involved in research and development and in the 
production of algae-based products. As this could be one of the most sustainable 
options, if implemented properly, still more efforts has to be made in selecting new 
algae strains and in scaling-up the production facilities, which at the moment are very 
small. 
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B.4. Carbon storage through industrial mineral carbonation 
 
1. Short description of option  
The atmosphere and the lithosphere exchange carbon naturally, via mineral 
weathering. This part of the carbon cycle works on a million-year time scale. 
Industrial carbonation tries to mimic it and to return the carbon to the lithosphere, 
but at a much shorter time scale (Dunsmore, 1992). We discuss the option here 
(category B), because, theoretically, enhanced weathering can be implemented by 
spreading out powdered minerals over large surface areas (e.g., see Schuiling and 
Krijgsman, 2006). The effectiveness would be greater if applied with concentrated 
flue gases, and could then be listed under our category A. Calcium (Ca) and 
magnesium (Mg) are the most common elements to form stable carbonates and they 
are also the most extensively studied. Another big advantage of using Ca and Mg 
silicate minerals is their abundance – Ca and Mg each are found at about 2% in the 
Earth’s continental crust (in molar per cent). Industrial solid residues, containing 
large amounts of Mg, Ca and Fe can be carbonated, too, and can be an interesting 
option for CO2 reduction in the regions lacking underground carbon storage 
reservoirs (Stephens and Keith, 2008). 
 
Mineral carbonation can be expressed by the following exothermic reaction: 
 
MO + CO2↔ MCO3 + heat    
 
In which M presents an element, such as calcium, magnesium or iron (Sipilä et al., 
2008). As the weathering is an extremely slow process, the efforts by industrial 
carbonation are directed toward its acceleration. Experiments with different 
mechanical and thermal pre-treatments, high temperatures, and pressure, reveal that 
carbonation reaction rates of olivine can be accelerated ten times by an increase in 
temperature from 25 °C to 100 °C, and four to five times if the pressure increases 
from 25 to 150 atmospheres. Pre-treatment, activating the mineral surface, could 
decrease the required quantity of ore by 75 % (O’Connor et al., 2004).  
  
Most of the research efforts are focused on Mg silicates (primarily the most abundant 
serpentine [Mg3Si2O5(OH)4] and olivine [Mg2SiO4]), which are more easily accessible 
and are found in deposits more concentrated than Ca silicate. The former is more 
abundant and accessible, while the latter has higher molar concentration of Mg and 
reacts more rapidly 
 (Stephens and Keith, 2008). 
 
Olivine is a magnesium iron silicate with formula (Mg,Fe)2SiO4, that forms a solid 
solution series between the two end members forsterite (Mg end member) and 
fayalite (Fe end member), with the ratio of magnesium and iron varying between 
these two end members. The crystal structure of olivine makes it very susceptible to 
weathering, because it is easily dissolvable by acidic groundwater or rainwater. The 
dissolution accelerates the weathering considerably, but it is a very slow process and a 
number of approaches are proposed to speed it up: reduction of grain size, changes 
in pH of the solution, preferences to fayalite (Fe end member) as a feedstock, as it 
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roughly has a 50 times higher rate of dissolution than Mg end member forsterite, 
application of high temperature, and CO2 pressure. However, most of these 
approaches involve energy penalties, reducing the overall mitigation potential of 
olivine carbonation. In addition, the deposits of serpentine in the Earth’s crust are an 
order of magnitude larger than those of olivine, making serpentine a better candidate 
for mineral carbonation (Veld et al., 2008).  
 
According to the location, mineral carbonation could be divided in:  
- in situ. This involves the injection of CO2 into underground reservoirs. If the 
injections are in thin (ultra)basic rocks at depths of 500 to 3000 metres, where 
the Earth’s high temperature will assist the carbonation to start with, the process 
can even become energy neutral, would the heat released be used as geothermal 
energy. It is worth noting, however, that most of current in situ studies are 
oriented mainly on deepening the general understanding of mineral carbonation.  
- ex situ. This involves processing in a dedicated plant. The most simple industrial 
mineral carbonation is a direct gas–solid carbonation, a process, where particulate 
metal oxides are brought into contact with gaseous CO2. However, the process is 
very slow, even at high temperatures and pressures, and, therefore, is considered 
not very promising. Instead, research currently focuses mainly on a two-step 
process, involving extraction of magnesium followed by a carbonation at high 
temperature and under high pressure (above 500 °C and 20 bar) (Sipilä et al., 
2008). The extraction of magnesium or calcium could be further accelerated by 
using some solvent, for instance, acetic acid. This approach is called aqueous 
carbonation, and its outcomes depend on multiple factors, such as temperature, 
pressure, liquid to solid ratio, and additives. Research on the optimal conditions 
is ongoing, but Sipilä et al. (2008) noted that ‘despite partial successes and 
promising process ideas, so far, the keys to success have not been found.’ 
 
2. Effectiveness  
Zevenhoven et al. (2006) estimated that there are large quantities of calcium and 
magnesium containing minerals around the world, of which theoretical capacity for 
carbon sequestration on a millennium time scale is comparable with the sequestration 
capacity of biomass and atmosphere (see Figure B.4.1).  
 
If the 15 EU Member States, which were EU member at the time that the Kyoto 
Protocol was agreed, would decide to sequester the CO2 required by the Kyoto 
protocol for the 2008-2012 period, by olivine carbonation, the world production of 
olivine would need to increase 55 times. It is possible to increase the world olivine 
production, which was four million tonnes, per year, in 2003. While olivine is found 
on all continents, it is known that its dissolution is faster in warm than in cold 
climates, making mineral carbonation in the Caribbean, Indonesia, Philippines and 
the Arabian peninsula especially attractive (Veld et al., 2008). The olivine could be 
spread in the vicinity of the mines in these countries, where the wet tropical climate 
stimulates weathering, wages are low, transport costs limited, and new jobs can be 
created (Schuiling, 2009). 
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Figure B.4.1. Estimated storage times and capacities for various CO2 sequestration methods 
(Source: Zevenhoven et al., 2006) 
 
The effectiveness of this option is also determined by the amount of energy required 
to run the process. Khoo and Tan (2006) calculated the energy requirements for five 
methods and found that CO2 capture by chemical absorption and wollastonite 
carbonation have the best energy performance, followed by chemical absorption and 
olivine carbonation. In these calculations, transporting CO2 from the power plant is 
not taken into account (see Table 1). Sipilä et al. (2008) recalculated some early 
published analyses of energy use, making a distinction between power and heat, as it 
is possible, sometimes, to use already existing waste heat streams instead of heat 
from electricity. They concluded that the energy input requirements are 
overestimated by approximately 30%, if it is assumed that heat can be used for the 
thermal pre-treatment instead of electricity. Earlier full life cycle analysis implies that 
the deployment of mineral carbonation, in combination with carbon capture,  would 
increase the energy consumption of power plants by 60 to 180%, reducing their 
average 35% efficiency to between 25 and 18% (IPCC, 2005). As the analysis of 
Sipilä et al. (2008) was not based on full life cycle analysis, it is not clear what the 
total energy reduction will be, when their methodology is applied.  
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Table B.4.1. Energy requirements per tonne CO2 for the five processes investigated (Source: Khoo 
and Tan, 2006) 
 
3. Feasibility  
Different reactions are being tested. However, research around mineral carbonation 
requires completely new approaches or significant improvements of old ideas and 
process routes (Sipilä et al., 2008). As previously outlined, industrial mineral 
carbonation is a very slow process and, therefore, pretreatment, such as crushing, 
elevated temperatures and pressures, are applied to accelerate the reactions, but there 
are significant trade-offs between the costs, the required energy and the rate of 
reactions, which have not been resolved, yet (Stephens and Keith, 2008). Questions 
related to effective recycling of the extraction agents and additives remain 
unanswered (Sipilä et al., 2008). 
 
Table B.4.2. Costs of mineral carbonation (Source: Huijgen et al., 2007) 
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The production of valuable end products could offset high operational costs for 
carbonation, but even though many options have been proposed, none of them has 
resulted in large-scale production, yet (Sipilä et al., 2008). The amount of carbonates 
produced in a large-scale mineral carbonation would be huge and, hence, their 
disposal would be a challenging task (Sipilä et al. 2008). The current costs of mineral 
carbonation are in the range of 23 to 238 euros/tCO2, or 84 to 872 euros/tC. The 
price of olivine is 60 euros/tCO2 and 220 euros/tC (Huijgen et al., 2007; see also 
Table 2). If powdered olivine simultaneously would be used for liming and C 
sequestration, the net costs would be lower (Schuiling and Krijgsman, 2006). A 
recent TNO report (Veld et al., 2008) estimated the cost of CO2 avoided by olivine 
carbonation to be between 12 and 60 euros. Laboratory experiments demonstrated 
that, in tropical conditions, 80% carbonation of olivine could be accomplished, in 6 
years, if olivine is spread on agricultural land, and in 28 years, if spread alongside the 
coast. The report notes, however, that in real settings, this rate could be 100 to 1000 
times slower. In temperate climates, the rate is also a few times slower than in 
tropical ones . Based on the findings of this report, Environment Minister J. M. 
Cramer (VROM) advised the Dutch parliament to consider olivine a less promising 
option than others, and to not dedicate funding to it, at present (Cramer, 2009).   
 
4. Political implications 
The option can be implemented at levels varying from local to international. It does 
not seem to have any special policy implications, compared to other emission 
reduction options considered here. 
 
5. Earth system risks and co-benefits  
Mineral carbonation allows immobilisation of CO2 for millennia. Unlike carbon 
storage in the ocean or underground, it does not suffer from leakage29 or uneven 
distribution of storage reservoirs, and has minimal requirements for integrating with 
existing infrastructure (Stephens and Keith, 2008). It also does not require long 
monitoring (Sipilä et al. 2008). There are huge quantities of mineral material required 
for large-scale mineral carbonation: for instance, CO2 sequestration from a coal-fired 
power plant via mineral carbonation requires five to ten times more mineral material 
than the amount of coal that is used by the plant. The associated mineral mining and 
processing activities will have similar negative environmental impacts on the typical 
ore mining: increasing the potential for soil erosion, sedimentation, landslides, habitat 
loss, air pollution, and landform modification. Serpentine mining needs extra 
attention, because chrysotile, which is a natural form of asbestos, is found very often 
in serpentine. Mineral carbonation destroys chrysotile, however, and the products of 
the process are asbestos free. The carbonation is also an effective way to demobilise 
some toxic wastes (IPCC, 2005). Theoretically, in situ mineral carbonation can be 
energy neutral, if the heat produced by the carbonation could be recovered. This 
could prove impossible, however, because the minerals and CO2 could reach thermal 
equilibrium with the surrounding rocks if the kinetics are very slow.  
 
                                                          
29 IPCC (2005) suggest, however, that the potential leaching of metals could be excluded only after 
conducting tests. 
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B.5. Biochar 
 
1. Short description of option  
Biochar is a black carbon, produced by pyrolisis of biomass. Charcoal is one of its 
varieties, produced from wood. The production of biochar allows for carbon 
sequestration and long-term storage, for many centuries and even millennia, and, 
therefore, was proposed as one of the possible options for CO2 mitigation, by Prof. 
Wim Sombroek from Wageningen University, who was a pioneer in studying the 
Amazonian charcoal rich deep black soils terra preta. It can be produced from wastes, 
which otherwise would release carbon dioxide.  
Feedstock for its production could consist of wood and crop residue and organic 
wastes, including manure and sewage sludge. Carbon recovery, on average, is 50%, 
but varies for different types of feedstock from 39 to 64% (Lehmann, 2007a). 
Lehmann et al. (2006 ) also emphasized that biochar production enables 
unambiguous verification of sequestration. Moreover, it has additional positive 
environmental and economical effects, because it is a by-product of energy 
production, and can be used as soil additive to improve soil quality and fertility. 
Evidently, the biomass used for biochar could also directly and fully be used as a 
renewable fuel. In addition, producing biochar as a means to sequester carbon also 
can have advantages in terms of enhancing soil fertility and crop yields, improve 
water quality, and reduce pressure on forests. Modern techniques allow for a 
combination of biofuel production and biochar sequestration. 
 
  
Figure B.5.1. Concept of low-temperature pyrolysis of bio-energy with biochar sequestratio (Source: 
Lehmann 2007a) 
 
 
2. Effectiveness  
Lenton and Vaughan (2009) proposed a mitigation potential of 0.12 Wm2 (10 ppm 
CO2), by 2050, and 0.37 Wm
2 (40 ppm CO2), by 2100. The technology exists and 
Lehmann et al. (2006) estimated that the current global potential for biochar 
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production is 0.6 ± 0.1 PgC/y , but could reach 5.5 to 9.5 PgC/y, by 2100. As to the 
effect on the energy balance (and thus mitigation requirements), the production of 
biochar is associated with some ‘energy penalties’: production and transportation of 
biomass, the process of pyrolysis and the application of biochar to the soil. Lehmann 
(2007a) stated that ‘pyrolysis produces 3 to 9 times more energy than is invested in 
generating the energy’, but there has not been a full assessment of the whole chain 
and different possible scenarios, yet. It should be continued for as long as there are 
excessive CO2 emissions. The climate system responds to it, instantaneously. 
 
3. Feasibility 
Charcoal is produced today. Biochar as soil fertiliser is implemented on a small scale 
(e.g., Rondon et al., 2005), but there are natural analogs, for instance, the Amazonian 
charcoal rich deep black soils terra preta (Sohi et al., 2009). Nevertheless, there are 
several technical challenges that would have to be addressed: 
 
• In the process of co-production of biochar and energy there is a conflict 
between simultaneously maximising them, while increasing one leads a 
decrease in the other. Wolf (2008) estimated that from a 45% yield of char, 
32% of energy could be recovered, while a 20% yield of char will allow a 
maximum energy recovery of 72%.  
• There is no suitable technology for incorporation of biochar in soil, yet. 
(Lehmann, 2007a).  
• Different combinations of feedstock and production conditions will result in 
different amount and composition of toxic and potentially carcinogenic 
organic materials, produced during pyrolysis (Lima et al., 2005), and will give 
as output a different type of biochar with different stability (longevity) and 
effectiveness of retaining soil nutrients. (Lehmann, 2007a).  
 
As to the costs and economic challenges, Lehmann (2007b) estimated that ’biochar 
sequestration in conjunction with bio-energy from pyrolysis becomes economically 
attractive under one specific scenario, when the value of avoided carbon dioxide 
emissions reaches 37 USD per tonne. According to Sohi et al. (2009), application of 
biochar may be attractive, even today, for producers of high value crops, because of 
its water storage ability. They emphasise, however, that ‘the feasibility of optimising 
its multiple useful characteristics is not known’.  
 
4. Earth system side effects  
As a soil addition, biochar may further decrease the emissions of nitrous oxide and 
methane, substantially (Rondon et al., 2005; Lehmann, 2007a), in greenhouse 
experiments has been observed that the addition the addition of 20 g biochar to 1 kg 
forage grass reduced the N2O and methane emissions by 80 and 100%, respectively. 
This effect, therefore, needs further research. Addition of black biochar will decrease 
soil albedo, if tillage is practised. Biochar particles, which reach ice caps and ice 
sheets as soot, will affect their albedo, too, thus contributing to global warming 
(Woolf, 2008).  
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Biochar can increase crop yield and, hence, can contribute to sustainability. It can 
restore soil fertility very effectively, and this characteristic is of particular interest for 
degraded soils. In additions, it needs to be applied only once to a certain location, 
unlike current fertilisers, which have to be reapplied, annually (Lehmann et al., 2006). 
As biochar improves nutrient retention in the topsoil, it might reduce pollution 
caused by nutrient leaching. Biochar also directly reduces pollution caused by 
fertilisers, since it has fertilising properties. If sludge, manure or poultry litter are 
used as feedstock, pollution, caused by their leaching, is also avoided (Lehmann et al., 
2007a). However, there is a limit to the amount of biochar that can be added to soil, 
both in terms of soil capacity and in beneficial effect as fertiliser. Lehmann et al. 
(2007a) suggested that additions of up to 50MgC/ha biochar have positive effects 
and only very high quantities might hamper crop growth. For instance, Amazonian 
terra preta soils contain up to 250 Mg of soil organic carbon per hectare, in the top 30 
centimetres. More positive effects could be expected when biochar is applied to 
degraded soils, than in when it is applied to fertile soils.  
 
In addition to its usage as soil fertiliser, biochar can be used as material for the 
terracing of sloping agricultural land or for raising ground level in flood zones 
(Woolf, 2008). Radlein (2007) proposed also to fill valleys with biochar and to cover 
it with soil. If biochar particles can find their way into air and water, they will cause 
environmental pollution. Such contaminated air, food and water will threaten human 
health and ecosystems (Sohi et al., 2009). There is growing evidence that biochar 
increases moisture retention (Sohi, 2009). Woolf (2008), however, stressed the need 
for further research on the impact of biochar on water repellency in soils. He quotes 
a study of Doerr et al. (2000), according to which organic coatings are a common 
cause of water repellency in soils, and suggesting that there is a possibility that 
hydrophobic compounds may occur in biochar.  
 
This option is also quite irreversible because, once applied, it cannot easily be 
removed from the soil. It does not have a rebound effect. 
 
5. Political implications 
Because of its irreversibility and the potential health and environmental side effects, 
large-scale biochar implementation would require an international assessment and 
regulation. As is the case for all other large-scale applications for which gaps in 
knowledge exist, responsibility and liability are moral and political issues (Sohi, 2009). 
There seem to be less risks involved in unilateral actions.  
 
6. Options and consequences for the Netherlands  
The Netherlands has expertise in biochar research and, thus, the goal could be to 
maintain its good position, continuing this research. Further study is necessary on the 
possible side effects of large-scale implementation of biochar as soil fertiliser, 
particularly, in the (sub)tropics. Another field needing further research is the 
optimisation of the ratio of energy–biochar production. 
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B.6. Air capture 
 
1. Short description of option  
Air capture systems remove CO2 from the air and deliver a pure CO2 stream for 
sequestration (Keith et al., 2006). A number of technologies to capture CO2 directly 
from the air have been proposed over the last decade (e. g. Lackner et al., 2001; 
Keith et al., 2006; Nikulshina, 2007). They have a potential to remove already emitted 
CO2 from the atmosphere and, hence, might play an important role in averting 
dangerous climate change, if applied on a huge scale. However, the CO2 
concentration in the air is only about 0.04 per cent, and, therefore, air capture should 
not be confused with CO2 capture from flue gas at big sources, such as electric 
power generation plants, where the CO2 concentration is more than 10%, making it 
thermodynamically much more favourable to separate the CO2 gas. Assuming that 
carbon capture and storage can be directly applied to those large sources, air capture 
aims instead at capturing the emissions coming from remaining small and mobile 
sources (such as those in the transport sector), which account for approximately half 
of the total in emissions. Small-scale analogues of air capture already are used on 
board in submarines and spacecraft, to remove CO2 from the air (Economist, 2009). 
Photosynthesis in plants could be considered to be a natural analogue of the 
engineering systems which could, therefore, be called ‘artificial trees’ (Kunzig and 
Broecker, 2009). Pure gases other than CO2, are commercially produced from air, but 
the costs and energy inputs for applying this to GHG reduction are prohibitive 
(Keith et al,, 2005).  
 
Different schemes have been proposed for air capture and CO2 disposition (e. g. 
Lackner et al., 2001; Zeman and Lackner, 2004; Keith et al., 2005; Baciocchi et al., 
2006; Nikulshina et al., 2008 ). This fact sheet only discusses capture – for disposal 
and storage of the captured CO2 we refer to IPCC (2005), because the issues involved 
are similar to CO2 captured from power plants and other point sources. These 
schemes all use some ‘sorbent’ material (mostly a sodium hydroxide (NaOH) or 
calcium hydroxide (Ca(OH)2) solution), which reacts with CO2 and binds it. 
Subsequently, CO2 is removed from the sorbent using, for instance, a chemical 
reaction, heating or vacuum. In this document, we discuss the designs of Lackner, 
Keith and Stainfeld, the only ones who constructed prototypes, so far. Keith and 
Steinfeld published their results in scientific journals, while the information on the 
designs of Lackner, who is developing his technology commercially, was taken 
mainly from the mass media.  
 
The design of Lackner and colleagues 
Lackner’s company Global Research Technologies (GRT) demonstrated one 
prototype in 2007, which uses membranes to capture CO2, which are then rinsed off 
with liquid sodium carbonate and separated from the fluid, using electricity (Figure 
B.6.1). However, Lackner obtained a patent for another technology which, according 
to the author, reduces the energy required to repeat the process tenfold. Currently, 
his team is working on a prototype that will capture CO2 from air on absorbent 
polymer sheets (ion exchange resins, used in water softening). Captured CO2 will be 
consequently released (or exhaled, as Lackner describes it) by means of changes in 
Alterra-Policy_implications_of_extreme_climate_change_scenarios[2].doc 127 
humidity. This usage of warm water vapour is one of the core inventions of Lackner, 
allowing the process to be carried out at only about 40 0C , saving energy (Chemistry 
world, 2008; Adam, 2008; Economist, 2009; Kunzig and Broecker, 2009). 
 
  
 
Figure B.6.1. Left – principle of Lackner’s design (Source: Kunzig and Broecker, 2009), upper 
right – Lackner with his first prototype, bottom right - artist vision (Source: Borns, 2008) 
The design of D. Keith and colleagues 
The technology employed by D. Keith et al. uses a spray of liquid sorbent to capture 
the incoming CO2 (Figure B.6.2). The liquid is subsequently led to a kiln, where it is 
heated to about 900 oC, in order to extract CO2. The sorbent is recycled in this 
process. The use of droplets instead of wet surfaces or sheets distinguishes this 
technology from other proposals for air capture. It increases the surface area of the 
sorbent and, hence, the efficiency of CO2 capture (Keith et al., 2005; Stolaroff, 2006; 
Stolaroff et al., 2008; Zeman and Keith, 2008; Keith, 2009).The choice of the sorbent 
is crucial for the feasibility of this design. Stolaroff (2006) described the ideal sorbent 
as ‘having a binding energy with CO2 just larger than the 20 kJ/mol required to pull it 
from the atmosphere, inexpensive, abundant, and non-hazardous’. There is ongoing 
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research done on new sorbents. Current proposals use aqueous solutions of calcium 
hydroxide (Ca(OH)2) and sodium hydroxide (NaOH), which conform with the last 
three requirements, but require relatively much energy and hence could increase 
GHG emissions if the energy supply would involve fossil sources. Keith et al., 
however, are concentrating at this stage on achieving low capital costs instead of 
looking for new absorbent that may reduce the energy costs. At the cost-optimal 
flow rate, a structural area of about 760 x 760 m2 would be required to capture 1 
Mt/yr of CO2 (Stolaroff et al., 2008). 
 
 
Figure B.6.2. Left – principle of Keith et al. design (source: Kunzig and Broecker, 2009), top right 
– Keith with the prototype from 2008 (photo: Ken Bendiksten), bottom right - artist vision (Source: 
University of Calgary, 2008) 
The design of Steinfeld and colleagues 
In two consecutive steps, the Steinfeld et al. fluidised bed first captures CO2 from air 
and then releases and then removes the pure CO2 gas (Figure B.6.3). During the first 
phase, calcium oxide (CaO) reacts with the CO2 from ambient air when heated at 
about 400 oC, forming calcium carbonate (CaCO3). In the next phase, the chamber is 
heated to above 800 oC and under these conditions particles of CaCO3 are 
transformed to CaO and pure CO2. In both phases, solar energy is used for heating, 
generated with parabolic mirrors. Changes in the position of the mirrors allow for 
adjusting to the required temperatures (Nikulshina et al., 2007; Nikulshina et al., 
2008; Nikulshina et al., 2009).  In this design, CaO is recycled and this recyclability is 
of great importance. It drops to 60% after five cycles, but can be reactivated with 
H2O, pure CO2 , Na2CO3 or NaCl (Nikulshina et al., 2009). 
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Figure B.6.3. Left - principle of Steinfeld et al. design (Source: Kunzig and Broecker, 2009), right - 
experimental set-up (Source: Nikulishina, 2009) 
 
2. Effectiveness  
Air capture could potentially generate any size of carbon sink societies would be 
willing to pay for. In the long term, it might have the potential to sequester more 
than 1000 PgC and cancel the total emissions from a strong mitigation scenario, or 
−1.43Wm−2 and more (Lenton and Vaughan, 2009). The option could possibly be 
implemented within a few decades (Keith, 2006). Main questions relate to the net 
effect on the energy balance, and, thus, to mitigation requirements. Lackner's team 
claim that their new technology massively reduces the amount of required energy, 
but does not reveal any details (Guardian, 2008). The team of Keith et al. 
concentrated on lowering the costs of the process instead of the electricity 
consumption. A lower price for air capture of 96 USD/tonne CO2 could be achieved 
at energy consumption of about 94 kJ/mol (Figure B.6.4). This energy consumption 
can be brought down to 53 kJ/mol, if the total cost increases by 10% (this is 
compared to the heat of combustion of gasoline, which is about 660 kJ/mol CO2). 
The team assumed further that the energy will come from carbon-neutral sources, 
such as nuclear or bio-energy. (Stolaroff et al., 2008). Keith (2009) has made another 
comparison: he calculated the energy needed to produce a bar of CO2 from flew gas 
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(starting from 14% concentration and assuming 100% capture) and from ambient air, 
and concluded that their ratio is 1.4.  
 
 . 
 
Figure B.6.4. The relation between energy consumption and total costs (Source: Stolaroff et al., 
2008) 
 
The total solar thermal energy requirement for the scaled-up reactor of Steinfeld et 
al. would be 2.5MW. This energy requirement is calculated for a rate of CO2 capture 
of 1 mol/s CO2, corresponding with air mass flow rate of 58 kg/s for a CO2 
concentration of 500 ppm (Nikulishina et al., 2007). If the same units are used, the 
design of Keith et al. (2006) will need a minimum of 4 GJ/tC (1 GJ/tCO2) and the 
design of Steinfeld et al. would need 208 to 250 GJ/tC energy for capture and 
sequestration . 
 
An important question is whether the renewable energy required to apply the air 
capture techniques in a carbon-neutreal way could not better be used directly for 
replacing the energy sources that cause CO2 emissions in the first place.  
 
The air capture should be maintained until desired concentration is achieved. In 
principle, the climate system responds immediately and proportionally to the devices 
used. 
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3. Feasibility 
The various teams that are working with prototypes suggest that their solution can be 
scaled up quickly, if required. The team of Lackner claims that they can construct a 
prototype within two years, if the required funding of 20 million USD would become 
available. The design of Keith et al. already has a prototype, and the design of Steiner 
et al. also has a small laboratory-scale prototype. Technical challenges are those of 
making a soundly working prototype, to scale it up to engineering size, to reduce the 
energy consumption, and to recycle the materials. 
 
As to costs, Lackner estimated that the price of capturing the CO2 will be several 
hundred dollars per tonne of CO2, when commercially available, but the prices will 
drop to 30 USD per tonne (110 USD per tonne C ) (Borns, 2008). He suggested that 
if the technology could be deployed for small-scale commercial uses, such as in 
greenhouses, water treatment and enhanced oil recovery, it will be economically 
feasible, even at prices of 200 USD/t CO2 (733 USD/tC) . This will give the 
technology the chance to be improved and scaled up. Keith et al. (2006) believed that 
the realistic price range, when only existing technologies and materials would be 
used, would be 200 to 500 USD (733 to 1833 USD/tC). These prices may fall to 
between 20 and 40 USD (73 to 147 USD/tC), in a long run (Keith, 2009). The design 
of Steinfeld, so far, has not been accompanied by economical analysis. Unlike the 
capture from power plant flue gases, where the costs of removing the last 10% of 
CO2 are much higher than removing the first 10, 50 or even 90%, the costs of air 
capture from ambient air increase linearly , thus, the costs of removing the last 10% 
equals the costs of removing the first 10% of CO2 (Lackner, 2001).  
 
4. Earth system risks and co-benefits  
CO2 emissions can be captured from diffuse sources, such as automobiles, 
aeroplanes, agriculture and home heating. In addition, also historical CO2 emissions 
can be removed (Keith et al., 2006). The process can be implemented independent of 
the location of CO2 sources, because atmosphere is relatively well-mixed with respect 
to CO2 (Stolaroff, 2006). The risks of air capture for the earth system appear to be 
limited, compared to other geoengineering options (e.g., no problems with 
irreversibility or rebound effect), but they are certainly not negligible. First, there are 
questions related to the energy required. Second, risks are involved in the disposal 
and storage of CO2. Third, some of the options have huge water requirements in 
addition to high energy use. For example, if the design of Keith et al. is used, 2 × 
1010m3/yr of water will be needed to capture the emissions of the US transport sector 
alone. This equals half of all non-power industrial water use in the United States 
(Stolaroff et al., 2008). Finally, the technology could meet with opposition, because 
of aesthetic reasons, as is the case with wind energy parks. 
The air scrubbing devices can be placed at the most convenient places, where it is 
cheapest to produce and maintain them, where there is enough available land or 
where concentrated CO2 can be used or stored (Lackner, 2001; Keith et al., 2006)  
The land requirements are small: an area of about 530 x 530 km2 would be enough to 
offset world energy consumption, would it reach the current US per capita 
consumption, while the technology does not require abandonment of existing 
infrastructure (Lackner, 2001).  
Alterra-Policy_implications_of_extreme_climate_change_scenarios[2].doc 132 
 
A suggested co-benefit is that synthetic hydrocarbon fuels or ‘carbon-neutral 
hydrocarbons’ can be produced, if the extracted CO2 is combined with hydrogen. 
This process, however, is still very energy intensive (Zeman and Keith, 2008). It can 
also be combined with renewable energy production; Lackner proposed to combine 
air capture devices with wind parks. Air capture devices could use the wind energy 
during the night, when electricity demand is low and some producers turn off their 
utilities. (Economist, 2009) 
 
5. Political implications  
Air capture can be implemented, unilaterally. If disposal and storage problems would 
be resolved locally, the international implications and, hence, the need for 
international management and control, may be limited. The main questions seem to 
be related to costs and resource requirements (energy, water, solvents), which could 
have international spill-over effects. 
 
6.  Options and consequences for the Netherlands  
At this stage, the Netherlands could join the research and development of energy 
efficient, economically viable air capture systems. 
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Appendix 3  C. Solar radiation management 
C.1. Injections of aerosol or aerosol precursors  into the stratosphere 
 
1. Short description of option  
Large volcanic eruptions cause global-scale cooling of the planet, by changing the 
Earth’s albedo. They inject sulphur dioxide particles into the stratosphere, which 
consequently reacts with OH and water to form sulphuric acid aerosol droplets, and 
the latter reflect a fraction of the sunlight back into space. The eruption of Mount 
Pinatubo in 1991, for example, reduced the global temperature by about 0.5 °C 
(Soden et al., 2002). Budyko (1977) was the first who proposed the use of ‘artificial 
volcanoes’ or injections of sulphur dioxide into the stratosphere to cool the planet. 
In 2006, Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen revived the debate (Crutzen, 2006). Rasch et al. 
(2008) presented an overview of the latest developments at the time.  
 
In order to make this option effective, aerosol precursors would have to be injected 
at the level of the stratosphere, because the residence time of the resulting particles 
there is relatively long, approximately 2 years (Brovkin et al., 2008). The aerosols 
could be carried to the stratosphere by balloons, rockets and aeroplanes, or by 
artillery guns (NAS, 1992). Robock et al. (2009) proposed to use nine KC-10 
aeroplanes or fifteen KC-135 aeroplanes, each aeroplane making three runs a day. 
 
2. Effectiveness  
 
The sulphate climate cooling efficiency is 0.75 W/m2 per Tg S in the stratosphere 
(Crutzen, 2006). Govindasamy and Caldeira (2000) found that a 1.8 per cent 
reduction in incoming solar forcing would compensate the global warming produced 
by a CO2 doubling. Injection of 7MtS/year could fully compensate global warming 
induced by 5000Gt CO2 emissions30, 90% of which may be released between 2000 
and 2300 (Borovkin et al., 2009).  
 
The effectiveness also depends on the speed with which the option could be 
introduced. The potential logistical problems of geoengineering, such as sulphur 
injections, are described by Tuck et al. (2008). It is suggested that the available 
technology could be used to inject sulphur into the stratosphere, although it has 
never been tested and would have to be optimized, over time. The climate system 
responds within months to this option (Matthews and Caldeira, 2007). For instance, 
the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991 injected 10 Tg S into the tropical 
stratosphere (Wilson et al., 1993). One year later, the Earth’s surface was cooled by 
0.5 °C. Therefore, deployment could wait until the problem aggravates and political 
agreement about its necessity is reached.  
 
Where effectiveness is considered, it should be noted that in order to continuously 
counteract the warming effects of greenhouse gases, sulphur injections have to be 
                                                          
30 But the actual mitigation effect will depend on the timing and the form of the sulphur (A. Robock, 
personal communications) 
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sustained for millennia (Wigley, 2006). Boucher et al. (2009) indicated that overshoot 
of CO2 for decades has to be offset for centuries.  
 
A final aspect of the effectiveness is the effect of the option on the energy system 
balance and, thus, onmitigation requirements. For this option, it will depend on the 
energy needed to produce the sulphur aerosols and bring them up into the 
stratosphere, and their impact on the energy balance probably will not be very 
significant (Robock et al. , 2009).   
 
3. Technical and economic feasibility 
 
Sulphur injections have not been tested. The scientists, involved in geoengineering 
research, assume that the current technology could be used for this option.  
Tuck et al. (2008) warned that severe logistic problems with the delivery of sulphate 
aerosols may arise. They point out that ‘the uncertainties, associated with the 
meteorological dynamics, the residence times of aerosols at 20 km, the physical and 
chemical properties of the natural and injected aerosol, and with the photo-
dissociation of sulphuric acid in the stratosphere’ have not been resolved, yet.  
 
Feasibility is also determined by the costs. NAS (1992) estimated the cost of aerosol 
injection at 0.03 to 1.0 USD/tCO2 (0.1 to 3.6 USD/tC) mitigated, based on the usage 
of hydrogen balloons or 16-inch naval rifles that could inject 1 t aerosol at an altitude 
of 20 kilometres. The cost would be five times larger, if rockets were used. Teller et 
al. (2003) calculated the total amount, needed for offsetting of all CO2 emissions by 
2100, and concluded that it would be even cheaper – 1 billion USD per year (3.6 
USD/tC). Robock et al. (2009) roughly estimated the operational cost of lofting 1 Tg 
of sulphuric gas, per year, into the stratosphere, for three methods of doing this 
(aeroplanes, artillery shells, and stratospheric balloons), at between 4.175 billion and 
225 million USD for the aeroplanes, depending on the aeroplanes used, 30 billion 
USD for the artillery shells, and between 21 and 30 billion USD for the stratospheric 
balloons. The purchase price of the aeroplanes has been calculated to be in the range 
of 784 million and 6.613 billion USD. 
These are only initial, oversimplictic operational costs for the aeroplanes, however. 
There is no assessment of the full costs, so far, because purchase costs, the expenses 
for control and observations, and compensations for negative side effects (on human 
health and livelihoods, ecosystems and on the whole Earth system) have not been 
included. The biggest unknowns are the side effects, and Boyd (2008) insisted that, 
unless these are assessed, based at the least on current limited knowledge, the above 
mentioned numbers can not be presented as the real costs.  
 
4. Earth system side effects  
Scientists are not able to predict all possible impacts of geoengineering options, such 
as sulphur injections. However, a significant number of side effects has been 
identified: 
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• Uneven spatial response. A geoengineered climate is unlikely to reproduce the 
climate from the pre-industrial era, because of changed vertical and latitudinal 
distributions of atmospheric heating. Model studies suggest that the extra 
stratospheric aerosol could lead to warming in high latitudes in winter and, 
hence, increasing rates of polar ice melting (Robock, 2000; Stenchikov et al., 
2006; Brovkin et al., 2009). Observations and modelling of the impacts of 
past volcano eruptions have shown that eruptions at high latitudes weakened 
the African (Oman et al. , 2006) and Asian monsoons (Oman et al. , 2005) 
and caused droughts in Africa and Asia and vice versa – eruptions in the 
tropics produced winter warming over the Northern Hemisphere (Trenberth 
and Dai, 2007; Brovkin et al., 2009). In a model study, Robock et al. (2008) 
demonstrated that by regular injections of SO2 the changes in precipitation 
patterns became permanent.  
• Ozone depletion. Aerosol particles in the stratosphere incite chemical reactions 
that destroy ozone (Solomon et al. 1996). They may cause between 30 and 70 
years delay in the recovery of the Antarctic ozone hole, and considerable 
Arctic ozone depletion, if sulphur injection, compensating for doubling of 
atmospheric CO2, would be implemented (Tilmes et al., 2008).  
• Acid rain and deposition. Injected sulphates which reach the troposphere, will 
produce acid rain, snow and fog and may cause damage to ecological systems 
and human health (Crutzen, 2006). One model study (Kravitz et. Al., 2009), 
however, showed that the additional acid deposition from sulphur injections 
will not affect most ecosystems to a large extent – water bodies that are very 
sensitive to acid being probably the only exception. 
• Negative health effects. Doubling of atmospheric CO2 increases surface ozone 
levels by between 2 and 8 ppb, in all seasons, and this will have negative 
health effects (Sanderson et al., 2007). Robock (2008) pointed out, quoting 
the World Health Organization, that if sulphur injections deplete ozone by 3 
per cent (the depletion caused by Mount Pinatubo), about 100,000 non-
melanoma, 1500 melanoma skin cancers and more than half a million cases of 
cataracts can be expected.  
• Effects on Net Primary Production (NPP). Geoengineering does not remove CO2 , 
it only compensates its warming effect. CO2 fertilisation will counteract the 
reduction in solar forcing and the result might be higher terrestrial NPP in a 
geoengineered world (Govindasamy, 2002). In addition, clouds and aerosols 
increase diffuse radiation, in turn, leading to more efficient canopy 
photosynthesis (Gu et al., 2002). It is still not known how the new 
combination (high CO2 concentration/lower temperatures) can affect 
ecosystem composition and distribution, and biodiversity (Govindasamy, 
2002). 
• Reduction in the efficiency of power-generating solar plants, using concentrating solar 
systems. Murphy (2009) found that sulphur injections will have a negative 
impact on the power-generating solar plants that use concentrating solar 
systems, reducing their efficiency by as much as one-fifth, because they 
depend on direct sunlight. Murphy pointed out that the eruption of Mt 
Pinatubo in 1991, that reduced total sunlight by about 3 per cent, caused a 
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20% drop in peak power output of Solar Electric Generating Stations in 
California, the largest collective of solar power plants in the world, at that 
time. The effectiveness of other energy-saving measures, such as south-facing 
windows for winter heat and overhangs for summer shade, would be 
reduced, too. The output of household flat photovoltaic and hot water panels 
would decline much less, because they use both diffuse and direct sunlight.  
 
In addition to the above possible side effects, under this criterion also the level of 
reversibility and the possible rebound effects of discontinuation are relevant. If a 
serious adverse effect is discovered after years of implementation of sulphur 
injections, there is no way back (Robock, 2008), because, while theoretically the 
injections could be stopped immediately, the rapid warming that would follow would 
be more dangerous than the gradual warming we are having now. That is why their 
effects could be considered as near irreversible: if CO2 emissions continue to 
increase, interruption of sulphur injections might lead to extremely rapid warming, 
with rates of up to 20 times faster than today (Matthews and Caldeira, 2007). 
 
All solar radiation management options for albedo change will only effect the 
temperature; they do not address ocean acidification. Increasing atmospheric CO2 
reduces ocean pH and carbonate ion concentrations (Cao et al., 2007), threatening 
the calcifying ability of key marine organisms, such as corals and plankton (Brovkin 
et al., 2009). Orr et al. (2005) found that, by 2050, in the Southern Ocean and, by 
2100, in the Pacific Ocean, marine organisms will be threatened, even under a 
‘business-as-usual’ scenario (IS92a scenario). These damages to high-latitude 
ecosystem conditions could develop very rapidly, on a decadal time scale.  
 
5. Political implications  
Finally, we look at the political implications of sulphur injections, that is, the 
international governance requirements; who decides and who controls the system? 
Governments will have a role to play, but private companies holding patents on 
proprietary technology can be expected to have a powerful position, which raises 
questions of procedural justice and responsibilities (Robock, 2008). Furthermore, 
weather modification and attempts at climate control have a history of more than 
half a century: military leaders in the United States and other countries have 
pondered the possibilities of weaponised weather manipulation for decades (Fleming, 
2008). Reacting to the attempts at weather modification during the Vietnam War, the 
nations of the world agreed in 1978 to the UN Convention on the Prohibition of Military or 
any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD, Fleming, 2004), 
which essentially prohibits weather modification that any nation would consider 
hostile or environmentally damaging. The terms of ENMOD explicitly prohibit 
‘military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having 
widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects, as the means of destruction, damage, or 
injury to any other State Party.’  
This treaty may also apply to the use of geoengineering to address the effects of rapid 
global warming. This possibility for uneven distribution of the effects, both positive 
and negative, will most probably lead to huge international debates. It will be very 
difficult to determine what would be the optimal climate. As there will be winners 
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and losers, reaching agreement may be impossible. This can easily provoke unilateral 
actions, with uncertain effects; it is impossible to modify the climate of each region, 
independently (Barrett, 2008). 
 
An often used, final ethical argument is that the incentive for mitigation may be 
decreased by the prospect of being able to either capture the CO2 or cancel (part of) 
the consequences (Robock, 2008). As Parson (2005) put it: ‘In a dynamic 
optimisation framework, improving future options usually reduces the desirability of 
near-term mitigation efforts.’ And knowing that these options (may) exist (in the 
future) will ‘reduce the political pressure for near-term efforts, by providing well-
founded supporting arguments for those who oppose near-term efforts to any degree 
and for any reason.’  
 
6. Implications for the Netherlands 
The Netherlands could take part in research and development, in modelling of the 
effects on the Earth system, and in monitoring. As this option is vulnerable to 
intentional harmful usage, the Netherlands could play a role in the creation of a 
proper legal framework and international institutions, in order to prevent it.   
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C.2. Reflectors in space 
 
 
1. Short description of option 
Early (1989) and Seifritz (1989) proposed the implementation of a space-based 
‘sunshade’ shield, situated at the Lagrange point between the Earth and the Sun at a 
distance of about 1.5 million kilometres from our planet. Such a shield, or shields, 
would avert the incoming solar radiation from the Earth.  
 
 
Figure C 2.1. Shadowing geometry. The L1 point and the common Earth–moon barycentre remain 
in-line, as they both orbit the sun with a one-year period (not to scale) (Source: Angel, 2006) 
 
Two different types of designs have been proposed:  
• Large shields. A single 2000 km diameter shield from thin aluminium folio, 
weighing 10 g/m-2 and weighting at least 45 million tonnes (Seifritz, 1989; 
Early, 1989; Keith, 2000). 
• Small reflectors. A cloud of many transparent metre-sized spacecraft (‘flyers’), 
weighing a gram each, assembled completely before launch and launched in 
stacks of 800,000. For 1.8% flux reduction they have to form an 6 million 
km2 cloud and would weigh about 20 million tonnes (including the structural 
and control elements) (Angel, 2006).  
 
2. Effectiveness  
If in the right position, the option could fully compensate any increase in 
temperature caused by an increase in CO2. Angel (2006) estimated that development 
and deployment could be realised in about 25 years. As to the net effect on the 
energy balance (and thus mitigation requirements), Seifritz (1989) proposed that for 
his scheme the energy required would be equal to the output of 30 nuclear stations, 
each of them producing 20GW over 20 years.  One tonne of carbon from power 
production for the space shield would mitigate the effect of 1000 tonnes of 
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atmospheric carbon, for the design proposed by Angel (Science daily, 2006). As for 
the sulphur injections, also the space reflectors would have to be sustained for 
millennia (Wigley, 2006) and according to a model study by Boucher et al. (2009) 
overshoot of CO2 for decades would have to be offset for centuries. Advantage is 
that the earth system would respond instantaneously by cooling. A full assessment 
would need to compare the effectiveness of launching shields or small spacecrafts 
with large total surface areas to prevent the sun’s power to reach the earth, with the 
harnessing of that power in a similar area of solar power stations at the earth’s 
surface, for example, in desert areas.  
 
3. Technical and economic feasibility  
Although according to (Angel, 2006) some analogues in space engineering exist, this 
option is not beyond the stage of a creative idea. There are many technical 
challenges. The Lagrange position is unstable and, thus, the shield(s) would have to 
be stabilised actively. This requires permanent observation and control. The 
production of lightweight material with optimal reflectivity, able to withstand 
mechanical forces and solar wind is as yet a challenge, too (Seifritz, 1989). Old 
screens would have to be replaced probably every 20 to  50 years. The not 
functioning ones which would remain in orbit may threaten other Earth-orbiting 
spacecraft. (Angel, 2006) 
 
As to the economic feasibility, the total cost, including development and operations 
is estimated to be about 5 trillion USD, with an average of 100 billion USD per year, 
if considered over a fifty-year lifetime. These costs will decrease thereafter, when 
only flyer and energy storage renewal is needed (Angel, 2006). In his calculations, 
Angel used a transportation cost of 50 USD/kg of payload, considering economy of 
scale (with present cost for multistage rocket transportation to high orbit being about 
20,000 USD/kg). Seifritz (1989) estimated that his design could cost about 6% of 
world gross domestic product (in 1989), while the design of Angel (2006) was 
estimated at about 0.2% of the world gross domestic product.  
 
4. Earth system risks and co-benefits  
For space reflectors, many potential side effects also have been identified, many of 
which are similar to those for sulphur injections (see above), such as uneven spatial 
distribution of climate effects. Lunt et al. (2008) argued, however, that this change 
may be relatively small, compared with the changes in an unmitigated world (0.8 oC 
warmer at high latitudes in the ‘shaded’ case, compared with 8.8 oC in the 
unmitigated case). Also, ocean acidification would not be avoided. In addition, there 
may be yet unknown effects. 
 
Different from sulphur injections, however, the controls employed to stabilise the 
shields could be used to stop the cooling at any time, by slightly changing the orbit. 
The space reflectors could have relatively long lifetimes and do not change the 
composition of the atmosphere. Steerable shields could be used to direct radiation at 
specific areas (Keith, 2000) – this has advantages, but could have the disadvantage of 
being used in weather warfare. 
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The level of irreversibility is similar to sulphur injections because of the rebound 
effect.  
 
5. Political implications  
The political implications related to governance questions and military use are similar 
to those of sulphur injections, as discussed above. The risks of unilateral action may 
be smaller, because costs appear to be higher. Different from the sulphur injection 
option, space reflectors may be more vulnerable to agressors aiming at intentional 
harmful usage. 
 
6. Implications for the Netherlands 
This option is very expensive, it will be almost impossible to implement it 
unilaterally. The Netherlands could take part in research and development, in 
modelling of the effects on the Earth system, and in monitoring. As this option is 
vulnerable to intentional harmful usage, the Netherlands could play a role in the 
creation of a proper legal framework and international institutions, in order to 
prevent it.   
 
Literature 
 
Angel, R., 2006. Feasibility of cooling the Earth with a cloud of small spacecraft near 
the inner Lagrange point (L1), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, U. S. A., 
103, 17,184– 17,189 
 
Early, J.T., 1989. Space-based Solar Shield to Offset Greenhouse Effect, Journal of the 
British Interplanetary Society, 42, 567-569  
 
Lunt, D. J., A. Ridgwell, P. J. Valdes, and A. Seale, 2008. Sunshade World’: A fully 
coupled GCM-evaluation of the climatic impacts of geoengineering, Geophysical 
Research Letters, 35, L12710 
 
Keith, D. W., and H. Dowlatabadi, 1992. A serious look at geoengineering, Eos 
Transactions, American Geophysical Union, 73(27), 289 
 
Keith, D.W., 2000. Geoengineering the Climate: History and Prospect. Annual Review 
of Energy and the Environment, 25: 245-284 
 
Seifritz, W., 1989. Mirrors to halt global warming? Nature, Volume 340, Issue 6235, 
pp. 603  
 
Science Daily, 2006. Space Sunshade Might Be Feasible In Global Warming 
Emergency 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/11/061104090409.htm 
 
 
 
Alterra-Policy_implications_of_extreme_climate_change_scenarios[2].doc 145 
C.3. Cloud modification through seawater injection 
 
1. Short description of option  
The idea to seed low-level maritime stratocumulus clouds with seawater aerosol, in 
order to increase their solar reflectivity, was proposed by Latham (1990), based on 
the studies of Twomey (1977), Albrecht (1989), and Slingo (1990), among others. 
These clouds have albedos in the range 0.3 to 0.7 that can be increased if the overall 
droplet surface area or the longevity of clouds could be enhanced. Injecting small 
seawater droplets (NaCl) of around 1 µm in size might contribute to both, because 
the residues after the evaporation of these droplets can act as cloud condensation 
nuclei to form new droplets ( Twomey effect), and their small size could slow down 
the formation of raindrops (Albrecht effect) (Latham, 2008). This process occurs 
also naturally, but there are insufficient condensation nuclei to cause adequate 
cooling. For a description of the physical base of the process, see Latham (2008).  
Low-level maritime clouds cover approximately a quarter of the oceanic surface. 
Doubling their condensation nuclei will result in about 5.5% increase of their albedo 
– an increase that may offset a doubling in CO2 concentrations (Salter, 2008). This 
technology could be used also to counteract only regional impacts, for example, to 
cool vulnerable regions, such as coral reefs and polar ice (Salter, 2008). But since 
regional climate change effects are very uncertain, the effectiveness of such regional 
applications is uncertain, too. 
 
Salter (2008) suggested to use remote-controlled unmanned spray vessels, based on 
Flettner rotors instead of sails (Figure C.3.1 left). They move perpendicular to the 
local wind direction and this motion drives underwater ‘propellers’ that can generate 
electrical energy for spray production. The Flettner rotor was designed in the 
beginning of 20th century by Anton Flettner, who built two ships with this 
technology (Figure 1 right).  
  
Figure C.3.1. (left) A conceptual model of spray vessels (copyright  J. MacNeill 2006) and a 
Flettner ship (right) 
 
Salter chose this system because of its ‘high lift coefficients, easy control by 
computer and convenience for housing spray plant and ejecting spray’. 
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Fifteenhundred of such spray vessels with a spray rate between 30 and 70 m3/s have 
to be employed in order to offset forcing of –3.7 W m-2. Salter suggested  silicon 
micro-fabrication technology to be used for spray generation.  
Spray vessels would be highly mobile, moving constantly to suitable sites with help of 
a global positioning system, a list of required positions and satellite communications. 
Sites would be considered to be suitable if they would have much incoming solar 
radiation and few high clouds that could reduce it. They would need to have also 
plenty of low-level marine cloud for whitening, preferably, with low initial density of 
cloud condensation nuclei. There are also practical considerations in choosing 
suitable sites, such as avoiding intensive shipping and iceberg routes.  
 
2. Effectiveness 
The maximum effect on radiative forcing would be enough to offset at least a 
doubling of CO2 emission, or –3.7 W m-2 (Latham, 2008). How fast would this 
work? The average thickness of the lowest few hundred meters of the atmosphere 
over the sea is about 800 metres. This atmospheric layer is characterised by high 
levels of turbulence with velocities of up to one metre per second and even faster. 
Therefore, mixing and distribution of seawater droplets is very rapid within that 
layer. Lifetimes of droplets are of the order of a week (Salter et al., 2008). The 
effectiveness also depends on the time needed to put the system into place. Salter et 
al. (2008) estimated that only two years of experimental research plus a further three 
years of research and development of reliable hardware for spray vessels will be 
needed, before the first full-scale operational prototype is constructed. Applying this 
technology will have immediate local cooling effect on the sea surface. Ocean 
currents, being an efficient transport mechanism, will eventually spread the cooler 
water, worldwide (Salter, 2006). Clouds should be seeded until the concentration of 
greenhouse gas emissions reaches the desired low level, to be achieved through 
parallel emissions reduction or sequestration measures.  
 
As to the net effect on the energy balance (and thus mitigation requirements), Salter 
et al. (2008) estimated that ‘Each vessel would require about 150 kW of electrical 
energy to atomise and disseminate seawater at the necessary continuous rate (as well 
as to support, e.g., navigation, controls, and communications), so the global power 
requirement (for 1500 vessels) would be about 2.3 × 108 Watts. Ideally, this energy 
would be derived from the wind.’ These are preliminary model calculations.  
 
3. Feasibility  
This option has not yet been tested, but is at the idea stage, supported by some 
modelling work. The German wind-turbine manufacturer Enercon will test a Flettner 
rotor ship in 2009 (Enercon, 2008). According to Salter (2008) ‘a development 
programme has been planned to reduce technical uncertainties’. Research and 
development costs for the construction of a prototype were estimated at about 27 
million GBP. An additional 30 million GBP will be needed for tooling, necessary for 
the rapid building of a large number of spray vessels. A single spray vessel will cost 
about 1 to 2 million GBP and will have a lifetime of approximately 20 years. It is 
expected that about 50 spray vessels could offset a one-year increase in world CO2 
(Salter et al., 2008). 
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4. Earth system risks and co-benefits  
The implementation of this technology will modify the distributions and magnitudes 
of ocean currents and local meteorology: temperature, rainfall, wind and land-ocean 
temperature contrast. The temperature structure of the atmosphere will change, too 
 (Latham et al., 2008). The effect of unintentional introduction of sea salt nuclei in 
higher clouds is very uncertain. Latham (2002) has warned that it can eventually 
cause warming instead of cooling, because high clouds may contain ice crystals. The 
impact of increased sea salt nuclei in higher clouds on precipitation is unknown, too. 
Compared to other geoengineering options, cloud seeding is ecologically relatively 
benign and except wind and seawater does not require any natural resources (Latham 
et al., 2008). Nevertheless, possible negative effects might arise, such as:  
 
• Negative effects for land suffering from droughts, if clouds in upwind areas 
are seeded (Salter et al., 2008). Cloud seeding might reduce the frequency and 
severity of hurricanes (Salter, 2008); 
• Rain, containing NaCl seeding nuclei, will increase soil salinity when it falls 
on land and if repeated, this will result in salt accumulation; 
• Ocean acidification is generally not reduced; 
• Some bird species may be affected by spraying.  
 
Salter (2005) emphasized the reversibility of this technology. This reversibility stems 
from the short lifetimes of droplets (about a week) and the flexibility in the choice of 
clouds. If CO2 emissions would continue to increase, however, the rebound effect 
might make it very difficult to stop, as is the case for sulphur injections.  
 
5. Political implications  
The implications for governance and politics are very similar to other geoengineering 
options influencing the radiative balance (see sulphur aerosols). The difference with 
sulphur injections is that the scale of application can be smaller, which on the one 
hand may make it more easy to deal with, but on the other hand also may make it 
more attractive to apply it unilaterally, with potentially unexpected consequences. 
 
6. Implications for the Netherlands 
The Netherlands could take part in research and development, in modelling of the 
effects on the Earth system, and in monitoring. As the implementation of this option 
could lead to tension between countries benefiting from it and countries which will 
be negatively affected, the Netherlands could play a role in the creation of a proper 
legal framework and international institutions, able to prevent, to deal with and to 
resolve the emerging international conflicts.   
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C.4. Albedo changes on terrestrial systems 
 
1. Short description of option  
Land-use practices influence the amount of sunlight reflected by the Earth’s surface 
and, hence, modify the Earth’s surface albedo. Betts et al. (2007) showed, for 
example, that the transition from natural forests to agricultural crops in the northern 
mid-latitudes during the last two and half centuries increased the surface albedo and, 
hence, cooled these agricultural regions by up to 2 °C. Therefore, a number of 
authors (e.g., Gaskill, 2004; Hamwey, 2007; Akbari et al., 2009; Ridgwell et al., 2009) 
proposed to intentionally change the albedo of deserts, human settlements and/or 
vegetation, in order to counteract global warming, caused by increasing GHG 
emissions. 
 
The world’s deserts are suggested to be among the best candidates for surface albedo 
modification, because they are ‘uninhabited, sparsely vegetated, flat and stable, with a 
high solar flux and low humidity (meaning less absorption of solar and IR by water 
vapour) and generally useless.’ (Gaskill, 2004), ignoring desert ecosystems and 
peoples for simplicity. The available suitable land for this option is 12 million km2 
(Gaskil, 2004). Gaskill (2004) calculated that if the typical desert albedo, which is in 
the range 0.2 to 0.5 (Tsvetsinskaya et al., 2002) is increased to 0.8 by means of a 
reflective cover, it could offset the radiative forcing of greenhouse gases, projected to 
be emitted between 2010 and 2070.  
 
How could this be achieved? Gaskill (2004) proposed to cover the world’s deserts 
with inexpensive, recyclable, tear-resistant, and easy to install and maintain material 
that would be replaced every three years. The material has to be highly reflective 
(reflecting >80% of incident sunlight) and could consist of white plastic on the top 
and aluminised plastic on the bottom, providing 80% reflectivity of sunlight and 90% 
emissivity of IR. The modified desert albedo has to be monitored by ground stations, 
unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites.  
Mechanical anchors can be used to keep it in place and robotic vacuum cleaners can 
clean its surface from dust, if necessary. Before the installation, the ground has to be 
cleaned from everything that could puncture this material.  
 
In order to counteract radiative forcing of 2,75 W/m2 for the 2010-2070 period, an 
average annual coverage of about 173,500 km2 will be required. In the beginning of 
the period, the coverage could be less, however, if greenhouse gas emissions increase 
non-linearly. By 2070, when all suitable deserts (about 2% of Earth’s surface) would 
be covered, greenhouse gas emissions would eventually have to be restricted or other 
geoengineering options deployed. The new area with coverage, that has to be added 
each year, is comparable with the 207,200 km2 area that is used annually in the 
United States for wheat production.  
 
Pavements and roofs in urban areas exert also considerable influence on the amount 
of solar radiation reflected by the Earth’s surface, as they account for more than 60% 
of urban surfaces ( Akbari et al., 2009). The average albedo of standard US roofing is 
estimated at 0.20. With existing technologies, such as reflective tiles, metal roofing 
Alterra-Policy_implications_of_extreme_climate_change_scenarios[2].doc 150 
products, white acrylic, elastomeric and cementatious coatings and white 
thermoplastic membranes it could be enhanced to about 0.55 to 0.60. For the 
pavements, the increase in solar reflectance could be substantial, too: while the 
albedo of a freshly installed asphalt pavement is about 0.05, the albedo of a freshly 
installed light-color concrete is 0.35–0.40, which goes down to about 0.25–0.30 for 
an aged pavement. 
 
Changes in vegetation cover could alter the regional climate, too. Vegetation colour, 
waxiness, leaf area, density, and geometries, influence the Earth’s albedo and, hence, 
could be used for intentional alteration of the climate (Hamvey, 2007, Ridgwell et al., 
2009). Although their global cooling potential is rather modest (only a decrease of 
0.11 °C could be reached by manipulation of waxiness, for instance), the regional 
effect for the mid-latitudes of North America and Eurasia during the summer 
months of June, July and August, might be much bigger, about 1 °C (Ridgwell et al., 
2009). 
 
It has also been proposed to cover parts of the ocean (10% for a doubling of carbon 
dioxide from pre-industrial levels to 550 ppmv) with floating reflective solids or 
spheres (Gaskill, 2004). Although sea ice is the prime example that this option would 
work, these proposals seem very unattractive and are not discussed here: not only 
can one question the feasibility of a stable layer on an unstable ocean surface, there 
are also serious questions as to the ecological and climate risks involved. 
 
2. Effectiveness  
Gaskill (2004) estimated the potential of this option to be 2.75 W/m2, by 2070. 
According to the calculations of Lenton and Vaughan (2009), however, this potential 
would only be 1.74 W/m2. Lenton and Vaughan supposed that this discrepancy may 
arise because of the assumed incident solar radiation of the deserts being higher than 
the global average. The desert areas have the second highest reflectivity of all surface 
areas – only surpassed in albedo by the ice caps. Therefore, the effectiveness of 
changing their albedo is not very high, compared to other land cover types, but its 
availability may be higher (Gaskill, 2004). 
 
Apparently, assuming no political difficulties to put the idea into practice, Gaskill 
supposed that it will take only about eight years to start full-scale implementation. 
There will be some net effect on the energy balance (and thus mitigation 
requirements: the production, transportation, installation and recycling of the cover 
would increase total present day greenhouse gas emissions by 1.8%). This percentage 
will decrease as global emissions rise. According to Gaskill, the option should be 
continued for 60 years, when other options can take over. The climate system will 
respond, instantaneously. 
 
The offset of radiative forcing by variegated plants, light shrubs or bioengineered 
grasses and shrubs is estimated at 0.59 W/m2 by Hamvey (2007), and at 0.64 W/m2 
by Lenton and Vaughan (2009) . The potential of modified crop albedo is estimated 
at 0.44 W/m2 by Lenton and Vaughan, and at 0.24±0.09 W/m2 by Ridgwell et 
al.(2009). This difference is attributed to different canopy albedo changes used in the 
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models, and/or different areas being covered by crops than was assumed in the 
model (Lenton and Vaughan, 2009). Changes in albedos of all human settlements 
may contribute 0.17 W/m2 (Hamwey, 2007) or 0.19W/m2 ((Lenton and Vaughan, 
2009), while only urban areas have a cooling potential of 0.044 W/m2 (Akbari et al., 
2008) or 0.01 W/m2 (Lenton and Vaughan, 2009).  
 
 
3. Feasibility  
In going from idea to theory to modelled option to prototypes to actual testing, the 
desert albedo option is at the first, idea stage. There are some technical challenges of 
developing and producing the cover with the desired characteristics, however, this 
does not seem to offer insurmountable problems. The proposed vacuum robotic 
cleaners also have to be developed, because conventional cleaning systems, available 
now, spread fine particles of soil over the surface that, subsequently, cannot be 
removed. The foil has to be fixed to the soil, and be sturdy enough to withstand 
uneven terrain. A main issue is to find areas which do not have other practical uses 
or high ecological value. 
 
As to the economic challenges, Gaskill (2004) estimated the cost of the whole project 
at 75 trillion USD: 500 billion USD/year and 19 million USD/mile2. According to 
Gaskill, almost 80% of the total cost would be for the plastic film, assumed to be 
recycled 3 times at 50% the cost of the original. The cost of installation, monitoring 
and maintenance are between 12 and 14% the cost of the plastic. The estimations are 
based on the maximum possible coverage of 10 million km2, carried out equally over 
60 years and kept in place for 150 years. Gaskill (2004) noted that where applicable, 
the land will be provided for free, in return for jobs and cancellation of debt. In his 
calculations, Gaskill did not take inflation or oil price increases into account.  
 
Roof and pavement modification schemes are categorized as low-tech and a number 
of products are available on the market. The price of their implementation is 
estimated at about 15 to 30 USD/m2 for roofs and 15 to 25 USD/m2 for pavements. 
The life cycle of these materials is on average 10 years (HARC 2004). Although there 
are crops, grasses and shrubs with higher albedo currently available, in the long term, 
new varieties with desired features may be created, for example, via breeding 
(Ridgwell et al., 2009). We could not find calculations of the costs of implementation 
for these options, but most probably they will be very modest. While the urban 
option can be implemented relatively easily, particularly on new buildings and 
infrastructure, and have co-benefits of reducing the urban heat island effect, it can 
only partially affect global radiative forcing. because of the relatively small share of 
useable urban areas on the global land area. 
 
4. Earth system risks and co-benefits  
Again, as other geoengineering options aim at influencing the Earth’s radiative 
balance, it is expected that changes in surface albedo will produce uneven changes in 
the climate, globally, regionally and seasonally (Gaskill, 2004; Lenton and Vaughan, 
2009; Betts al., 2007).  
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Changing desert albedo will also have ecological effects, not only in the area covered, 
but also elsewhere. For example, currently Saharan dust delivers almost all 
phosphorus needed for the normal functioning of the bromeliad ecology of the 
Amazon, and half of the iron for the North Atlantic’s phytoplankton (Gaskill, 2004). 
Covering the Saharan desert will alter these nutrient flows for the Amazon and 
North Atlantic. Ocean acidification would not be avoided, other than perhaps 
through the effects of a cooler climate. 
 
The reversibility depends on the starting time of the project and the area covered. 
The rebound effect (if discontinued) has not been studied, but in general would be 
the same as for the other albedo-changing options. 
 
Changing the human settlement albedo has the positive side effect of cooling the 
living areas and reducing electricity consumption (Akbari et al., 2008).  
The replacement of the current grasses by modified ones will change plant-plant, 
plant-microorganism and probably plant-animal interactions, in regional ecosystems, 
which, in turn, may alter the whole ecosystem. However, this effect on the 
ecosystems is not much studied and is not well-known, yet (Hamvey, 2007). The 
implications for the nutritional value of the new varieties is, as yet, unknown. The 
infrastructure necessary to create and propagate plant varieties with required features 
is currently available. Moreover, as most arable crops are replanted annually, it will be 
easy to replace current crops and to sustain planting of crops with higher albedos 
(Ridgwell et al., 2009).   
 
5. Political implications  
Because there will be unknown distributional effects, in case desert albedo change 
would be implemented at a large scale, governance issues are involved. Gaskill (2004) 
recognised this and called for ‘an international treaty, indemnifying all involved with 
the project from lawsuits resulting from alleged or actual damage to the climate or 
economy of a country or region’ caused by the changes in desert albedo. The risk of 
unilateral actions will depend on the area covered. Many of the lands considered for 
this option, are politically unstable or are large emitters, such as China (Gaskill, 
2004). This raises the question of whether the rest of the world will rely on these 
countries.  
 
Modification of urban albedo via introduction of new roofs and pavements, 
however,  depends mainly on the collective voluntary efforts of local actors. 
(Hamvey, 2007). While this would allow this option to be implemented at lower cost 
to the governments, it requires behaviour changes which are not always easy to 
realise. Although Hamvey was confident that local actors would be willing to 
voluntarily take the necessary measures, dependent on economic and other 
incentives, this could be a rather challenging task. Hamvey suggested that the costs 
for albedo enhancement are internalised in the ‘economic co-benefits of energy 
savings and reduced ground level ozone concentration’.  
 
Crop varieties with higher albedo could have lower yields and, thus, may jeopardise 
food security, although some comparison between the existing varieties shows that 
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this is not always the case (Ridgwell et al., 2009). For the grassland albedo 
enhancement, Hamvey (2007) envisaged some political implications, as many of 
them are in developing countries, which cannot possibly pay for the associated 
biotechnology intellectual property rights. Therefore, he suggested that some of the 
international financing and technology transfer mechanisms, such as the Clean 
Development Mechanism be deployed. 
 
6. Implications for the Netherlands 
The Netherlands could take part in research and development of new surfaces and 
crops, in modelling of the effects on the Earth system, and in monitoring. It is 
necessary to implement appropriate policies for encouraging the introduction of light 
surfaces and this could be done unilaterally. As the implementation of this option 
could lead to tensions between the countries which will benefit from it, and the 
countries which will be negatively affected, if implemented on a very large scale, the 
Netherlands could play a role in the creation of a proper legal framework and 
international institutions, able to prevent, to deal with and to resolve the emerging 
international conflicts.   
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Appendix 4 D. Exploring the effectiveness of emergency responses 
to climate change 
 
Detlef van Vuuren and Elke Stehfest (PBL) 
 
1. Introduction 
Most research on mitigation strategies, so far, have concentrated on long-term 
consistent scenarios that focus on a certain greenhouse gas concentration target 
(either a peaking or stabilisation pathway). Such climate policies seems to explicitly 
assume that climate change is a gradual process that allows for a long-term 
assessment of climate impacts against the costs of climate policies. The uncertainties 
in the climate system and related impacts are large. Several studies indicate that there 
are considerable risks of potential catastrophic or abrupt climate change impacts, 
including melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet (Oppenheimer and Alley, 2005) or the 
West Antarctic Ice Sheet (Oppenheimer and Alley, 2004), or other abrupt climate 
change phenomena (Alley et al., 2002). If signs of abrupt, dramatic climate change 
impacts would become apparent, societies could be faced with the question of 
whether a rapid response is possible. Obviously, chances of such a situation 
occurring are higher in a situation where no or only a mild form of climate policy is 
introduced. 
 
It is important to know the ‘response time’ in such a situation, given the different 
response options at hand. This response time depends on both the physical 
parameters of the climate system and the technical and socio-economic constraints 
that occur when getting these options in place. Options that can be considered as 
part of the rapid response to climate change include rapid introduction of new 
technologies, geoengineering, and rapid lifestyle changes. In this context, we have 
explored the response time of two alternative responses in the context of the 
IMAGE model (Bouwman et al., 2006): 
• A rapid transition to a low-carbon economy, by implementing all available 
options in the energy sector, and reducing non-CO2 emissions, but without 
pre-mature capital replacement (for the methods, see here Van Vuuren et al., 
2007). 
• Stabilising or reducing radiative forcing by geoengineering on a global scale. 
Here, we assumed that this is by introducing sulphur aerosols into the 
stratosphere. 
 
We explored the typical ‘response time’ (that is, the time between the introduction of 
the measure and a substantial improvement in climate change trends) by introducing 
these options into a scenario that introduces a mild form of climate policy up to 
2030. For 2030, we assumed that society would have proof that continuing trends at 
that time would lead to dramatic impacts. In this scenario, therefore, drastic measures 
would be introduced from 2030 onwards. The experiments are of a ‘what if’ nature 
and only capture some of the relevant aspects of a rapid response (see discussion 
below). The added value compared to earlier calculations (e.g., by Wigley, 2006) is the 
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introduction of an explicitly modelled mitigation scenario. Calculations are done 
against a climate sensitivity of 4.5 oC. 
 
2. Rapid mitigation 
The result of the effectiveness of a rapid mitigation response in slowing down 
climate change (as measured, for instance, by global mean temperature) depends on 
the maximum emission reduction rate. Unfortunately, such a rate cannot be defined 
unambiguously. In the real world, it would depend on many complex factors, such as 
the inertia included in a decision-making processes, the time to change investment 
decisions and behaviour, lifetime of capital, decisions to retire capital prematurely 
and inertia in replacing or expanding production capacity (e.g., factories for solar cells 
or more efficient cars). Typical lifetimes are in the order or 40 years for power 
stations, 20 to 40 years for manufacturing equipment, 10 years for cars and much 
longer than that for transport infrastructure, decades up to centuries for building 
stock and urban infrastructure, but much smaller for heating devices (maybe 20 
years). In models, some of these factors also play a role. In many models, exogenous 
assumptions are made on the speed at which technologies may be introduced. In 
other models, such as the PBL IMAGE/TIMER model, emission reduction is 
bound by the lifetime of capital in different sectors. Some models even weigh the 
option of premature capital requirement against the costs of using current capital. 
 
CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion 
Concentrating first on the CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion (the lion’s 
share of greenhouse gas emissions), some idea on the maximum rate of greenhouse 
gas reduction can be obtained by looking at the existing literature on mitigation 
scenarios. We have used the database of existing mitigation scenarios to explore how 
the rate of CO2 emission reduction varies across models; this database consists of the 
scenario developed for IPCC AR4, plus scenarios published in the last three years 
(Clarke, 2009; Fisher et al., 2007; Knopf et al., 2009; Rao et al., 2008). We showed the 
ten-year average emission reduction rates of a few hundred scenarios in the 2010-
2100 period (nine data points per scenario) published in literature for various 
stabilisation levels (consistent with the categories used in IPCC AR4 (Fisher et al., 
2007)).  
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Figure D.1. The global emission growth rates of CO2 emission (expressed as percentage of emissions 
in 2000) in mitigation scenarios (categories I, II and III corresponding to scenarios aimed at 
stabilising greenhouse gas concentration of 2.5 to 3.0 W/m2, 3.0 to 3.5 W/m2 and 3.5 to 4.0, 
W/m2, respectively). Negative numbers indicate emission reduction 
 
The figure shows that in literature hardly any scenario can be found with a reduction 
rate beyond 4 to 5% of 2000 emissions, annually, over a ten-year period. Obviously, 
most models have used some form of optimal pathway for emission reductions, over 
time (either formal optimisation or more ad-hoc rules), which is likely to lead to 
rather smooth reduction pathways, over time – nevertheless, as these scenarios aim 
for the lowest targets in literature, the information is indicative. It should also be 
noted that for a reduction rate of, for example, 3%, the associated decarbonisation 
rate is in the order of 5 to 6%, as GDP continues to grow.  
 
In TIMER, we can simulate an all-out response by deliberately bringing the carbon 
price to the maximum value of 1000 USD/tC in a single year. The model then 
reduces the CO2 emissions at the maximum rate possible – bound by the lifetime of 
the capital stock (capital turnover rate). In the model, different lifetimes are used for 
different types of capital –the rates shown in Figure D.2 are aggregated results of 
these. Calculations show the rate of reduction to be around 4% per year for the 
period of 20 years after the introduction of the high carbon price, in the standard 
model set-up, and 6% per year if also the option of bio-energy with carbon capture 
and storage is allowed. 
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Figure D.2. Fossil-fuel related CO2 emissions (PgC) and annual emissions reduction (%) under a 
rapid emission reduction from 2030 onwards, using the energy model TIMER 
 
There are several important remarks to be made regarding the TIMER runs, and also 
the maximum reduction rates suggested by the literature: 
• Information does not focus on premature replacement of capital. Although 
an expensive option, in fact, under high prices premature replacement might 
actually be attractive. We have not evaluated this further. 
• We did not investigate any global policy requirements or social and financial 
implications related to implementing such high rates of emission reductions.  
• We have not considered lifestyle changes as an additional mitigation option . 
This would allow faster reduction rates. 
• Both existing literature and the TIMER calculations limit the rate of 
reduction by the rate of capital turnover. In reality, there might be more 
inertia (decision-making processes, rate of building PV factories etc). As a 
result, the maximum rate of reduction might actually be overestimated. 
• The discussion above only concentrates on CO2 emission from fossil-fuel 
burning. In the implementation runs, we have also included non-CO2 gases 
and CO2 from land use. As the potential for some non-CO2 greenhouse gas 
sources is smaller than for CO2, and as we have not explicitly considered 
measures to reduce emissions from land use, the impact on total greenhouse 
gas emission is somewhat smaller in relative terms. 
  
On the basis of the literature survey and the TIMER calculations, we concluded that 
the emission reduction rate for fossil-fuel related CO2 emissions of about 6% per 
year is probably the maximum technically achievable rate of a prolonged period of 
time without any accelerated depreciation of capital stock. The TIMER results fit in 
the bandwith of rates in the literature. 
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All greenhouse gases 
When we implemented the rapid mitigation strategy in the IMAGE model (that is, 
the rapid response shown in Figure D.2 and applying the same rapid carbon price 
increase on non-CO3 emission) resulted in a greenhouse gas emission pathway as 
depicted in Figure D.3. CO2 from energy was reduced by a rate that is determined by 
the turnover time of capital in the energy system. CO2 from land use somewhat 
slowed down the rapid reductions in the energy system – among other things, as a 
result of the bio-energy expansion (the next impact of bio-energy was positive, but 
consisted of a reduction in fossil fuel-related emissions and an increase in land-use 
related emissions). Reductions in methane emissions were somewhat comparable to 
the overall greenhouse gas emission reduction, but emissions from N2O were merely 
stabilised (and not reduced) as a result of limited technical (identified) emission 
reduction options. For these gases, not only the rate of change was limiting, but also 
the total identified reduction potential. 
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Figure D.3. Greenhouse gas emission pathway following the rapid emission reduction strategy 
 
 
 
3. Sulphur aerosols as a means to stabilise radiative forcing 
Various forms of geoengineering have been proposed to reduce the impacts of 
climate change. One option is the introduction of sulphur aerosols into the 
stratosphere, which would, by scattering incoming radiation, reduce radiative forcing 
(Crutzen, 2006; Schneider, 2008). The lifetime of sulphur aerosols in the stratosphere 
is one to two years, considerably longer than in the troposphere. This is long enough 
for the introduction of sulphur aerosols to be effective, but at the same time short 
enough to be seen as reversible. The amount of sulphur aerosols needed is, as a 
result of the effective radiation scattering of aerosols in the troposphere, rather 
limited (only a per cent or so of current anthropogenic sulphur emissions). 
Interestingly, also the costs would be relatively cheap, and are estimated from billions 
of USD, up to tens of billions, per year (Bles, 2009), which is much lower than 
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estimated costs for emissions reduction measures. Earlier, Wigley found, using 
MAGICC model calculations, that injecting a Pinatubo-sized batch of sulphates into 
the stratosphere every one to four years could buy up to 20 years before major 
cutbacks in emissions would be required (Wigley, 2006). An important feature of 
increasing planetary albedo by injecting stratospheric aerosols is also that, in 
principle, it could be scaled up from a small reduction of radiative forcing up to a 
reduction of 3 W/m2 or more.  
 
Although the effect of the measure would be to reduce average radiative forcing, the 
real impacts are still fairly unknown. One aspect is that – like the impacts of 
increased greenhouse gas concentrations – also the impacts of ‘sulfur cooling’ are not 
equally distributed across the planet. Therefore, there will not be an exact 
compensation, on a local scale. But there clearly may be unwanted side effects, such 
as stratospheric ozone depletion, changes in precipitation rates (some studies indicate 
a reduction of precipitation in tropical countries (Matthews and Caldeira, 2007)) and 
sulphur deposition. These impacts could be worse than the climate change impacts 
that one aims to avoid. Also, if not combined with mitigation, ‘sulfur cooling’ will 
have to be applied continuously, in the future, in order to retain effectiveness. 
Stopping might lead to an unprecedented rapid increase in global temperature. 
Finally, it would not avoid other impacts associated with the increased greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere, such as ocean acidification, as a result of 
increasing levels of dissolved CO2 in the ocean. 
 
Based on the (unkown) risks and uncertainties that are involved in geoengineering, 
most authors consider this option at best an additional measure to mitigation action, 
in most cases ‘to buy a little more time’. In our experiments, however, for simplicity, 
we introduced the measure as a stand-alone case. We assumed an introduction in 
2030 and explored two targets for radiative forcing levels: 2 W/m2 and 3.5 W/m2. 
Aerosols are introduced in the stratosphere, in order to achieve these targets 
immediately. As greenhouse gas concentrations would increase, the amount of 
sulphur required, therefore, increases with time. 
 
4. Results for climate parameters 
Figure D.4 shows the radiative forcing pathway that coincides with the emission 
pathway and geoengineering strategies discussed, so far (Figure D.3 and Section 3). 
Concentrating first on the rapid mitigation response, Figure D.3 shows that 
emissions peak in 2030. Figure D.4 in contrast shows that radiative forcing continues 
to increase for about 10 years and only starts to significantly decline 15 to 20 years 
after the peak in emissions. From then on, radiative forcing declines at a steady rate, 
to reach a level of 2.9 W/m2 by the end of the century. The decline is partly a result 
of a decline in atmospheric CO2 concentration – and partly a result of the decline in 
forcing from other greenhouse gases, most notably CH4.  
 
The associated temperature profile is even a bit slower. With the assumed climate 
sensitivity, temperature increase is around 2 oC (above pre-industrial) by 2030. The 
mitigation scenario is able to limit further increase to 0.4 oC – reaching a temperature 
peak in 2060 (30 years after the emission peak). By the end of the century, 
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temperatures will be 2.3 oC above pre-industrial level. In other words, if emissions 
can be reduced at such a rate, it is possible to constrain further temperature increase 
to ‘only’ 0.3 oC after implementing the rapid reduction strategy – but, for a long time, 
temperature cannot be reduced. Even slower processes, such as sea level rise, would 
still continue to increase at a considerable rate.  
 
Earlier, Solomon et al. (2009) showed that any strategy that hopes for a rapid policy 
response is bound by the inertia of the climate system, both in terms of CO2 
concentrations and temperature. For CO2, slow CO2 uptake by the ocean implies 
that, even after a sudden reduction in emissions, a large part will remain in the 
atmosphere (after an early faster decline). Moreover, in terms of temperature, the 
slow heat uptake by the oceans also implies that global mean (atmospheric) 
temperature will not drop significantly on policy-relevant time scales. This indicates 
that, therefore, several climate impacts (such as dry season rainfall reduction in some 
regions and sea level rise) are virtually irreversible over the next millennium. This 
could even be compounded by irreversible changes, such as ice sheet collapse or CH4 
emissions from tundra. Our results, are bound by the same phenomena as the simple 
climate and carbon cycle models we used are calibrated against the larger models. 
Realising that our paper also captures socio-economic inertia, one might think the 
results look slightly more favourable. There are three reasons for this: 1) we 
concentrated only on the 21st century (which includes the first slightly more rapid 
response to declining emissions, 2) we also included non-greenhouse gases, in 
particular, methane that shows much more reversible dynamics, and 3) our CO2 
emissions, in the long run, were not only brought to zero – but to even less than 
zero. Still, the runs illustrate the limitations of any strategy that counts on delayed 
action followed by rapid reduction later.  
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Figure D.4. Radiative forcing, global mean temperature change, sea level rise and ocean acidity in 
the various scenarios. 
 
The two ‘radiative forcing’ stabilisation scenarios have clearly different results. The 
strategy that immediately freezes radiative forcing at the level of 2030 (3.6 W/m2), 
initially, in terms of temperature increase, has almost similar results as the emission 
reduction scenario (in other words, the 10 to 15 year increase in radiative forcing in 
the mitigation scenario has little impact). In the long run, this scenario in fact has 
worse results than the rapid mitigation scenario, as the continuous emission 
reductions in the latter case lead to a decreasing radiative forcing (and associated 
temperature), while the radiative forcing stabilisation in the former case implies a 
continuing temperature increase. 
 
The second radiative forcing case immediately reduces radiative forcing to only 2 
W/m2 (400 ppm CO2 eq, a level that the mitigation scenario may reach in the long 
run). This reduction is so dramatic that, according to MAGICC, it actually leads to an 
immediate response in temperature. Global mean temperature drops to around 1.5 
oC above pre-industrial level  in just 10 to 15 years31. After this – it remains more-or-
                                                          
31 Note that we implemented the strategy, for illustrationary purposes, rather rapidly, if a sudden drop 
in temperature would be considered dangerous by itself, introduction can also be more smoothly 
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less constant at this level. Sea level rise, in contrast, continues to increase over the 
whole scenario period – but at a reduced rate. 
 
It should be noted that the geoengineering variants do not prevent the increase in 
CO2 concentration – and thus neither prevent ocean acidity. We estimated ocean 
acidity using a direct relationship with the atmospheric CO2 concentration
32. The 
baseline scenario and both geoengineering variants show a decrease in ocean pH 
(increase of acidity) from 8.1 now to 7.8 by 2100 (and still declining afterwards). 
While the full ecological consequences of these changes in calcification are still 
uncertain, it appears likely that many calcifying species will be adversely affected. The 
drastic mitigation strategy does prevent most of the pH decrease. Obviously, if 
geoengineering is only introduced as a temporarily solution to support mitigation, the 
decrease in ocean pH can also be slowed down under scenarios with geoengineering. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that if geoengineering is implemented as an alternative to 
mitigation – as assumed in the scenarios implemented here – action will need to be 
continued forever. We illustrate that here by implementing a variant of the most 
extreme case (2 W/m2) in which ‘sulphur cooling’ is ceased by 2060 (Figure 2.5). The 
results are meant to be illustrative, but they show that this would result in extremely 
rapid climate change – as climate system would ‘suddenly’ see the radiative forcing 
consistent with the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration. This would lead to a 
return to the original baseline in just a few decades, but even more dramatically. to an 
extreme jump in temperature of more than 1 oC in just 5 years, between 2060 and 
2065. While the MAGICC model might not be calibrated to exactly represent these 
cases, the results do indicate the dramatic consequences of such a scenario. 
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Figure D.5. Radiative forcing, average global temperature increase, and rate of temperature increase 
in a situation in which the measures compensating GHG radiative forcing would be stopped 
                                                          
32 Results are only meant to be indicative. To simplify equations, we have assumed the upper ocean 
layers to be in equilibrium with atmospheric CO2. In time (century scale), mixing of different ocean 
layers will reduce the CO2 concentration in the upper ocean leading to a higher pH. We have used 
published numbers for atmospheric CO2 concentration and the pH of the upper ocean layer to derive 
the following relationship: pHocean = 10.498*[CO2]atm-0.0443 (Caldeira and Wickett, 2003; Orr et 
al., 2005; Raven, 2005). 
Alterra-Policy_implications_of_extreme_climate_change_scenarios[2].doc 164 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Implementing a dramatic rapid mitigation strategy globally, in 2030, that reduces 
greenhouse gas emissions by around 4%, per year, can effectively limit temperature 
increase to only a few tenths of a degree after the introduction of the policy. 
However, inertia in the climate system implies that a peak in temperature will only 
occur around 30 years after the introduction of the policy – and after 70 years, 
temperature will not yet have returned to the level of the year of introduction.  
 
A geoengineering strategy that is able to directly impact radiative forcing can lead to 
more rapid results, depending on the stringency with which the measure is 
introduced. A modest strategy to limit radiative forcing would not do much better 
than the rapid mitigation strategy. However, an extreme strategy that reduces 
radiative forcing back to a low level (here 2000 radiative forcing), at once, could have 
more immediate results. This does obviously also significantly increase the risks that 
are associated with such a strategy. Both the modest and stringent geoengineering 
strategies are not likely to offer an ultimate solution, as it would be necessary to 
continue activities indefinitely. Therefore, if implemented at all, they would more 
likely be combined with some form of mitigation strategy. 
 
The socio-economic and climate inertia that limit the effectiveness of a rapid 
response strategy can obviously be mitigated by an earlier reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
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